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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the origins and impact of fascist population
policy. The 'battle for the birthrate' inspired major social and
institutional reforms under the dictatorship. Yet the question of
why the regime should embark upon a pronatalist campaign remains
largely unexplored.
The study traces the origins of Mussolini's demographic campaign
to the eugenics movement, This thesis begins with an analysis of the
meaning of race in Italian scientific culture. A central concern is
to show how the debates of prewar science shaped the agenda set by
the fascist regime. The first part of this thesis is devoted to a
discussion of the theories of prominent eugenicists. Their arguments
provide the key to understanding the wider aims of the Duce's plans
for state intervention to boost the birthrate.
The thesis then proceeds to an examination of policy implemen-
tation. Welfare programmes stood at the centre of fascist population
policy. The regime sought to provide encouragements to Italians to
increase their reproductive output in the form of substantial health
reforms. The second part of the thesis explores the Institutional
development of the National Organisation f or the Protection of
Motherhood and Infancy. Created In 1925, ONMI established Italy's
first comprehensive national health service for women and children.
This section seeks to assess whether the regime built a viable and
efficient state apparatus for the mass organisation of welfare.
The third part of this thesis takes a closer look at public
provision. As a considerable part of ONMI's budget was spent on a
campaign to reduce levels of maternal abandonment, this section
explores the impact of illegitimacy policy. To assess more fully the
achievements of fascist welfare policy, the thesis attempts to
describe the continuities and changes in state administration of
social assistance from liberalism to fascism. One aim Is to uncover
the legacy of Church charity in a Catholic country with a rich
beneficent heritage. The transformation of pious institutions into a
system of public welfare proceeded very haphazardly in Italy. The
liberal state proved too timid a force for the unruly network of
private charities which proliferated throughout the kingdom. This
thesis will argue that fascism failed to consolidate this inheri-
tance into a tight and efficient system of social services. The
pattern of welfare development during the fascist period shows how
uneasy and uneven institutional growth remained even under a
centralising and inodernising dictatorship.
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7INTRODUCTION
The Ascension Day Speech of 26 May 1927 marked the foundation of
fascist dictatorship in Italy. In this parliamentary address,
Mussolini defined the objectives of his regime. The Duce promised to
"cure the race" of all its "symptoms of moral and physical decadence".
He proclaimed himself to be the nation's "physican" who had a
therapeutic mission to regenerate the race. Chief among his ambitions
stood the goal of population increase. Italy's "cribs lay empty", he
pronounced, "while the country's cemetaries grow full". He placed the
kingdom's vital statistics on a demographic battlefield with those of
his European neighbours. Forty million Italians compared unfavourably
with 90 million Germans and 200 million Sla ys. France loomed as a
mighty military power with a combined colonial and Indigeneous
population which numbered over 130 million people. And the British
ruled over a huge empire whose combined force of almost 500 million
inhabitants could be inobilised to defend the realm. 1 The sheer size of
the armies other nations could muster proved a disquieting thought for
a dictator with expansionist aims.
The Duce planned to increase the population to 60 million by the
year 1950. Mussolini had formerly believed in the doctrine of
overpopulation, espoused by Italian followers of Thomas Robert
Malthus. 2
 He explained to those assembled to celebrate the "birth" of
fascism in March 1919 that continued population increase would cause
misery and hunger because of the poverty of Italy's economic
endowments. 3
 As late as December 1924, Mussolini complained of the
nation's deficiencies of land and resources as a natural hindrance to
demographic increment. A poor country unable to feed and employ its
people, Italy could ill afford to sustain an annual increase of over
440,000 people, he asserted to the Senate.4
In his address on Ascension Day in 1927, Mussolini repudiated these
earlier statements. He now argued that a nation transformed by fascism
could comfortably accommodate at least ten million more citizens.
Rural development schemes would make Italy "unrecognisable in ten
years' time". Reclamation projects to clear cultivable soil and
agrarian reform to modernise the mezzadria would propel agricultural
output and lead to national self-sufficiency in food production. And a
future empire would absorb any excess population In colonial
8settlements. &
In his famous essay entitled Numbers as Force, which first appeared
in Gerarchia In September 1928, Mussolini continued his attacks on
"maithusianism". Contrary to the outmoded ideas of an Anglican
clergyman who wrote over a century ago, he argued, population
increment would not cause unemployment to rise or famine to ensue. In
his estimation, fewer workers spelled economic stagnation and
industrial decline. One of the most troubling weaknesses of the
Italian economy, chronic underconsumption, Mussolini claimed, was a
symptom of the failure of demographic expansion to keep pace with
economic progress. While the nation's factories reeled off goods at a
quickening rate, a sullen birthrate stunted the growth of a home
market. On the question of living standards, the Duce remarked that
Italy's 42 million people now lived better and longer in 1928 than the
country's 27 million residents had done back in 1871. By increasing
national wealth and manufacturing productivity, sustained population
growth, Mussolini affirmed confidently, would generate progressive
improvements in the health and welfare of all Italians.5
The Duce matched these optimistic appraisals of the impact of
population growth with a gloomy outlook on actual demographic trends.
Although still vigorous and virile, he warned, Italians showed
symptoms of demographic degeneration in a waning birthrate. The fall
of great civilisations in history, he commented, almost always
coincided with a nadir in natality. He described "population
prolificity" as a "political force" and envisaged an imminent
reproductive war between races which superior species were destined to
lose because of their reluctance to breed. While the white races of
the West seemed threatened with extinction, the yellow and coloured
races of Africa and the East propagated energetically. In the
foreseeable future, he averred, Inferior peoples would invade and
conquer Europe. Through intermixture with their bad blood, the white
race would grow weaker still and eventually die out.7
Steady decline in the birthrate caused a latent crisis which
fascism hoped to remedy in tempestive and aggressive state
interventions to increase fertility. The "first phase" of the regime's
demographic campaign, Mussolini explained in his Ascension Speech,
aimed to achieve a "massimo dl natalltà" and a "mlnlmo dl morta1ltà.B
The fascist government, he announced, would intensify the struggle
9against drugs, malaria, tuberculosis, alcoholism, cancer, suicide,
mental deficiency, vandalism, spitting, and all other maladies
afflicting the race. Along with progressive measures to improve race
hygiene, repressive enactments against the social contagion of
sterility promised to persuade Italians to become more prolific. The
celibacy tax on bachelors and future financial levies against
childless couples aimed to prohibit voluntary infecundity. The
protection of motherhood and Infancy by means of a welter of health
and welfare reforms figured as the institutional focus of the Nbattle
for the birthrate".9
With these pronouncements, Mussolini declared his commitment to
defend the "morality and health of the Italian stirp".'° A part of the
authoritarian plan to alter Italian fertility involved the
introduction beginning in 1928 of a series of laws favouring fathers
of large families with tax breaks, housing benefits, and employment
preference. 11 Mussolini's effort to make peace with the Catholic
Church by presenting fascism as a force seeking to revive religious
sentiment formed a vital component of his politica della famlgl.f a. The
Duce's firm stand on marriage, abortion, infanticide, prostitution,
contraception, pornography, and child abandonment paid court to the
values of a confessional nation. 12 When asked in an interview in 1932
whether the regime's politica demografica would actually succeed,
Mussolini responded: "I strongly believe that the laws fascism has
created to increase population will put a halt to demographic
decadence". He continued: "more than the formal legislation, the moral
precepts fascism embodies, and the religious virtues the regime
upholds, will convince the Italian people to mu1tiply".
These financial and moral Inducements, however, were a small facet
of a monumental social experiment. The regime made a serious attempt
to regulate reproduction by considerably enlarging the domain of state
activity. The frantic bid to boost the birthrate served as the motive
behind such disparate trends as government support for temperance,
censureship, emigration control, welfare and labour provision, public
security laws, enactments on sanitation, prisons, asylums and
hospitals, crime prevention, and reform of the penal and civil codes.
These and other institutional and legislative developments marked the
inauguration of public intervention In private life as a distinct form
of fascist governance.
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This thesis endeavours to explore the origins of fascist population
policy in the eugenics movement. The study begins in the last decades
of the nineteenth century when Italian anthropology first began to
formulate theories about race. A new generation of scientists mixed
evolutionary theory with the doctrine of atavism espoused by the
father of criminology, Cesare Lombroso.' 4
 They defined evolution as a
vertical progression from the lowest to the highest forms of life. The
long-skulled race of dark-complexioned Mediterraneans, in their
opinion, comprised a superior stirp gifted with a civilising mission
to conquer and colonise inferior types. The theories behind scientific
racism have seldom failed to discomfort historians.' 5
 But at this time
in Italian history, the most respected and distinguished members of
the academic establishment upheld a strong belief in racial hierarchy.
Catholic theologians engaged In a lively debate on the descent of man
from the apes.' 6 Even the most vehement opponents of evolutionism
could still find comfort in Italian eugenics' exaltation of the moral
and spiritual perfection of the Italian race. '7 And the Catholic
priest, Agostino Gemelli proposed a eugenic interpretation of the duty
of all Italians to reproduce and multiply the race which was
thoroughly compatible with Church dogma on birth control.'5
The threat of racial degeneration loomed large In the scientific
imagination as the challenge of a new century dawned. A backward
agriculture and infant industry now appeared as principal themes in
eugenic discussions about the country's prospects for continued
progress. The fears which gripped the scientific community reflected a
more general anxiety about the future of Italy in an era of increased
hostility and competition for commercial and imperial supremacy. A
belated nationhood finally achieved, the kingdom, nonetheless, seemed
economically unfit to engage in power politics on equal terms with
more advanced nations. At a time when Italian statesmen renewed their
search for world stature and international prestige, eugenicists
sought to develop strategies to prepare Italy for colonial expansion.
They came to see population increase as a solution to Italian
political and industrial Inferiority. Their pronatalist outlook
unearthed an ideology about the evolutionary degeneration of Italian
womanhood. Calls for the protection of motherhood reflected fears
about women's alleged advancement in public life and increasing sexual
freedom from childbirth. Eugenicists invoked the 'law of nature' in
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their defense of the biological function of women as reproducers and
the social primacy of their role as mothers. They depicted the
preservation of a natural inequality between the sexes as a
precondition for racial improvement. In an era when fertility began to
decline, moral and medical arguments focused on the themes of a
degradation of Italian femininity and a disease in the female
reproductive apparatus. Scientific Insight into sex difference sought
to give evidence of the racial Imperative of a restoration of
reproduction to its proper place as the centre of women's Identity,
sexuality, and experience.
In the postwar period, these themes coalesced in the tenets of
fascist population policy. Part two of this thesis examines the
implementation of the regime's programme for racial betterment. As
part of his pronatalist platform, Mussolini professed commitment to
the cause of public provision for women and children. Promulgated on
10 December 1925, the founding statutes of the National Organisat Ion
for the Protection of Motherhood and Infancy gave credence to this
claim. Guidelines for government support of gynaecological and
obstetric clinics, subsidised free meals, Infant day care centres,
financial benefits for child support, hardship allowance for the
needy, and a host of other schemes promised to improve the quality of
the Italian stirp.
According to the regime's spokesmen, the advent of fascism marked
the beginning of a welfare revolution in Italy.' 9 No previous prime
minister had delivered such a comprehensive package of public health
reforms. Fascist commentators used the purported creation of a stato
asslstenziale for social leverage both at home and abroad.° Official
press and propaganda reports highlighted how little liberalism had
cared f or the Italian people. The hesitant nature of liberal
government, these arguments repeated, had kept the financial and
institutional bases of relief private and charitable. Soon after his
accession to the premiership, the Duce had done what over seventy
years of liberal rule had failed to accomplish. The dictator had
transformed the loose and untidy structure of beneficenza into a
national system of social services.'
In his grand designs, Mussolini may have fulfilled the social
mission of nineteenth-century statecraft. A health service based on
universal right and free access replaced miserly and minimal
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government under liberalism. ONMI stood to fortify the power and
authority of the state by increasing the presence of fascism in daily
life under the dictatorship. The regime attempted to overcome the
structural weakness of the Italian state by centralising control of an
administration of public welfare which stretched from Rome to every
commune. But management of an unwieldy bureaucracy would prove no easy
task.
The wider questions which inform this thesis concern the impact of
fascism on Italian society. So central to Mussolini's modernising
ambitions, welfare development lends insight into the actual
achievements of the dictatorship. The study of the implementation of
the regime's large and sweeping reforms reveals that the
distinquishing features of fascist welfarism were begrudging state
funding, confused directives, short-sighted planning, and
mismanagement of resources. Whatever protection the state struggled to
provide must be set against the reality of hardship and poverty for
many working families under fascism. Even an efficient welfare system
would find the delivery of material rewards substantial enough to
Influence the birthrate a difficult undertaking. But the fascist
welfare state offered only lamentable Incentives for Italian women to
Increase their fertility.
This thesis addresses the problem of change and continuity from
liberalism to fascism. While most of the promises In ONMI's founding
statutes remained unfulfilled throughout the fascist period, the
organisatlon devoted a large share of its budget to a single campaign.
Slow in attempting to meet other social targets, particularly those
affecting married women workers, ONMI moved quickly to provide aid for
single mothers. The third part of the thesis attempts to uncover the
liberal precedents of fascist illegitimacy policy and to assess the
long-term obstacles to welfare-state building in Italy. Liberalism
failed In Its desultory efforts to reform charitable institutions. But
neither did fascism succeed In transforming a beneficent endowment of
foundling homes and maternal hospices Into a 'modern' system of state
provision.
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PART I.
EUGEN I CS
Nessuno, oggi, prende sul serb la faLigerata sedicente
legge di Maithus.. . . Falsa e iithecile è la tesi che la
minore popolazione significhi iiagglore benessere.
Benito Mussolini
1928
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The Italian Race
The Italian eugenics movement emerged in the aftermath of national
unification when industrialisation first began to transform society
and the economy. The anxieties shared by a new generation of inte-
llectuals grew out of this experience of rapid and unprecedented
change. To many contemporary observers Italy still lagged far behind
the world's advanced economies and showed no real promise of future
greatness. The failures of colonial policy also gave Impetus to new
worries about national Identity and destiny. Doubts about the
nation's prospects for survival In an age of imperialism assailed
Italian scientists at the turn of the century. In their search for
some reason to have faith in progress, they came to uphold a belief
in biological race.
This section of the thesis attempts to extend the study of the
origins of fascist ideology beyond its narrow recognition of
intellectual sources to a broad understanding of cultural
influences.' Darwinist debate did not die out In Italy by the 1870s,
as some scholars have contended. 2 Nor was the discovery of biological
race in the last decades of the nineteenth century an expression of
conventional nationalist sentiment, as others have maintained.2
Proponents of racial progress renounced the inherited patriotic
Ideals of the unification period as empty rhetoric from a bygone era.
They created new political myths in their desire to see a strong
Italy embark on the twentieth century. Eugenicists transformed Ita-
lian nationalism by giving the struggle for empire a lofty purpose
and a scientific Justification In evolutionary theory.
International Eugenics
In July 1912, Leonard Darwin and the English Eugenics Education
Society presided over the first international eugenics conference.
Hundreds of delegates from around the world attended the meeting. The
Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and the
American academic and former president of Harvard University, Charles
William Elliot both gave inaugural addresses. Alfred Ploetz,
president of the International Society for Race Hygiene, and Sir
William Osler, Regius Professor of Medicine at Oxford University,
Joined the list of distinquished speakers. The purpose of the week-
long gathering was to publicise the aims of the science and to
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encourage countries to form affiliations. The question of whether
social intervention, called "artificial selection" by eugenicists,
could actually effect desirable racial change dominated discussion.4
The conference confirmed the pre-eminence of English and American
scientists as leaders in the field. But the large Italian delegation
showed a desire to gain recognition from their foreign colleagues.
Some Italian eugenicists became members of the permanent standing
committee of the international movement and others helped to organise
the assembly's symposia. Professor Alfredo Niceforo, a statistician
at the University of Naples, served on the conference's central
planning committee, along with Professor Guiseppe Sergi, a founding
member of the Roman Anthropological Society. A renowned anthro-
pologist, Sergi enjoyed a wide reputation through English
translations of some of his major scholarly works.6
Other Italian academics chaired seminars devoted to the study of
particular eugenic problems. Only 28 years old in 1912, Corrado Gini
held a professorship in statistics at the University of Cagliari. In
his conference paper, Gin! expressed his belief that nascent social
sciences, like demography, could contribute as much as the natural
sciences had done to understanding the mechanisms of racial
evolution. Other Italian delegates included Sante de Sanctis, the
president of the Roman Anthropological Society and an eminent
psychiatrist by profession.6
Prof essor of neuro-pathology at the University of Genoa, Enrico
Morselli gave a paper on the importance of preserving and enhancing
racial variation and hierarchy. In their attempt to create perfect
human beings, he stated, eugenicists should not strive to abolish the
natural inequality between races and nations. 7 Roberto Michels,
presented ideas drawn from his major work, The Sociology of Political
Parties, which had just been published. He attempted to describe how
democracy was "unnatural" given the "iron law of oligarchy" which
gave some men an inborn ability to rule.6
Professor of political economy at the University of Turin, Achille
Loria addressed some of the issues raised by Francis Galton, the
English mathematician who established eugenics as a science in 1883.
Loria criticised the middle-class elitism of Galton's belief that
only the "elect" produced a superior progeny. Loria proposed that the
average proletariat possessed a far better Inheritance than
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the privileged and pampered men of "genius" Galton so admired.'°
The Italian eugenics movement comprised prominent intellectuals
from various disciplines who shared a belief in eugenics as a science
and a commitment to the cause of racial advancement. Eugenicists
thought they could discover the laws governing heredity and turn the
course of evolution in a desirable direction. They proclaimed
themselves the guardians of posterity, men of science with a moral
duty to apply their knowledge for the purpose of human betterment.
The arrogance of this vision found expression in their trust that
a scientific revolution approached, Enrico Morselli pronounced
eugenics a "new force of rebirth and salvation" promising to bring
Italy out of the dark age of uncertainty which had befallen in the
aftermath of unification.'' An astute observer of these events,
Agostino Gemelli recorded his impression that lombrosian ideas of
Incurable social ills had waned in Italy.' 2
 In the last decades of
the nineteenth century, Italian science left the laboratory and now
sought ways to change society.
'Euthanasia' and Defectives'
The 1912 convention raised important questions for Italian
scientists. They recognised the implications of eugenics' aim of
social control, and struggled to define their own position on the
individual's right to reproduce without interference from the state.
The inquiry grew out of the 'defectives' debate and the related
'euthanasia' question which radical eugenicists had urged their
colleagues to address at the international congress. While Italian
eugenics shared many of the assumptions of mendelism which dominated
discussions of heredity, they expressed an ambivalent attitude
towards the call for repressive legislation.'
A review of the convention appeared in the Corrier'e della Sera on
4 September 1912. Alessandro Clerici reported that Italian
eugenicists accepted the premise that defectives transmitted inferior
traits to their offspring. But he also noted that scientists in
Italy, unlike many of their colleagues abroad, rejected forms of
racial hygiene such as sterilisation.' 4
 Enrico Morselli addressed
these issues in an article which attempted to give Italian eugenics a
social agenda. Italian scientists adhered to a belief in a natural
variation among races. Purity of race stood out among the goals of
the science, as "blending with bad breeds" damaged the peculiar
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personality and physique of the more perfect latin type. Although he
accepted the scientific justification for the reproductive regulation
of defectives, he remained reluctant to expose Italian eugenics to
the risk of ridicule by publicising a radical programme.'6
In a book entitled Mercy-Killing: Euthanasia, Morselli explored
arguments both for and against the containment of social
contaminants. His definition of poor inheritance was rather vague.
Defectives comprised "all those anti-social elements who endanger the
racial constitution." He admitted "humanitarians may have a certain
repugnance for repressive laws on human reproduction" but affirmed
society's "absolute right to protect itself from the harm caused by
the undesirable and unfit." He discussed the relative merits of the
various proposals for racial hygiene put forth at the 1912
convention. These included exile or deportation, confinement,
sterilisation, marital prohibition and mass murder. Positive
measures for social selection comprised the creation of a female
reproductive caste, sex education in schools, health campaigns, and
legal ised polygamy for men. 16
Morselli also confronted the controversy about 'racial euthanasia'
which had arisen at the 1912 conference. He argued that if
eugenicists stood firmly behind the belief in the supremacy of white
races, they should also advocate the extermination of inferior races.
The conquest of new lands by Europeans Inevitably led to the question
of what should be done with indigeneous populations. He saw the
colonisation of New Zealand and Australia as two extreme examples of
conscious policies of racial decimation. Morselli did distinguish
Italian eugenics from foreign movements. The only practical way to
conserve the white race, he argued, was to prohibit mixing with
inferior black, yellow, and coloured peoples. Italy, he stressed, was
a Catholic nation with customs and traditions different from those of
Anglo-Saxon countries. While the Church would surely oppose any
artificial interference In reproduction, he wrote, the Italian people
would mount a strong opposition to radical policies. The Italian
route to racial perfection, he continued, would be more bland and
timid than that followed by foreigners.'7
Recognition of the social primacy of the Catholic Church compelled
Italian scientists to reject extreme views. Practical concerns also
Influenced their outlook. In an article appearing in an anthropo-
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logical journal in 1914, Guiseppe Sergi addressed the question of how
Italians could best arrive at racial perfection. Although he did not
voice any ethical objection to "negative" measures, he raised doubts
about the scientific evidence for belief in the possibility of
perfecting the physical components of racial stock. No definitive
proof yet existed, he maintained, about whether sterilisation would
actually improve racial patrimony. And, the costs of implementing any
largescale experiment far exceeded the capacity of the Italian state.
Sergi worried about the moral consequences of permitting only
"selective marriages", an idea first advanced by Francis Galton in
1865. Denial of sexual rights to the unfit, he believed, would
increase illegitimacy and lead to even greater burdens on society to
care for outcast offspring."
Guiseppe Sergi and Alfredo Niceforo convened a general meeting of
the Roman Anthropological Society on the 21 March 1913 to discuss the
role of eugenics in society. Sergi represented a moderate position by
arguing that eugenicists should pursue biological research on
speciation and avoid imprudent forays into social experimentation."
Speakers expressed different views about whether science could
improve the race, but members did approve a resolution calling for a
wide dissemination of eugenic ideas. Eager enthusiasts saw the
opportunity to carve out for themselves a prominent role in public
affairs outside the university. Niceforo believed government should
use scientific knowledge to plan social policy. The adoption of
eugenic alms in forward-looking legislation would enhance the power
of the state to create worthwhile citizens. Others agreed that
eugenics should aim to convince the Italian people of the need for
"political intervention" in private life to promote racial
improvement. 20
A gradual "education" and "persuasion" of the public became the
strategy of Italian science. Eugenicists saw their movement as a
forum for scholarly debate and as a progressive lobby in Italian
society. In December 1913, members of the Roman Anthropological
Society announced the creation of the Italian Committee for the Study
of Eugenics, and elected Guiseppe Sergi as their president. Sante de
Sanctis assumed the vice-presidency of the committee, and Gin! and
Niceforo joined others as appointed officials of the central
directorate. 2' By April 1914, the newly-formed society counted fifty-
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eight adherents.22
Eugenic movements outside of Italy focused on the question of
racial defilement and aimed to promote laws to 'cleanse' the race of
'poisons. 2a
 Italian eugenicists saw 'race hygiene' in the form of
fertility control as a 'Protestant' and 'Anglo-Saxon' invention. They
did not approve of 'asexualisation' as a desirable measure. On the
contrary, they came to depict Italian racial superiority in terms of
innate sexual prowess.
Eugenic ideas gained currency In a wide range of Italian
Intellectual and political circles. Carlo Francesco Ferraris argued
	 -
that any nation which did not criininalise contraception and abortion
was destined to become a weak and degenerate "eunuch" race. A former
socialist, Napoleone Colajanni wrote Latins and Anglo-Saxons:
Inferior and Superior Races in 1906, a work which fused marxist and
eugenic theory. Because of the obstacle of belated nationhood and
industrialisation, he asserted, the latin race could compete with
great powers only by accelerating the pace of economic change. 24
 The
prominent liberal politician, Francesco Nitti declared "latin
fecundity" an unrelenting civilising force which would Inspire the
rebirth of a second Roman empire. 26
 The revolutionary syndicalist,
Paolo Orano called condoms a tool of International capital and a
"bourgeois conspiracy" to keep the proletariat numerically impotent.
National survival, according to him, depended on whether future
generations would increase population and create colonies. 26
 The
founder of the Italian Nationalist Association, Enrico Corradini
borrowed biological metaphors to enhance his thesis of the
"proletarian nation". A young and virile nation, Italy was destined
to outlive bourgeois, decadent Europe and grow to be a new world
leader. 27
 The following sections attempt to explore how eugenic ideas
came to dominate prewar Italian culture.
National Degeneration
Italian eugenics grew out of a crisis of confidence in liberalism.
The impoverishment of liberal politics encouraged a scientific debate
on the future of the Italian nation. Pessimism amongst intellectuals
also derived from recognition of the legacy of belated nationhood in
a world Increasingly dominated by great powers. The nation's second-
rate status as the 'invalid' of Europe became the focus of early
eugenic writings.
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In an article published in 1899, Guiseppe Sergi discussed the
problem of national degerleration. 2e
 The work is important because its
theme points to new directions In scientific thinking. A former
student of Lombroso, Sergi used the concept of degeneration to launch
his criticisms of Italian politics and society.
	 Rather than depict
degeneration as an Individual's affliction, as Lombroso had done,
Sergi developed the idea into a theory of flawed national character.
His panoramic view of national history as a progression of stages
from Infancy to senescence reflected the Impact of evolutionary
theory. Biological and medical metaphors served to illuminate his
concept of the organic nation. This vision of society as a biological
organism subject to the laws of nature would have an enduring impact
on eugenics.
Sergi defined Italy as a "morbid" nation suffering the "crippling
malady of obsession with its Roman past as a great empire". A
pathetic reflection of its former self, Italy had become a "dead
civilisation" paralysed by the chronic "illness of frustrated
political prepotence", Unless new forces of change and progress
revitalised the Italian people, he war-ned, the nation threatened to
become extinct altogether. Sergi called for a "regeneration" to
awaken those national ambitions which colonial failures abroad and
political instability at home had destroyed.3°
Published in 1900, Sergi's The Decadence of Latin Nations further
developed the theme of degeneration. The evolutionary perspective
became more pronounced in this work, as Sergi described history as a
struggle between nations and the world as a natural hierarchy of
powers. He depicted Italy as a "sick" nation disabled by an Innate
inferiority complex. He blamed the governing classes for having
caused the "precocious decadence" which hindered his "infantile"
nation from regaining empire.'
Sergi argued that in the 1880s Italy had experienced its first
growing pains in "ridiculous" expeditions in Assab and Massowa, both
premature attempts to assert "national adulthood". The traumatic
disillusionments" suffered should have awakened Italy to the harsh
reality of its "natural inferiority amongst mature nations TM . The
military victory of Japan over China in 1894 and 1895 unsettled any
complacency about lasting European supremacy In global affairs. The
staggering defeat of the Italian army at Adawa In March 1895 by
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Ethiopian chieftains, Sergi stated, caused the collapse of Cripsi's
ineffectual government and put a humiliating end to Italy's ambitions
In East Africa. 32
 These symptoms of the decadence of the "latin race"
confirmed Italy's "impotence" in armed and economic combat against
superior powers. "Shamed and puny", Italy had consistently blundered
In colonial adventures, Sergi lamented, and repeated failures had
prematurely stunted his nation's imperial growth. Crispi had
"pathetically sought to snatch the bare bones discarded by the
French, the Germans, and, above all, the British".39
Sergi found the cause of national decline in Italy's political
leadership. Periodic parliamentary crises exposed the "latent
paralysis" of the entire edifice of governance. The constitutional
question, compromised premiership, and the consistent failure to
devise authoritative solutions to social and economic problems seemed
signs of the "Inherent political invalidism and cretinism" of the
nation's leaders. The congenital weaknesses of Italian nationhood had
become increasingly evident in the last decades of the nineteenth
century. Expensive and unprofitable colonial expeditions showed up
the deficiencies of Italy as a commercial and military power.34
Despite these obstacles, Sergi envisaged a future when a new Italy
would achieve the military and economic maturity requisite for
competition on equal terms. According to him, the Italian people
possessed one great asset which lay dormant in the corrupted national
character, a natural survival instinct. He believed a new generation
of political leaders should harness this energy to forge a truly
unified and powerful nation. To prepare for empire, Sergi believed,
the nation had to undergo first a social struggle for rebirth. He saw
the necessity for a "great civilising mission" within Italy's own
frontiers to make the masses fit enough to meet the challenge of a
new age. Only through "social expansionism" at home could Italy's
ambitions abroad be realised.9
The idea of national degeneration reflected the belief that
evolution could be regressive as well as progressive. This fear
exposed the underlying Insecurities of a generation who became
painfully aware of the frailties of the Italian nation-state. Despite
the gloomy nature of Sergi's reflections on the achievements of the
nineteenth century, a new nationalism surfaced, which appealed to
Italians to overcome their Inferiority.
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Scientific Iwperialisa
In a book entitled Italy: The Origins, which W8S first published
in 1895, Guiseppe Sergi introduced race into the discussion of his
nation's imperial destiny. He defined race as the biological, moral,
and psychological attributes of the Italian people. According to him,
race constituted the most important motive force in evolutionary
change. He portrayed the world as a natural order regulated by the
struggle for survival between superior species and their inferior
prey. Sergi defined the peculiar racial personality of the Italian
people as an outgrowth of their psychic urge to create empire. He
looked to this Instinctual drive as the answer to the question of
national survival in a hostile world. 36 The idea of Italy's
entitlement to the 'lost territories' of the Roman empire had long
been used to defend colonialist and irredentist aims. 37 But the
Sicilian anthropologist gave a new scientific Justification for the
old mare nostrum frustration over the closure of the Mediterranean to
Italian expansion.
Sergi argued that the Mediterranean was the birthplace of
civilisation and the Italian people the first civilised race. He
believed he could trace the origins of the race to a time over 30
thousand years before when the Italian stirp had first appeared as
indigeneous inhabitants of the peninsula. Descendents of these early
progenitors of pure latin stock founded the Roman civilisation in the
Iron Age. Bronze Age Invasion by marauding aryans from the East, he
explained, had penetrated only a small fraction of the northern
Italian mainland, leaving most latins an unadulturated breed. And in
the course of natural evolution, those lesser attributes of
indoeuropean migrants had become subsumed by the more perfect and
dominant characteristics of the Italic type. Italians possessed
unique racial assets which allowed them to achieve more and live
longer than other great Mediterranean civilisations. The evolution of
the Minoan and later Greek races remained arrested, so neither
civilisation developed into great empires. In contrast, the latin
race was driven by an "innate tendency towards imperialism", an
instinctual drive which continually renewed the blood and force of
the Roman people. This Immutable trait compelled Italians to be a
warrior and predatory race,
In this long and scholarly treatise on racial formation, Sergi
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aimed to show how imperialism, militarism, and capitalism, which
together comprised "civilisation" in his opinion, were irresistible
expressions of Italian racial temperament and destiny. To survive as
a race, Italians, he urged, must become a civilising people once
more. Because commerce arid colonies fostered the development of
industry and culture, iatiimust now seek to break beyond their
cramped frontiers and reconquer empire.39
The view of imperialism as a psychological necessity gained ground
during the Giolittian period when Italy launched a campaign to
recapture the 'granary of ancient Rome'. Contemporary observers
watched the upsurge of popular nationalism surrounding the 1911
Tripoli venture with fascination, According to Roberto Michels, the
outburst of euphoria over the African affair reflected a deep need of
the Italian people to bury their image as the "Cinderella of Europe"
in the past. Frustrated ambitions had nurtured an aggressive and
defensive drive in the Italian public for international influence and
prestige. Although the economic rewards from future commercial and
agricultural exploitation of Libya would be scant, he believed, the
fervour over the conquest had renewed a healthy national identity.
For the first time since the "holy wars of national liberation", the
Italian people felt pride in their nation's achievements.40
The inborn qualities scientists saw in the Italian race reflected
their own hopes for the future. The conquest of Libya promised to
regenerate the race's supreme qualities and instincts. But the age of
empire stirred new fears In the scientific Imagination as the threat
of racial irnmingling now loomed large in discussions of 'primitive'
types.
The Destiny of inferior Races
In a series of lectures he delivered at the University of Turin,
which were published in 1911, Enrico Morselli set out to predict the
evolutionary future of races and their sub-species. He wished to
demonstrate how inferior types would perish in the course of natural
selection because of arrested moral and physical development. Evolu-
tion, he believed, did hold out the promise of human perfection for
the white race, as continual adaptations would bring improvements to
an already highly-evolved form of life.41
An early convert to evolutionism, Morselli owed an Intellectual
debt to the doctrine of atavism. He based his theory of a disparate
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but determinate evolution of races on a belief in outward appearance
as a sign of hereditary endowment. Morselli described the white race
as an "elect species" because their physical attributes conformed to
his own standards of beauty. He praised the idealised forms of
classical "Roman" sculpture and saw these as embodiments of the
excellence at which white human beings would arrive. He envisaged a
"future utopia" in which the world was inhabited solely by perfect
human beings.42
The underside of this aesthetic Image of human perfectibility was
the representation of other races as ugly and sub-human. Their brain
development mysteriously retarded, primitive races were "protomorphs"
who had not yet acquired full human traits. Their bodies showed
anatomical traces of moral and physical Inferiority and even a morbid
predisposition to degeneration. Their eventual extinction, Morselli
believed, would be no great loss to humanity as these bestial and
ancestral types had contributed nothing to the dual advance of
evolution and civilisation.'3
Morselli categorised people who belonged to distinct ethnic,
national, and linguistic groups as sub-species within the three main
races. Within the white race, the latin stirp stood out as an
original and pure somatype. He admitted that science had yet to
discover the mechanisms governing transmission of racial attributes.
He relied on what he and other eugenicists called "germ-plasm" to
describe something latent in the evolutionary process which conserved
the latin stirp. Morselli did not express any doubt about the
characteristics which distinguished latins from Anglo-Saxons, another
main group of European descent. Like Sergi, he celebrated the
Mediterranean as a model of physical grace, moral strength, and
intellectual prowess.'4
But the Anglo-Saxons showed signs of cultural decline. Differences
in build and colour made them effete and infirm, while climate and
geography weakened their characters. They possessed an unhealthy
reverence for democracy and literature, grim reminders of their
nervous natures. They were a people who revelled in religious heresy,
worldly pleasures, and hedonistic pursuits. And they Indulged a
propensity towards homosexuality and libertinage, a sexual taint
which boded ill for their future reproductive fitness. While members
of the superior race did deviate from his Ideal, Morselli believed
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evolution held some hope for improvement of these defective
mutations.'6 But the degeneracy of lower races appeared irreversible
to the scientist.
Knowledge of the laws of evolution, Morselli explained, led him to
uphold a pessimistic prognosis of the survival chances of the
savages. He gave specific examples of sub-human species who were
destined to die out. These included the Australian Aborigines, a
hopelessly deformed and diseased variety in his estimation.
Descendents of early man who failed to evolve, the Aborigines
possessed marks of their primitive and stunted inheritance. That they
were pilous, short, and dark people served as proof enough for
Morselli of their ineludible elimination in the battle for human
perfection. And the brown-skinned Moans of remote New Zealand, he
claimed, showed the personality traits of an uncivilisable people.
The arrival of missionaries, Morselli argued, had failed to elevate
them from their semi-animal barbarism, for the Moans violently
resisted Christianity and other aspects of Western culture.46
Although their bodies had adapted remarkably well to harsh
environments, the intelligence and morality of black Africans
remained backward. Their atavism condemned black people to
extinction, Morselli stated, and made them a degenerate and dangerous
race. Contact with Europeans, he stressed, had brought out those
Injurious and latent tendencies, like alcoholism, vice, and crime
which whites controlled in themselves because of their civilised
natures. Blacks would perish in the struggle for racial hegemony
because their primitive Instinct gave them no strength of will to
resist temptation. They remained unregenerate even under the salutary
influence of civilised societies. The experience of Afro-Americans in
the United States confirmed Morselli's belief In an innate disorder
comxnmon to all inferior races which condemned them to decay. Black
Americans, he asserted, showed no indication that they would ever
rise above being the poorest, the unhealthiest, the most promiscuous,
and the least ambitious minority group in the nation,47
Guiseppe Sergi echoed many of the opinions expressed by Enrico
Morselli. According to him, savages ranked lower on the evolutionary
scale than the lowliest criminal degenerate found in white civilised
society. Completely amoral and uneducable, they weakened their racial
germ-plasm in frenzied and ritualised sex which exposed them to the
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risk of venereal disease.'9
 The idea of the degeneracy of other
races could be used to justify European colonial domination. The
worth to humanity of Inferior beings who were destined to die out
anyway seemed rather negligible to Sergi when set against the higher
civilising mission of the superior stirps.
Eugenics and Anti -Semi t ism
Eugenic works also focused on the Importance of the 'Jewish
question' to the future of Europe. A general in the Italian armed
forces, Livio Livi wrote a statistical study of the purity of the
Jewish race which was published in 1918. He asked whether all Jews
shared the same ethnic and anthropometric traits despite dispersal
in different countries. Although they had little in common in terms
of complexion, stature, proportions, and brain size, he argued, the
varieties of Jewish types were unimportant when common ancestry and
culture were considered. And those differences could not compare to
the huge divide separating Christians from Jews.
Livi believed that the Jewish race would remain homogeneous
despite superficial assimilation Into European nationalities. Enrico
Morselli expressed a more rancorous point of view. In his preface to
a translated work by the French eugenicist, Arturo Ruppin, entitled
The Jews of Today, Morselli argued that white Europeans had to
defend themselves from Jewish influence. He claimed that "Abraham's
stirp" had risen from the ghettoes of mediaeval Europe and
infiltrated the highest echelons of Italian society. Because of
their sly natures, Jews outwardly assimilated, he maintained, yet
remained true to their separatist and exclusive traditions. Though a
mixed and morbid race, the "semitic type" possessed facial and
cranial characteristics different from the fair-skinned, tall, and
elegant hellenic and latin stirps. The murder of Christ their
greatest contribution to the development of Western civilisatlon,
Jews represented to him a force within Europe which was "invading,
prosletising, and messianic".6°
Morselli defended zionist aspirations, but only because he hoped
that a future homeland would finally rid Europe of the Jewish
menace. He also expressed the wish that the Jews remaining In Europe
would simply perish through racial degeneration. The diaspora had
already weakened "hebrew stock", he argued; and declining birthrates
within Jewish communities everywhere in Europe were the most visible
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symptom of imminent extinction. Through intermarriage with superior
European blood, the Jews would cease to exist as the "elect
people".
Most Italian eugenic Ists did not perceive their views as
inflammatory. Some were even careful to point out a difference
between the scientific observation of truth and the expression of
political opinion.&2 They believed their theories of racial
degeneration to be free of any subjective bias. Yet, the attempt of
Italian scientists to prove that 'inferior' races were destined to
perish reveals intriguing ambivalences. Their view of nature as a
struggle for racial superiority and dominance rests on a deep
antipathy and antagonism f or the 'other'. They constructed a
positive identity for themselves as Italians, but their image was
very aggressive. And they represented non-lat ins as types embruted
by an inferior racial inheritance. Yet they remained reluctant to
condone any 'artifical' interference to accelerate the regressive
evolution of degenerate races. The Italian scientific imagination
chose instead to wish these races away by assigning them a brief and
uninspiring part in the evolutionary history of humanity.
Racial Fertility and Blending
Another anxiety began to dominate eugenics as scientists
confronted the issue of European patterns of fertility. Declining
birthrates everywhere in Europe, but especially those evidenced in
France, stimulated discussion about whether the white race was fit
enough to build and maintain empires.
In April 1911, Corrado Gini gave a lecture in Trieste which
became the basis for his book, Demographic Factors in the Evolution
of Nations, which was published the following year. This work began
with the question of why such a noble and gifted race as the Italian
should face extinction when inferior races were reproducing with
vigour. Italians suffered an exhaustion of reproductive power
characteristic of a great but aged race. Young and virile races like
the Sla ys and Asians, he argued, showed a healthier survival
instinct. Their growing populations provided manpower for huge
armies capable of conquering new territories.
Corrado Gini attributed a biological cause to the decrease in
Italian fertility. According to his theory of demographic
degeneration, innate fecundity progressively deteriorated as the
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racial constitution aged. Evolution brought physiological changes to
the racial metabolism which exhausted reproductive energy and
resulted In low fertility and inferior progeny. The quantity and
quality of offspring produced varied from one generation to the next
because of the reduced bodily strength and stamina of the race. A
race passed through four evolutionary stages from youth, maturity,
senescence, to decline, each characterised by a successive
diminishment of racial sex vigour. In his view, Individuals and
families, as well as races and nations, followed this predestined
cycle of birth and decay.64
The theory of an organic predisposition towards sexual impotence
revealed inconsistencies of argument. Gini variously referred to the
demographic crisis confronting the white race as latent or acute. He
contradicted himself too about whether the Italian population was
growing or dying. And he did not address the question of why
humanity had not perished long ago if, according to his own
depiction, generative powers irreversibly deteriorated. Despite the
weaknesses of a prose style ridden with dichotomies, Gini's broader
vision of a biological time-clock threatening the Italian race with
extinction proved a powerful myth. His reputation made both in Italy
and abroad, Gini could consider himself after 1912 the most
celebrated eugenicist of his generation.
But Gini also harboured a darker scientific Interest in the
question of racial contamination through interbreeding. Because he
saw fertility as a symptom of racial health, he grew uneasy about
the higher reproductive output of inferior races. Many of the
primitive races he so deplored, like the Mexicans of Central America
and the Bantu of South and Central Africa seemed much more fit in
reproductive terms than his own sadly senile race. 86 And these were
bastard races who, in his view, were far less sound than pure breeds
like the Italian. He rejected outright the notion that intermixture
could produce hybrid strains who were more resistent to environ-
mental and biological pressures and possibly even more prolific. And
he did not consider the Idea that the influx of new blood from a
younger race could regenerate an old one. 88 In his Demographic
Factors in the Evolution of Nations, he began to develop an argument
against racial blending. He expressed a strong belief that the
European race was the best the human species had yet produced and
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must be protected from blood pollution by races of little worth.
Not until the postwar period, however, did Gini begin a personal
crusade within the International eugenics movement for the defense
of white Europe from foreign blood contagion. In August 1919, GIni
wrote to Leonard Darwin requesting that he put forth a resolution
before the English Eugenics Education Society calling for scientific
investigation into the pernicious effects of race mixture between
blacks and whites. Gini also maintained that it was now an opportune
moment for all member societies to begin lobbying their governments
for legislation to prohibit interracial marriages and sexual
congress. The global conflict, he believed, had put the question of
contact between Europeans and inferior African and mixed races at
the forefront of eugenic debate.57
Though Darwin brought the motion before the board of the English
society on several occasions, the proposal to put pressure on
government to promulgate restrictive race laws met with a cool
reception. Immigration controls to limit the rights of colonial
populations to reside in the United Kingdom were welcome, but
encroachments on the private freedoms of Englishmen abroad were
quite unthinkable, In a letter to Gini which he wrote on 7 May 1920,
Darwin responded by saying that the English society found the
suggestion of mounting such a campaign "impolitic". In any event, he
continued, such an extreme measure would have little chance of
success given existing democratic conditions in the country. The
president of the English society felt eugenicists should undertake a
"gradual" approach by cultivating public awareness of questions of
racial survival.55
Official government investigations into the size of the Jewish
and immigrant population on native soil confirmed that Italy
remained far more ethnically homogeneous than the great colonial
powers, England and France. 59
 Decades of heavy emigration abroad
might have stirred worries about racial dilution, but this was not
an Issue for Corrado Gini. Rather, the assumption behind his fear of
race poison was that Italy would Indeed become a large empire and as
such would have to develop an imperial policy towards indigeneous
populations.
Rebuffed by Leonard Darwin, Gini used other Institutional
affiliations to launch his attack on racial poisons. Formally
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established in Paris In July 1928, the International Union for the
Scientific Investigation of Population Problems grew out of the
efforts of British organisers of the World Population Congress held
in Geneva in September 1927. Gini was elected to the central
directorship of the Union in 1927, which comprised an Initial
membership of 27 nations.'0
 He presided over the International
Congress for Studies on Population, held In Rome in September 1931
under the auspices of the Italian Commitee for the Study of
Population Problems. The committee leadership included prominent
eugenicists like the Catholic priest, Agostino Gemelli and the
endocrinologist, Nicola Pende. Along with Mussolini, Luigi
Federzoni, President of the Senate, Aifredo Rocco, Minister of
Justice, and Gulseppe Bottai, Minister of Corporations, were In
attendance as honourary delegates.'1
Corrado Gint used the opportunity of an Inaugural speech to
address the question of primitive races. Especially proud of the
research of his committe on the fecundity of Italians, Gini reported
that he would conduct expeditions abroad to study the reproductive
habits of inferior populations. He wished to provide statistical
evidence of the lethal side effects of crossbreeding for superior
races. He believed that intermixture weakened the racial germ-plasm
and resulted in less reproductive hybrids.' 2
 At the Second Interna-
tional Congress of Eugenics, held in New York In 1932, GIni gave a
paper on the evolutionary unification of the diverse Italian
anthropological types into a pure and superior race. Preservation of
the special attributes of Italians, he believed, depended on whether
government would prohibit pollution from bad blood.'3
Corrado Gini received generous funding for his projects from the
International Union for the Scientific Investigation of Population
Problems. But the general secretariat under Sir William Beveridge at
the London School of Economics and Captain George H. L. F. Pitt-
Rivers in Paris grew increasingly suspicious about Gini's political
motivation and scientific method. The Union declared that research
into racial sterility and fertility could not be undertaken without
consideration of the effects of food supply and nutrition on the
body. At a plenary assembly in October 1932, the executive committee
decided to oust the Italian delegation from the Union.'4
Despite this setback, Corrado Gini did not dismantle his
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committee or halt research. He now sent expeditions abroad through
the Royal Italian Geographic Society and gained Italian government
backing for an imperial Commission on the Demography of Primitive
Races. In 1933, Gini published the results of medical research
conducted on over one thousand native families In the Libyan colony.
Other major projects in the following years included a study of why
the Berbers of North Africa possessed European racial features like
blond hair and blue eyes. Though noble in build and less uncivilised
than black Africans, the hamitic race, his published results
confirmed, had not mixed with European blood.
Eugenics and Fascism
By the end of the nineteenth century, the idea of the 'nation' no
longer inspired allegiance amongst those who beheld a unified Italy
which failed to live up to their ideals. Italian intellectuals
discarded the inherited culture of the risorgimento, and searched
for new maxims and exhortations. The inborn and eternal qualities
they assigned to the 'race' reflected their own conception of what
Italy could become in the future. Eugenicists welcomed the advent of
fascism and found a government amenable to their cause. The regime
lavished public appointments on some scientists, like Corrado Gini,
and prestigious new professorships in the eugenic sciences and state
funding for research projects on others. Eugenicists proudly took
their place as the experts and planners of a fascist Italy. Through
national press coverage, catchwords like 'race' and 'degeneration'
passed into common currency. By the end of the 1920s, the language
of fascist politics became virtually indistinguishable from that of
eugenics.
Old debates did not fade away in the postwar period. The issue of
sterilisatlon re-emerged at a eugenics convention In Milan in
September 1924 when Corrado Gini gave an address which distanced
Italian eugenics from an hereditarian position. Race hygienists, he
stated, made inflated claims based on zoological and botanical
research, while human beings were different from lower species.
Italian eugenics, he asserted, wholly rejected the aim of either
voluntary or compulsory sterilisation. Instead, the movement in
Italy firmly supported the efforts of the fascist government to
achieve "gradual improvements in the quality of the race" by means
of "modifications in the social environment M .	 At a conference on
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mental hygiene in Rome in 1929, German psychiatrists caused a furore
by defending sterilisation on scientific and moral grounds, an event
which the national press reported.7
A papal enclycical on 31 December 1930 condemned the Anglican
Church's condonation of birth control at the recent Lambeth
Conference. A subsequent decree issued by the office of the Holy See
on 21 March 1931 denounced eugenics as a false science, and
criticised the fascist regime's population policy. Pope Pius XII
drew a clear distinction between propagation as a Christian precept
and propagation as a political duty.
Together with other prominent eugenicists, Father Agostino
Gemelli, a founder and rector of the Catholic University of the
Sacred Heart in Milan, and an experimental psychologist, addressed
these issues at a convention of Catholic physicians in April 1931.
Geinelli stressed in his speech that the Church opposed measures to
impede fecundation. Italian science, he affirmed, also respected the
sacred right of all Individuals to reproduce and rejected any form
of "sexual amputation" as a violation of natural and divine law. He
also expressed his belief in the common social vision of fascism,
eugenics, and Catholicism. The Church showed charity towards the
sick and infirm, and so too did fascism have a humane and ethical
purpose. The regime, he believed, aimed to use science to cure
defectives and guarantee all Italians better lives. And in its
policies on birth control, fascism elevated the moral standards of
Italian society and defended Christian values. The "fascist state",
he concluded, was a "moral state" because its social legislation
conformed to Catholic teaching on the family.69
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Population and Progress
This chapter seeks to address the paradoxical nature of Italian
population policy. That a developing capitalist nation which had long
exported excess labour abroad and exploited cheap labour at home
should chose to boost the birthrate seems somewhat baffling. Some
scholars have seen the demographic campaign as confirmation of the
incoherence of fascist planning. The launch of pronatalist schemes
appears to be a reckless strategy in a poor country already suffering
from chronic overpopulation.' And others have argued that the 'battle
for the birthrate' marked a significant departure from fascism's
original objective of economic modernlsatlon.2
Prewar science lends Insight into the peculiar logic behind the
dictatorship's fecundity drive. Another characteristic which
distinguished Italian eugenics from foreign movements, the problem of
economic development figured prominently In discussions of racial
advancement. Engaging in a lively debate on Thomas Robert Malthus'
doctrine of overpopulation, eugenicists in Italy came to believe
demographic growth accelerated the rate of agricultural and industrial
expansion. They issued powerful arguments advocating population
increase as a solution to Italy's plight as an Inferior capitalist
nation. Their views exerted a profound Influence on the aspirations of
Italian fascism for a prolific and productive nation.
Agriculture and Subsistence
Rapid industrial growth In Italy after 1880 coincided with agricul-
tural crisis. Depression hit cereal producers after 1873 as prices
began to decline on the world market. The Depretis government's policy
of tariffs on wheat imports in 1887 protected the home market from
foreign incursion. But state Intervention failed to rectify the long-
term problem of the uneven development of Italian agriculture. While
propertied wheat producers benefited from state support, the Italian
peasantry carried the full brunt of bolstering commercially
invertebrate agriculture.
In the aftermath of protection, food prices rose, as did rural
taxation, unemployment and flight. The depletion of cultivable land,
the deterioration of sharecropping and smallholdlng, and the emergence
of a landless peasantry threw the Italian countryside into crisls.*
Pronounced regional variation In industrial expansion accentuated the
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agrarian problem. Concentrated In the northern mainland, Industry did
not absorb the nation's large reserve of displaced rural labour.
Increasing emigration from the South in the last decades of the
century confirmed the failure of protectionism to encourage steady
economic growth In backward regions.&
As a consequence of agricultural depression, coupled with the
problem of a growing urban population to feed, the question of
subsistence dominated economics at this time. Translated into Italian
in the late 1860s, Malthus' 1803 editIon of An Essay on the Principle
of Population failed to capture much attention until two decades
later. The widespread hunger and want which characterised the lives of
many Italians In the newly unified nation perhaps awakened a belated
interest in the pessimistic prophecies of an earlier English reformer.
Maithus had set out to study the factors which "impeded the progress
of mankind towards happ1nessi.s He found the primary causes of human
misery In unrestrained population growth and inalterable productive
constraints. Italian theorists challenged this view by arguing that
the means of production in a modern economy progressively increased to
accommodate rising social demand for goods and food.
The most outspoken of Malthus' critics and a prominent socialist
economist, Achille Loria rejected the principle of overpopulation and
devised an alternative proriatalist theory. Loria began his attack by
pointing out that many of Malthus' predictions had proven wrong. Far
from being a prolific age of incessant demographic increment, Loria
believed, the nineteenth century had brought modest population growth
due primarily to the achievement of prolonged life. And the pressure
of excess population In rural Italy, he maintained, caused crisis
because existent economic arrangements in the countryside benefited
only the rich and landed, In his first major work on this subject, The
Lar,' of Population and the Social System, which was published In 1882,
Loria argued that "reproductive power" did not remain constant as
Malthus had erroneously posited. 7 To dispute Malthus' premise of the
"uncontrolled nature of man's passionshie, Lorla gave an analysis of
population change which drew heavily from evolutionary and biological
theories. He postulated that "carnal instinct", his version of
Malthus' concept of the Instinctual urge to procreate, actually
decreased in individuals as civilisatlon advanced.9
Although a socialist who was primarily concerned with the problem
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of raising living standards for the poor, Lone agreed with other
eugenicists on the issue of fertility control. He saw population as
the most important factor in economic and social progress and wrote:
"nations which artificially limit their fecundity arrive at bestial
corruptions". Degeneration of carnal instinct served "to kill the
family ideal, to shake the foundation of civilisation, and to destroy
the sentiment of social duty". A European, in his opinion, represented
"a social capital at least ten times superior to that of an
Oriental". 10
To defend his pronatalist position, Lone challenged Maithus'
notion of natural limits to the means of subsistence. Maithus had
believed that population increased in a geometrical ratio and doubled
every 25 years. The means of subsistence, in contrast, grew along a
slower arithmetical progression in Maithus' estimation. The increments
of agricultural production did not keep pace with those of population
growth, so food supply, even under favourable conditions, would
Inevitably fail to meet rising demographic demand, Malthus identified
these two differing rates as an immutable natural law which led to a
conflict between population and subsistence. 1 ' Lone claimed that
Maithus' mathematical calculations were no longer valid in an era
characterised by great progress and innovation.
Advanced by improvements in cultivation, Italian agriculture, Lone
believed, would comfortably accommodate the needs of a thriving
population. Although he did not specify by what margin he wanted the
Italian population to boom, he envisaged a sharp and sustained
Increase in the rate of growth. He also articulated a plan for a
prodigious expansion of agricultural output and efficiency. A rural
policy aimed at augmenting the productivity of the land without
sacrificing the fertility of the soil, he stated, would encourage
agricultural production to arrive at near-exponential growth. By
distributing rural property and wealth more evenly, he believed,
agrarian reforms would raise levels of internal consumption, increase
national self-sufficiency in food production, and free Italian
agriculture from export dependency. In his view, these changes would
lay the necessary foundation for industrial progress and national
prosperity too. Far from bringing misery, as Maithus had contended,
excess population contributed to economic development by enlarging the
rural and manufacturing labour force. Under optimum conditions, both
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demographic and economic growth maintained a buoyant and healthy
equilibrium. 12
In his book entitled, Maithus, which was published in 1911, Lorla
described his Ideal of a healthy population system. Loria pronounced
Malthus' advocacy of moral restraint to be typical of a "repressed
clergyman and frigid Englishman". He found the Idea of sexual
abstention both repugnant and unnatural. A so-called prudent measure
to check constant population growth, celibacy before marriage, he
charged, encouraged prostitution and illegitimacy. And he thought neo-
inaithusians who stood in favour of contraception were morally
corrupted and misguided about the economy. In the place of Malthus'
outmoded law of population, Lone substituted another based on his
equation of carnal instinct with capitalist instinct. Biological needs
and urges, he believed, governed economic relations. Sexual depni-
vatiori led to the atrophy of the race's energy and enthusiasm for
enterprise and work, and weakened the drive to create a strong and
competitive economy. Population growth stimulated capitalist
accumulation and expansion by putting pressure on people to Increase
wealth and productivity. But a vital precondition for demographic
growth, Italian agriculture, Lone argued, had to be thoroughly
modernised. He proposed that land ownership and tenure arrangements be
made more equitable and fair, arable land be extended through public
reclamation and irrigation projects, and Improvements in yield be
introduced through widespread use of machinery and chemicals.13
The renowned economist, Augusto Mortara echoed this appeal for a
long-term agricultural policy. He saw the seeds of civil war in a
rural Italy wracked by poverty, Mortara warned that widespread peasant
discontent and land hunger led to the growth of socialist organi-
sations in the formerly passive countryside. Because of emigration,
large territories in Calabnia, Sardinia, Apulia, and elsewhere, had
become depopulated and barren. He too wished to see Italian
agriculture contribute to the Industrial expansion of an integrated
and balanced national economy. And like Lone, Mortara criticised the
logic of Maithus' arguments in favour of birth limitation. He believed
Italy could sustain a substantial rise in population so long as an
increase in agricultural productivity accompained this growth.'4
In his volume, The Duties of the Landed Estate and the Social
Question, which was re-issued with an introduction by Lonia in 1912,
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Mortara took an 1815 volume by Maithus on the same subject as a point
of departure for an investigation into differences in methods of
cultivation and rural incomes. The landed class had become parasitic
and unpatriotic in their drive to realise profit at a cost to the
nation's chief natural endowment, the land. They deforested woodland
and depleted the soil with no thought for the future. Mortara argued
that Italian propertied elites should recognise their social respon-
sibility by reversing the trend towards the progressive impoverishment
of the land by means of sound investments in new technique and
equipment to upstay soil fertility.15
A chronic hindrance to economic development, the mezzadria, he
argued, encouraged landlord mismanagement, Indolent cultivation, and
peasant impoverishment. This mainstay of Italian agriculture must be
reformed through new contract agreements to increase the subsistence
levels of sharecropping families and to improve the productivity of
poderl. He called for a revival of the countryside through the spread
of small ownership into cleared waste and wet land. The extension of
tillage by means of reclamation works, together with re-settlement
schemes to create a stable and large propertied peasantry, he
believed, would provide Italy with the requisites for a healthy rural
economy. Only with this vital precondition met through radical
revision of systems of land ownership and tenure could Italy hope to
become a powerful industrial nation.'
Italian economists saw backward agriculture as a disadvantage to an
industrialising nation. In confronting this problem, they came to
extol the virtues of peasant proprietorship and improved sharecropping
as forms of farming which encouraged fertility. Whereas casual and
salaried workers with no Investment in the land guarded family size,
smallholders and tenant farmers placed a premium on expanding the
labour power of the household economy. In their idealised versions of
the Italian countryside, they harked back to the goals of earlier
agrarian reformers before them. 17
But they did not believe that Italy should remain a thoroughly
rustic nation. Their ruralism placed a pronounced emphasis on laying
the preparatory framework for a balanced and even development of
industrial capitalism through agricultural niodernisation. They may
have chosen to ignore the compelling evidence which emigration
afforded of intense demographic pressures in deprived rural areas.
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Part of the cycle of poverty and scarcity which afflicted agricultural
regions, high infant mortality belied the myth of a robust peasantry.
They neglected to consider the possibility too that a small country
like Italy possessed finite resources. Limits to the amount of
reclamable land and to the ability of labour-Intensive cultivation to
lift agriculture well above subsistence may have been seen as
confirmation of Maithus' theory of productive constraints. But Italian
economists strove instead to present an alternative vision of a fecund
Italy. According to them, a revived and abundant agriculture would
nourish a populous Italy and generate economic expansion.
The Sterility of the Middle Class
Widening differentials In class marital fertility became a major
theme in eugenic writings. In the nineteenth century, the professional
middle class and the nobility kept child output low mostly through
late marriage. By the 1880s official statistics seemed to suggest that
Italian elites had recourse to birth control. 19 Under early
Industrialism, the traditional structure of rural households remained
intact as average family size in underdeveloped regions decreased only
slightly during this period. And the urban working class still
reproduced much like their rural counterparts, though the fertility
pattern for city dwellers began to shift towards fewer children and
longer intervals between birth.19
Distinct regional differences in birthrate became marked for the
first time after 1910, when the Industrialised North experienced a
heavy fall in fertility. The declining birthrate affected agricultural
regions only slightly; Apulia, Calabria, and Basilicata still showed
remarkably high levels of fertility. Varying rates of urban and rural
fertility emerged as one consequence of Industrialisation. The
populations of cities grew rapidly in the period 1880 to 1915 but
mainly because of migration from the countryside.2°
Italy's drop In natality was neither urgent nor precipitate.
Compared to the reproductive performance of other Europeans, Italians
still propagated at an exceptional rate. A peculiar distinction of
Italy in this period of general European fertility decline, the
kingdom produced a sizable excess of annual births over deaths, one
index of a population's prospects for replenishment. 21 Yet, after a
century of demographic growth, the coincidence of this sudden downturn
with industrialisation caused distress. Eugenicists believed a
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dwindling away of the country's supply of future workers made the
economy most vulnerable precisely at the moment of industrial take-
off. They anticipated Italy would follow the path of more advanced
nations like England and France, which had long since renounced a
lively birthrate as a precondition for population growth. 22 The birth
and death rates of these countries came too perilously close to parity
for Italian observers to contemplate that Italy might not share their
fate as moribund races.
Italian eugenicicists began to develop theories about the causes of
differences in class fertility. Achille Loria upturned Galton's theory
of the biological superiority of the upper orders. He detected the
signs of advanced moral degeneracy in members of the middle class.
Italian elites, he believed, were a parasitic bunch of liars and
swindlers who lived off the sweated earnings of others. Inherited
wealth and privilege though corrupted the character and constitution
of family strains and progressively weakened their fertility. Loria
depicted the middle class as the Italian race's true repository of
injurious inheritance. In contrast, he saw the working-class
achievement of higher fecundity as an Index of better reproductive
fitness in a darwinian sense. Though they were innately Ill-suited to
command wealth and influence, the Inferior orders, he argued, had a
"pronounced aptitude for procreation". Eugenics, he urged, must strive
to preserve proletarian sexual energy for the sake of racial
survival. 23
Alfredo Niceforo did not share Loria's enthusiasm over the
reproductive proficiency of the proletariat. In his paper at the 1912
conference, Niceforo claimed to have discovered a natural order
determining class structure. The arrested evolutionary development of
some individuals predisposed them to assume their allotted place
amongst the poor. In his opinion, the working class suffered from
moral and physical cretinism, an Inheritable trait which they passed
on to their children. Anthropometric data confirmed to him that the
lower orders displayed advanced symptoms of this degenerative
disorder. Their smaller cranial circumference and stunted yet stocky
stature made for a physical apparatus thoroughly unable to endure
mental fatigue but perfectly adapted to do rough manual labour. The
inborn inferiority of the poor accounted for striking class
disparities in rates of Illness and death. Though sickly, working-
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class people showed a greater propensity towards sexual precocity and
promiscuity than individuals with a far worthier inheritance. The bad
breeding and low hereditary endowment of the labouring classes,
Niceforo warned, threatened to defoul the race.24
Vilfredo Pareto, the sociologist, described differing class
fertility as a cause of political degeneration. The fecundity of the
proletariat, together with the sterility of the ruling class, he
believed, led to greater "social circulation". As members of the lower
orders moved upward to replenish the higher orders, those aspirants
left behind grew jealous and resentful. This mechanism of social
replacement revived a weary population system, but also led to
conflict as the losers of the struggle of natural selection organised
and rebelled. The numerical preponderance of the masses became equated
in Pareto's mind with their potential political might as a
revolutionary force. And the greater fertility of the working class
seemed to him evidence of the eventual extinction of Italian elites
and society's natural tendency towards ever more popular forms of
democracy. 26
The arguments of Pareto and Niceforo were minority opinions within
Italian eugenics. Scientists in Italy transformed the class dimension
of English eugenics by focusing their ambitions f or the future on the
proletariat. Precisely because they stood lower down on the evolution-
ary scale, the inferior orders, eugenicists thought, were uniquely
adapted to become reproducers of the race.
Proletarian Prolificity and National Productivity
In his first major publication, the 1912 Demographic Factors in the
Evolution of Nations, Gini outlined his position on the hereditary
contribution of the working class to the race. He made a direct
reference to Pareto's concept of social circulation when he stated
that proletarian fertility led to the rinsanguamento of a lethargic
population. 2 The progressive weakening of sex drive, he believed,
affected the working class less than it did the upper class who had
advanced farther along the evolutionary parabola. Contesting Maithus'
theory of the constancy of procreative urge, Gini maintained that a
population's sexual powers and biological vitality varied according to
class. The "generative instinct to reproduce the race" had become
exhausted in the superior orders because they were "aged" and
"senile". Challenging Maithus' belief that the lower orders should
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practice family limitation27 , Gini argued:
"Artificially stimulating reproduction in the higher classes, and
checking that of the lower classes, would be equivalent to trying to
improve society by prolonging the life of the old and infirm and
preventing new generations from taking their place."2
The task of Italian eugenics, he believed, was to encourage the young
and virile proletariat to propagate even more earnestly.
Gini viewed a population system as a sophisticated biological
organism, subject to Irrevocable laws of natural evolution, According
to his theory of demographic metabolism, high reproductive output
correlated positively with a range of desirable racial traits like
longevity and resistance to disease. Gini attributed the cause of a
number of symptoms of degeneration, such as predisposition to
alcoholism, syphillis, tuberculosis, stillbirth, miscarriage, sickness
and early death, to diminished sex vigour. 29
 Prolific people with an
abundance of sexual energy, he argued, were a superior breed with
strong bodies and sound nervous systems. The connection made between
reproductive fitness and physical health explains why the fascist
regime later argued that the implementation of a pronatalist policy
would result in reduced mortality and morbidity in Italy.
Gini posited that an individual's "generative instinct" determined
all body functions. When vital powers deteriorated, so too did the
entire physical chemistry of the organism begin to degenerate. The
upper classes, he argued, had lost their sexual appetite and as a
result had become infecund. The production of a ready and plentiful
supply of sperm and ova was Gini's measure of sexual potency. He
defined sterility as a syndrome characterised not only by Inability to
reproduce but also by a tendency to produce defective or inferior
gametes. Upper-class progeny carried the taint of demographic
exhaustion in their poor constitutions and physiques. The underlying
reproductive disorder caused them to be less robust and healthy than
the offspring of their sexually voracious social 1nferiors.°
The middle class led sedentary and intellectual lives, he asserted,
because of spent sexual stamina. They enjoyed less frequent and less
energetic sexual intercourse than the working class. Thoroughly
evolved and civilised, the upper class nonetheless paid a big price
for their refinement in a loss of sexual desire and reproductive
fitness. Gini described characteristics of their urbane and
cosmopolitan lifestyles as further evidence of their impotency. Their
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pronounced proclivity to marry late, limit family size, and spend
income on leisure accelerated the biological mechanisms for fertility
decline. And personality disorders like social ambition, career
success, and individual fulfillment were other symptoms of the sexual
malady afflicting Italian elites.31
In his 1912 work and throughout his career, Gin! associated sexual
potency with bodily energy, specifically the ability to do rigorous
manual labour. He defined an aggressive sex drive as a healthy sign of
an Industrious, disciplined, arid efficient worker. Challenging the
emphasis on machines in marxist interpretations of economic progress,
Gin! asserted that the individual was the most important agent in
production. Stature, pigmentation, stamina, and musculature had their
part to play as factors Influencing levels of output. But the innate
fecundity of a body type was the crucial variable, Hyperfecundity
caused a worker to be highly resistant to fatigue.32
A self-professed biological materialist, Gint equated "proletarian
prolificity" with "national productivity". 33 Like classical
economists, he recognised the importance of labour supply as a primary
factor In commodity production and capital accumulation. He divided
society into productive and non-productive spheres of economic
activity. As mental workers, the bourgeosie, he argued, inhabited a
world divorced from production and contributed little to increasing
national wealth. As manual workers, the proletariat engaged in
productive labour by creating commodities. He believed that the rate
of economic development increased In direct proportion to the quantity
of society's producers.34
In his book The Amount and Composition of the Wealth of Nations,
which was published in 1914, and which earned him more international
acclaim, Gini argued that demographic degeneration caused economic
regression. He described Italy's economy as a "diseased and dying
body" desperately in need of new blood. Only an increased supply of
productive labour, Gini diagnosed, could resuscitate Italy's lifeless
industry and agriculture. He plunged into a grim reverie about the
future and gave an account of his apocalyptic vision of economic
reversion to a lower stage of development. Should the birthrate
continue to drop, he warned, the nation's economic destiny looked
bleak. Capitalist modes of production would deteriorate rapidly,
commerce and finance would crumple, sparse and scattered agrarian
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communities would arise, and the economy would degenerate to a
primitive state characterised by barter, forage, and pillage. A nation
deprived of many indigeneous resources, Italy had to replenish its
store of "human capital", he argued, in order to compensate for
financial and natural deficiencies. 38 Augusto Mortara shared Gini's
concern that continued "depopulation' spelled impending economic doom.
In a book published in 1914, Mortara expressed his nagging fear that
population decline would make his haunting "nightmare" of Italy's
economic decay come true. 	 No more than "numbers" as Mussolini would
later echo, the prolific proletariat had become to these men of
science the raw material needed to fuel economic progress.
Population and the Wealth and Power of Nations
Italian eugenics promoted the belief that population growth would
increase the wealth and power of the nation. From a military point of
view, Corrado Gini argued, Italy could Ill afford to tolerate
birthrate decline. The United States enjoyed the geographic advantage
of distance from potential European rivals, as well as a strong
economy and thriving population. British naval supremacy stood
unchallenged. And the great power's isolation as an Island nation
reduced the risks of foreign invasion. A huge empire, Russia kept its
population continually mobilised in a large army which protected
frontiers. Deprived of these assets, Italy possessed no natural
defense against territorial threat. Vulnerable to attack as a
continental power with Inland and seaboard borders, Italy had to
increase the numerical strength of its armed forces in order to ensure
national security.
Demographic growth, Gini asserted, also reduced threats to law and
order. The power of the state to control population movement grew as a
direct consequence of increased density, he believed. Brigands,
subversives and criminals alike would have little chance of survival
If the police and army could seek out and destroy the internal enemy
more effectively.	 In addition to his consideration of questions of
military and policing prowess, Gini disagreed with optimistic
appraisals of the economic and social effects of the decreased
birthrate. He challenged those "malthusians" who saw population
decrement as a precondition for higher incomes and living standards,
improved consumption, and general improvements in health and welfare.
When the race's "reproductivity" degenerated, he contested, capital
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accumulation and Investment, credit and currency exchange, commerce
and trade, and property values also declined. In his Demographic
Factors in the Evolution of Nations, he wrote:
If a population remains stationary or declines.., then national wealth,
expressed in the supply of money, will decrease; property values and
the land market, dependent on the number of households and social
demand, will decline rapidly.... The entire process of accumulation
will cease...
Demographic downturn depressed market forces, led to economic
stagnation and subsequent decline. Arrested development of the housing
and land markets somehow accounted for Italy's bad industrial
performance and kept the economy backward and uncompetitive. Gini
defined the stimulus to commodity production and increased consumption
In a peculiar way. He dismissed the relevance of fluctuations In wage
and employment levels to production and consumption. The sheer size
and number of households rather than the amount of disposable income
of families determined demand for manufactured goods.
Not trained as an economist, Gini may have failed to capture the
complexity of the problem of economic development. Despite this
weakness, his argument rested on a clear assumption. He stated quite
unequivocally that "the most powerful stimulus to capital accumulation
Is the reproductive Instinct". Without the Incentive which the drive
to reproduce the race provided, capitalists had no desire to "con-
stantly realise profit to Increase the wealth of the family patrimony
and the security of future generations".40
The size of working families had a direct impact on national levels
of labour productivity. Labourers in industry and agriculture with no
family or few children, he argued, lacked the motivation needed to
endure long hours and bad pay. Prolific fathers made the most
"productive, deferential, and obedient workers" because they faced the
difficult task of maintaining a large brood of dependents. Poverty was
an "effective inducement" for workers to take on extra shifts and
supplementary Jobs in order to ensure family survival. Childless and
single workers, on the other hand, showed a destructive propensity to
indulge in "selfish and unpatriotic agitation and strikes to get
better contracts and conditions". Low wages and Job Insecurity too
favourably affected rates of output and efficiency by increasing
competition and rivalry In the labour market. The "scarcity of
labour", he believed, impeded the beneficial process of "rigorous
selection of the most fit and disciplined labourers". When population
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shrank, employers were forced to hire "the most deficient and unruly
elements from the working class at an grossly inflated price".41
The link between reproduction and production formed the basis of
Gini's theory of demographic degeneration. The simple conflation of
sex drive and the work ethic provided a powerful argument for those
who wished to see Italy become a strong Industrial nation. But whether
Italy could halt the progressive impoverishment of the race's "gener-
ative" and "capitalist" instincts remained unanswered.
The Eugenic Programme for Racial Defense
Neither Gini nor other eugenicists ever answered the essential
question posed by eugenics. Whether social change could bring about
biological improvement seemed an intractable problem to them all.
Although Gini accepted that "habitat and education effected racial
adaptations", he reluctantly admitted he did not understand the
mechanism. Despite the predicament of science's rudimentary knowledge
of evolution and Inheritance, Gini did not hesitate to define a
eugenic programme geared at "stimulating proletarian sexuality". He
advocated "eugenic Interventions" aimed at creating a social
environment suitable for "maximum natallty".42
In his Demographic Factors in the Evolution of Nations, Gini
offered a range of eugenic remedies prefiguring the fecundity drive he
helped to mount under fascism. The entire state apparatus, the
bureaucracy, civil administration, the judiciary, the police, and
public institutions for welfare and education must be mobilised, he
maintained, in a campaign for racial survival. Along with "negative"
eugenic measures against celibacy, the state should provide "positive"
incentives for Italians to increase fertility in the form of financial
benefits for large families. But purely economic encouragements, like
those contemplated in France, he stressed, could not possibly alter
the race's genetic disposition to diminished sex vigour.43
The tempo of modern life under industrial capitalism had undercut
sexual prowess, in his opinion, by destroying "family sentiment". He
fretted over rising expectations of affluence as a symptom of a cul-
tural decline which made Italians selfish and hedonistic. Indivi-
dualism and materialism augured ill for the future of the family. A
discrete malaise Infected the whole national community as the
traditional values and the moral stamp of Italians disappeared. New
role models for citizen behaviour were needed, he held, to invoke the
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Italian people to join the struggle for racial survival. The govern-
ment should launch a patriotic crusade to create civic unity and
solidarity in the face of this imminent danger to the race. "Tempes-
tive reforms for racial defence" were needed, he believed, to
inculcate the belief that "procreation was the supreme political duty
of Italians".44
Gini believed that a broad pronatalist policy would succeed in
engineering "radical mutations" in the collective psychology nd the
reproductive habits of the Italian citizenry. The impact of reforms
and propaganda, he affirmed, would be felt in the space of one
generation alone. The battle for the birthrate though had to be fought
on many fronts. And to win the struggle, government had to rely on
both consent and coercion to mobilise the masses. Stimulants to
propagation, such as fiscal benefits, and punitive measures, such as a
celibacy tax, promised to provide persuasive motifs for Italian sexual
comportment.
Italian eugenics seemed singularly determined to discover ways to
manipulate the masses in a desirable evolutionary direction. Roberto
Michels argued in 1918 that industrial capitalism had magnified the
difficulty of effective governance by "increasing pressures from
below" and "raising expectations of happiness and wellbeing". He
thought consent would become harder to achieve in a complex, indivi-
dualistic, and fast society. By focusing narrowly on economic issues,
socialism, he argued, had proved itself incapable of inspired
political leadership in a postwar Italy. Government, he warned, would
have to organise the values and lifestyles of citizens in order to
maintain power. He saw the adoption of a policy for "social
penetration" as the only way forward for the modern state.4
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The Degeneration of Italian Motherhood
The war brought new themes to the forefront of eugenic debate.
Scientists looked with some concern at the profound changes to Italian
society which wartime inobilisation had wrought. Food shortages and
economic hardship after 1916 put public health on the agenda, while
disturbing demographic trends renewed interest in racial degenera-
tion. 1
 Eugenicists formulated plans for social intervention to
increase the birthrate. Their commitment to the cause of welfare
reform reflected the underlying belief that public health betterment
would revive the race. New patterns of family size and female
fertility placed women at the centre of their programme for postwar
social reconstruction.
The Health and Welfare of the Race
Soon to become Italy's first professor of comparative racial
demography, Franco Savorgnan studied the negative impact of the war on
the nation's population. In a book published in 1918, the statistician
blamed high female employment in traditionally male armaments and
heavy industries for weakening Italy's progeny. After 1915, the rate
of stillbirths rose dramatically as a consequence, he concluded, of
the Influx of women into factory employment. The work of mothers
outside the home decreased the vigour of the Italian stlrp; and
changing standards of women's appropriate place forced unnatural
cultural adaptations in the female species. Like many of his
colleagues, Savorgnan voiced his fears that the Italian woman of the
near future would deplore the necessity of childbearing and abhor the
constraints of marriage. In his opinion, maternal instinct had already
begun to degenerate, rendering many women "desexed", "unfeminine",
"unreproductive", and "unfit" f or motherhood. Bad rearing and little
nurturance accounted for the poor quality of wartime infants.2
Another "diseugenic" Influence on racial health, age distribution
within the general population had shifted enormously during the war
when strong young men were in such short supply. Because women had
been left at the homefront with older, less virile men whose offspring
were prone to physical degeneration, rates of sexual invalidism were
destined to rise in the postwar period, Savorgnan believed. Infant
mortality for under-one-year-olds peaked In 1918 but did not reach
higher prewar levels despite food scarcity. Savorgnan commented on
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increased birth weights amongst newborns, which he attributed to the
longer intervals between pregnancy characterising new patterns of
female fertility. Although this trend may have offset some of the
worse effects of race degeneracy, the war generation, he affirmed,
still suffered from diminished robustness due to disruptions to family
life. Especially worrying to him, the evolutionary advancement of
womanhood through increased opportunities beyond the domestic sphere
seemed to beckon a new generation of Italian women to fill the ranks
of the nation's reproductive degenerates. He saw decreased commitment
to motherhood and marriage as the biggest obstacle to postwar social
order. 3
Dismay over the future of the family compelled eugenicists like
Savorgnan to morally censure the much publicised figure of the new
woman worker. Others agreed that women's employment outside the home
was thoroughly Inicompatible with motherhood. Women who earned their
own income became "egotistical", lost their "feminine virtues of self-
denial and nurturance", and, most frightening of all, "learned to
practice birth control". A "sexual revolution" causing women to gain
increased control over reproduction seemed to threaten the race with
extinction.' In postwar Italy, many observers felt that the "relations
between the sexes" had to be restored to a "natural inequality" as a
precondition for population growth.&
Added to the threat posed by the loss of women's procreative
instinct, other health hazards endangered the race. Giorgio Mortara
expressed great dissatisfaction with the nation's wartime reproduc-
tive output. He believed the social climate and conditions of
mobilisation had put the Italian population on an irregular and
perhaps Irreversible evolutionary course towards decreased growth and
vitality. Hunger and riots in the cities, military discipline on the
shopfloor, food requisitions, labour shortages in the countryside,
rising inflation, and lowered living standards had all "weakened the
social organism" and "arrested racial development". Further damaging
the race's prospects, public institutions of health and welfare had
proven to be too incompetent to prevent epidemic and malnutrition.
Levels of tuberculosis amongst children soared in 1917 as a result
of poor quality control and distribution within the livestock and milk
industries. In the summer of 1918, an outbreak of influenza caused the
death of over 600,000 people, Mortara recounted. Recurring episodes of
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typhoid, cholera, and meningitis weakened racial germ-plasm and
imperilled future generations. Along with these debilitating diseases,
malaria rose above prewar levels and re-emerged as a major killer. The
deathrate of children between the ages of five and ten years increased
dramatically because of a resurgence and extension of child labour in
industry and agriculture. The establishment of military zones and the
mass movement of soldiers had increased the spread of sexual
contagions despite the coinmercialisation of prophylactics by war
authorities. Men rejected for armed service on grounds of ill-health
and handicap had propagated throughout the war. All this evidence
provided Mortara with compelling proof of the enormous health problems
the postwar generation would face.7
But the worse symptom of all, the birthrate dropped perilously low
during the war. The Italian people seemed Intent on committing
collective suicide. Infected by a "social pathogen", the race indulged
a pronounced predilection for "the pernicious habit of birth control".
To Mortara, the price of armed conflict seemed to be a "fateful
regression in sexual morality". Although marriages and births picked
up some momentum between 1919 and 1920, they failed to reach prewar
levels. And mobilisation had caused illegitimacy and abandonment to
rise. After the armistice, this upsurge continued. Mortara attributed
the cause of these demographic trends to "sexual modernism". What he
called "the sentiment of antinatalism" seemed to be growing in the
Italian people. As if that were not bad enough, Italians appeared to
him to have become immoral and promiscuous as a result of the social
transformations of war.
During the war years, the proportion of abandoned infants grew
from just under forty to well over seventy percent of all illegi-
timates. An increase in casual sex amongst the unrestrained youth of
Italy accounted for the rise in parental desertion, Mortara believed.
In the prewar era, he maintained, "irregular unions" tended to be
stable despite the contribution which emigration and rural flight made
to the illegitimate birthrate. But the wartime absence of male heads
of households, soldiers' deaths and disappearance, and largescale
urban migration completely fragmented family and community networks of
social control. The presence of troops on the homefront increased
opportunities f or sexual commerce and favoured the "proliferation of
occasional illicit coupling."
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And demobilisation accelerated processes of social and sexual flux
and instability. Along with the rapid formation of new families after
the cessation of hostilities, numerous other couples openly lived
together outside of marriage. Mortara saw a particularly troubling
source of nonmarital cohabitation in the large ranks of young war
widows. Because they lost entitlement to their husbands' pension upon
remarriage, these women had a material incentive to stay outside the
confines of acceptable middle-class morality. In 1920, sexual order
completely collapsed, he believed, as illegitimacy rates shot upwards
even in rural regions. Because traditional foreign outlets closed to
Italian emigration, demobilised men flooded the countryside and caused
an upheaval of "immorality". The rise in "extra-legal copulation"
shattered his image of rural Italy as a last refuge from the rollic-
king lifestyles of the metropolis. The new morality which emerged from
wartime drudgery and deprivation had infected the young who, Mortara
believed, now indulged in sex as a recreational activity. The
staggered return of love-starved men from the front, he asserted,
prolonged the cycle of sexual euphoria gripping the Italian peninsula
and islands.'°
Achille Lone shared Mortara's concern over the physical and moral
decay of the Italian race. In a book published In 1921, the economist
described the social and economic costs of Italian belligerence. He
elaborated on Mortara's scenario of rampant sexual profligacy, disre-
spect f or traditional values, and the impatient pursuit of pleasure,
which supposedly characterised postwar youth, A "sex mania", he
declared, threatened to consume the energy of the race in barren and
wasteful pastime. The young seemed to have cultivated an unhealthy
disdain for work and family. He saw the seeds of a frightening "social
and economic involution" in these signs of race degeneration. The
economy devastated arid productive forces depleted, he stated, Italy
could not afford to tolerate the wave of youth rebellion. Loria called
for a policy of racial defense to fortify the social fabric and to
prepare the young for their role as the nation's labour force. A
revival of those time-worn attributes of the Italian race, morality
and health, he believed, would ensure Italy's future prosperity.''
The Science of Fecundability
Preoccupations about declining health and morality engendered
debate about sexual differentiation. In the prewar era, Enrico
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Morselli had bemoaned the fact that the Italian woman of the future
would have smaller breasts and slimmer thighs as her body adapted to
evolutionary changes in society. 12 In his study of the sexual order,
which was published in 1914, Roberto Michels elaborated on Lombroso's
theory of the moral inferiority of women.
Michels depicted women as N lower animals" who had to be restrained
within the confines of marriage because of their moral infirmity. He
believed in a "natural male instinct" which drove all men to be
aggressive and promiscuous. Women, on the other hand, played the game
of "erotic coquetry" in order to entice suitors. Feminine nature, he
argued, dictated that women invite pursuit from men, feign modesty,
and finally submit to sex. To support this contention, Michels
investigated what he called "seduction". He asserted that "feminine
resistance to manifestations of male sexual desire" were "an empty
form" and that a "violated woman" was "always an accessory to her
defilement". He disputed whether rape existed given women's confused
and impaired psychology. Legal enquiries in rape cases routinely
showed the "girl to be a consenting party in most cases". And, he
continued: "the successful consummation of rape... goes far to justify
the belief that she set no very high price upon what she lost".
Michels concluded with strong words about the "legal and social
subjugation of women" as a natural consequence of female inferiority
and as a desirable means to protect "feminine virtues and honour" from
predatory males. 13
In the postwar era, Italian eugenicists incorporated attitudes
about the moral necessity of sexual differentiation Into evolutionary
biology. In 1916, Nicola Pende, eugenics' first influential medical
thinker, became preoccupied by what he defined as a rising rate of
"female reproductive disorders". Modern women, he believed, lacked a
"maternal instinct" and had become "infecund" as a result. To conserve
the race, Pende advocated that women undergo a rigorous "education"
from an early age in order to make them more "feminine" and
"motherly". 14 In 1923, Pende, a professor of pathology at the
University of Ban, claimed he had discovered a new science which he
named biotypology. Pende's principal concern was to demonstrate that a
connection existed between physical type and human behaviour. Viewing
the body as a total system, subject to the laws of evolution, he
wanted to prove that disfunct ion in any one part set the whole
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biological and mental organism awry. lB
Reworking darwinian notions of reproductive fitness, Pende believed
that muscular, skeletal, and metabolic differences between men and
women determined their separate but complementary sex roles. He viewed
the human organism as a quadrilateral pyramid with each side repre-
senting the various constituents of evolutionary inheritance. The four
elements of biopsychological make-up comprised body shape, the neuro-
chemical system, affective traits, and intelligence. These components
of constitution and personality, he believed, followed the dictates of
"orthogenests" whereby they evolved in determinate directions through
environmental and social pressures. While the whole function of the
human organism was fertility maintenance, evolution could proceed in a
"pathological" way, thereby forcing biological and psychological
adaptations which rendered the body "deviant" or "sterile". The aims
of his science were to correct these evolutionary mistakes and to
insure that the race ceased to produce infertile variants.
Pende classified constitutional variants and their sub-categories,
and attributed specific behavioural patterns to each body type. 17 A
large number of Italian men, he reckoned, were sexually defective, and
most of these unfit males belonged to the "hypogenital" variety who
exhibited physical characteristics of their deviance. Hypogenitalism
predisposed the body to eunuchoidism because of deficiencies of
internal humoral secretions which caused impaired sexual development.
Their penises small and sperm scant, these men were unsound in
reproductive terms. Because they lacked a "strong heterosexual
physique and temperament", hypogenital men were especially prone to
become homosexuals. An "unnatural" psychological symptom of this
disorder, these "pseudo-hermaphroditic" men acted more like women and
children and were less aggressive than "normal" men.
For his views on the determinants of masculinity, Pende owed an
intellectual debt to the French neurologist, Charles-Edouard Brown-
Sequard, who first defined the aims of endocrinology In 1891, and
whose work was translated into Italian in 1894. Concerned with
discovering ways to increase "potency", the French scientist believed
internal testicular secretions to be the cause of the "most noble
attributes in man". A diminishment of sperm production because of old-
age or infirmity, he recorded in his clinical notes, caused men to
become "less intelligent, honest, ambitious, and courageous than real
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men".' 9 In the last decades of his life, Brown-Sequard devoted himself
to the problem of "rejuvenation". At the age of 74, he began to inject
himself with "seminal extract", a compound made from the ground-up
testicles of dogs and guinea-pigs, in order to increase his body's
" nervous force". After repeated Injections of the serum, Brown-Sequard
observed an increase in the distance he could propel a jet of urine.
The scientist also believed the fluid could be sold commercially as a
cure for constipation and senility, as well as a remedy to improve
sexual performance and virility.20
Italian zoology in the 1920s focused almost exclusively on the
study of sex difference. Scientists attempted to correlate fecundity
with the "outward manifestations of manhood" in frogs, roosters, and
pigeons, and they drew human analogies from their observation of lower
animal behaviour. Brown-Sequard's influence could be felt in clinical
trials on frogs who were castrated and then given the testicular
extract. This research seemed to confirm that frogs had a "healthy and
highly masculine libido even when made sterile", because they
apparently became very aroused and aggressive once injected with the
serum. 2' Alessandro Chigi, the director of a poultry-breeding
institute in Rovigo, imported three male wild roosters from Java and
let them loose amongst his fowl. He reported that the Javanese breed
possessed far more pronounced male character traits than ordinary
domestic cocks. They "dominated the hens, separated them from their
legitimate husbands, and forced them to copulate". The foreign birds
also took more mates on average than the Italian variety. The
experiment, however, supported his conviction that interbreeding
caused damage as few of the hybrid offspring proved to be fecund. On
the strength of these results, Chigi presented a paper arguing in
favour of the sexual segregation of the races to preserve Italian
fecundity.
Although Italian scientists had not yet isolated or extracted male
or female sex hormones, they attempted to define what was normal
sexuality. 2a
 Pende based his views on femininity on a belief that
women's personality and physiology derived from a balance of genital,
thyreoid, and pituitary gland secretions. When functioning properly,
the female organism evolved into a perfect body type characterised by
fatty deposits, little muscle, round shoulders, large breasts, and
heavy thighs. Civilised women, Peride believed, more frequently pos-
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sessed disproportionately broad hips than did women from primitive
races.
Asthenic women, however, were slender and masculine in shape due to
an overactivity of thyreoid secretions. They were distinguished by
specific hypogenital attributes such as small, upright breasts, a flat
stomach, boyish thighs, and a slight moustache, and these symptoms
Indicated the biological sterility of the organism. Hypogenital women
were socially deviant too. These types of female behaved like men
because they could be sexually aggressive, selfish, and ambitious.
Their tendency towards sexual degeneracy was evidenced In genital
malfunctioning. "Inverted females", these impaired women experienced
primary sexual pleasure from clitoral stimulation rather than
penetration. Because they possessed "hyper-evolved vulvae" and "under-
developed uteruses", they frequently showed a sexual preference for
members of their own sex. Pende also attributed a volatile personality
and a low Intelligence to the physical condition of "heterosexual
deformity".
Another biotype, "the hypopitultary constitution", comprised men
and women who showed specific psychological and physical "stigmata"
associated with sexual immaturity and Intellectual precocity. Pende
described the hypopituitary male as a flabby, effeminate, and slothful
somatotype who suffered from a pronounced underdevelopment of the
primary sexual organs, a lack of libido, and recurrent and sometimes
chronic impotence. Because of their Inadequacies, these men possessed
depressive natures and often turned to mental pursuits to compensate
for sexual deficiencies. Intellectuals and radicals, these men were
emotional and irritable, critical and disruptive of social order.
Hypopltuitary women deviated from Pende's norm by presenting masculine
physical and mental traits. Abnormal development in this type of woman
evidenced itself too in an asexual temperament and infertile
constitution. The most striking attribute of the hypopituitary female
was their unusual propensity towards intellectual endeavour and
rational thought, which Pende considered to be absent in normal
women.
Deficiencies in testicular and ovarian function caused "hypo-
thyreoid" men and women to be more imaginative than normal people.
Excitable and tense, these types were prone to a childish disposition
because of lack of mammary and penis development, body hair, and
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libido. Other biotypes comprised the "hyperpitultary woman" who
exhibited male characteristics like muscular tone and physical
strength. Her extreme upper-body development disturbed her ovarian
balance and rendered the system "unreproductive. The "infantile
female", a cross between the pure hypothyreoid and hypopituitary
types, possessed an overly developed heart and aorta which caused her
to be submissive and self-denying. And the brains of "hyperadult"
woman showed congenital abnormalities and lesions which inclined her
towards forms of behaviour more typical of a man, such as decisiveness
and authoritativeness. 26
According to Pende, the "normal" male was ostentatiously virile and
manly. This biologically superior type was extremely fertile, evi-
denced by the precocious size of his genitals, a strong sex drive, and
the abundance and potency of seminal fluid. "Hypergenital" man's
perfect mate was the "hyperovarian" woman, who produced more ova than
the average female. Though some hyperovarian women had an "active
libido", determined by an "exaggerated sensitivity of the secondary
sexual organs, the breasts and vulva", most possessed a more modest
"feminine" nature reflecting their "hyperfecundity". This type of
woman bore the physical signs of her primary mission to reproduce the
race. The "prematernal woman" was slim and narrow in her lower body,
but these were temporary masculine traits. As she grew into full
womanhood, and "after a long exercise of her biological and social
function of bearing and rearing offspring", the "normal" woman evolved
into a "mature maternal type". Her hips and breasts enlarged, the
maternal biotype exhibited the "stigmata of motherhood". A "repro-
ductive apparatus fully adapted to nourish and defend the fruit of her
womb", hyperovarian woman was Pende's ideal of femininity.27
Appointed to a directorship of a biotypology clinic at the Univer-
sity of Rome in 1925, Nicola Peride began to conduct biometric research
on women patients. Based on measurements of body proportions and
investigations of reproductive histories, Pende reported that 62
percent of all Italian women were hyperovarian. Less than half that
number of British and German women could be deemed hyperfecund, Pende
asserted proudly. And most Italian men, he observed, enjoyed a pro-
nounced hypergenital disposition. More fertile and sexual because of
their superior constitutions, Italians, he believed, produced a
greater number of gametes and a better quality sex-cell than any other
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race.
Biological Politics
The discoveries of biotypology perfectly encapsulated the concerns
and values of the fascist regime. Studies of the biological and social
determinants of fertility proliferated throughout the period. Eugeni-
cists eagerly correlated eye colour, physical attractiveness, stature,
obesity, length of the nose, time spent at the toilet, and a number of
other factors, with pychosexual development. 	 One study showed that
dress was a "demographic variable" which directly influenced the
birthrate. Elegant and well-groomed women, Carlalberto Grillenzoni
argued, possessed a pronounced "ant imaternal nature" and were a
detriment to the race. 3° Another took Italian university professors as
a sample group to examine the causes of middle-class sterility. This
investigation demonstrated that scientists and philosophers were more
prone to "hypofecundity" than those intellectuals who engaged in
"practical" disciplines like architecture or engineering.31
Corrado Gini lent his expertise in demography to discover the
underlying causes of infant mortality. As director of ISTAT I Gini
completed a study of Italy's fecund population in 1928. Incorporating
research he had conducted on the war generation 	 , Gini argued that
patterns of female fertility had no bearing on the survivability of
infants. These results seemed to conflict with sociological and
medical research which showed that the shorter Interval between births
and the longer reproductive cycles of prolific mothers adversely
affected the life chances of their children. 	 Gini ignored this
evidence and chose to demonstrate a positive connection between
fecundity and adult mortality. High fertility, he believed, accounted
for the longevity and robustness of highly-sexed people. 3'
Research on hypofecundity advanced the cause of blotypology even
further. The consensus within the medical community was that over 75
percent of marital Infertility was caused by women's endocrine
disorders. At the top of the list of major factors influencing female
fertility stood gracility, thinness, excessive sport, career ambition,
and Intellectual pursuits. In 1934, the regime opened the first
fascist sterility clinic at the Salsomaggiore mineral baths. There
thousands of women took training courses on motherhood to revive
maternal instinct and underwent the water cure to stimulate ovarian
activity.
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PART II.
THE WELFARE REVOLUTION IN LAW AND PRACTICE
Massio di natalitA, iniEo di Lortalità; e i due aspetti
del fenoeno sono interdipendenti. Difatti, quando la natalitá si
abassa, non è vero che la ortalità si abass!; è vero ii
contrarlo. E vero, Inoltre, che le Nazioni invecchiano e che ad un
certo momento la natura imporra le sue leggi inesorabili. Le
Nazioni !rivecchiate avranno ii tracollo foriiidabile della loro
popolazione, poiché l'igiene, 11 iiigliorato tenore di vita, tutto
puô contribuire a prolungare la vita, e, del resto, vol
ii'lnsegnate, ii prolungamento nedio della vita umana in Italia è
salita di dodict ann!, ma ad un certo moiuento la falce cade. Mi
saprete dire, fra dieci e quindici anni, che cosa sara successo
nelie Nazioni che gia oggi presentano del sintomi di sen!lità?
Benito Mussolini
1928
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014)11 LEGISLATION: 1925-1934
Whether Mussolini modernised Italy is still an open question.
Victoria de Grazia has lent new insight into this problem. In her
study of the Dopolavoro, de Grazia gave a balanced assessment of the
regime's successes and failures in gaining popular support through
state after-work programmes.' Tim Mason recently urged historians to
continue in their endeavours to bridge the divide between abstract
theories and real histories of f8scisln. Further research on fascist
Institutions and policy, he argued, was needed to reveal how the
dictatorship developed In the 19305.2
This chapter attempts to contribute to this ongoing debate by
reflecting on the alms and achievements of fascist social legis-
lation. The regime turned pronatalist ideology Into public policy
with the creation of the National Organisation for the Protection of
Motherhood and Infancy in 1925. This chapter examines ONMI's founding
statutes, financial and administrative structure, and institutional
development in an attempt to assess whether the regime built a viable
and efficient welfare apparatus.
The Liberal Roots of the Fascist Welfare Revolution
ONMI's legislative history predated the advent of fascism. Four
months before Mussolini's March on Rome on 30 October 1922, the
Italian senate declared all existing health and welfare laws for
women and children to be fragmentary and insufficient. Between 1865
and 1890, successive local government acts set mandatory budgeting
requirements for the provision of aid f or foundlings. Other cate-
gories of women and children fell outside the sphere of statutory
public services. The liberal parliament passed only a handful of
timid laws protecting women and children, and most of these had
failed to have much of an Impact. They included the 1907 law on work,
the 1913 law on alcohol In schools, the 1918 law on wetnurses, the
1919 law on tuberculosis, and the 1921 contagious diseases act. Apart
from these enactments, the 1865 civil code and the various laws on
public sanitation promulgated after 1859 contained a few scattered
dispositions covering women and children. After the senate's
endorsement of a formal enquiry, a royal commission began to
investigate the question of social assistance towards women and
children on 9 June 1922.
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After their first meeting In June, the commission disbanded Into
four sub-committees, then adjourned indefinitely. While all 22
commissioners advocated some form of central control of services,
they remained divided about the exact form state involvement should
take. Because of the war deficit, financial considerations shifted
discussion towards a mixed public and private funding scheme. For-
eign precedents also confused them. Some preferred to establish an
Italian variant of the English model of a children's bureau within
the Ministry of Home Affairs. Others wished to avoid creating a
separate bureaucracy altogether, as had the Spanish, Danish, and
German governments which spread responsibility amongst competent
health and educational ministries. But the massive state organi-
sations for child welfare established in France and Belgium attracted
little interest.4
On 22 December 1922, the new Prime Minister exhumed the inquiry
report from the parliament's archives and formally dismantled the
commission. Mussolini appointed a team to prepare a legislative
design to fit his plans f or a radical overhaul of government
administration. After deliberations, the council voted in favour of
following the Belgian model of a centralised parastate institution.
Although the Under-Secretary of the Interior, Aldo Finzi, assessed
the project in early 1923, the regime's political Instability
deferred parliamentary review. Not until 8 December 1924 did the
Interior Minister, Luigi Federzoni, present the proposal to the
senate, who voted in favour of minor amendments. Final senate
approval f or the revised bill came on 10 June 1925, after which it
successfully passed through the lower house.5
By creating a national welfare organisation, the law of 10
December 1925 satisfied Mussolini's state-building aspirations. And
the eugenic community found reassurance in ONMI's objectives. The
report which accompanied the findings of the fascist commission
stated:
N children are the vital lymph glands of the economy,...Italy must
join the family of civilised countries who have recognised how social
hygiene can be used by governments to increase the productive forces
of the nation.. ..The children of today are the citizens of tomorrow;
therefore we must insure that they are raised rationally and scien-
tifically so that Italy's young generation will be healthy and
industrious.
The 1924 legislative design also emphasised the regenerative effects
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of welfare. Federzoni declared the protect ton of motherhood and
infancy to be "an urgent political and eugenic matter" and ONMI to be
a uforce for the defense, preservation, and progress of the race".7
Despite this optimistic appraisal, the 1925 legislation left
important questions unanswered. Pressing parliamentarians to accept
his 1924 legislative design, Federzonl had assured sceptics that the
new organisation would not create any additional expenditure for the
state treasury. 8 But just how ONMI could reconcile its vast programme
with the government's desire to economise on welfare spending
remained a mystery.
ONMI: Legislative Achieveent
ONMI's founding statutes of 10 December 1925 contained 25 articles
which defined the broad shape and scope of the new organisation. 9 The
regulation which followed on 15 April 1926 comprised 238 articles
divided into six separate titles outlining the structure and
programme of ONMI. As Mussolini later noted in his Ascension Day
Speech, the most recent statistics showed that about 5,730
institutions in Italy cared for women and children.' 0
 ONMI gained
control of this welfare establishment, which provincial and municipal
governments had administered In the liberal period. Because most of
these institutions catered to inf ants, ONMI determined to encourage
the development of more services for women.
Centralisation of welfare administration stood out as the
principal Innovation of fascist reforms. The April decree described
ONMI's institutional form as a three-tiered hierarchy in which the
national leadership oversaw the implementation of policy by provin-
cial and municipal representatives. 11
 Another novelty, the 1926
regolamento recognised the necessity of creating a tight
infrastructure of services throughout the nation. Regional and local
variation in the number and quality of charitable institutions had
become a chronic weakness of public beneficence under liberalism. The
1926 law addressed the problem of acute differences in resources
which kept poor and rural areas outside the sphere of social deve-
lopment. Organisational guidelines specified that ONMI's provincial
leaders should seek to meet the particular needs of local communi-
ties by setting responsive welfare targets, allocating special funds,
and planning new initiatives. The 1926 promissory package of reforms
laid great stress on transforming the patchy pattern of provision
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into an even and uniform national health system.'2
To promote institutional development, the 1926 regulation gave
ONMI a considerable presence in big cities and small towns through-
out the nation. Together with plans to create ONMI councils in every
province and municipality, the enactment outlined clear directives
f or the establishment of neighborhood committees. Large communes like
Milan, Rome and Turin were to be divided into manageable zones
comprising as few as 5,000 inhabitants. These administrative
districts, the legislation specified, would correspond to working-
class rioni and quartieri. In metropolitan centres, ONMI would
mediate between state and society. And in rural Italy, the
organisation would help to redress the terms of social backwardness
by building a network of services which reached even the most
outlying areas.'3
Continual experimentation by trial and error characterised the
process of forging an administrative apparatus for state provision.
Between 1925 and 1939, the fascist government passed four laws and
four decrees which made adjustments to ONMI's structure and
programme.' 4 This chapter examines this legislation to evaluate the
extent of the planning and expertise which went behind welfare
reforms.
Welfare Leadership in the New Italy
Reduced to 13 members In 1934, ONMI's national leadership
comprised 38 councillors In April 1926. 15 The 1926 regulation
installed within the central directorate two senators and two
deputies as compulsory government delegates, and a team of specia-
lists chosen from prominent charities, government departments, and
voluntary orgarilsations. ONMI would recruit consultants from the
Ministries of Public Education, Justice, Public Health, the National
Economy, and Foreign Affairs, who would form internal commissions for
the review of legislation and policy on various aspects of welfare.'
The 1926 regulation expressed the goal of creating a new type of
public servant who was not a career bureaucrat but a competent
technical expert. Membership in the central directorate extended to
professionals from the Italian Paediatric Society, the Italian
Obstetrics and Gynaecology Society, the Italian Eugenics Society, the
National Organisation for Handicapped War Orphans, and the Italian
Red Cross. The technocratic aspirations of the legislation came out
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clearly in those clauses describing ONMI's leadership as enlightened
men of science who would apply their knowledge to the business of
social planning.'7
The regulation made provision for women's participation in welfare
administration. Article 3 acknowledged the special contribution women
could make as mothers and Catholics dedicated to the cause of the
advancement of motherhood and infancy in Italian society, One
delegate each from Catholic Action's Union of Women and the National
Council of Italian Women would join the central commission. The
statutes also conceded to the fascist party a direct say In policy-
making by inviting a representative of the fasci femminili to join
the select council of five advisors to the president of the
organisat ion. ie
Other clauses specified that lay and ecclesiastical members of the
Catholic community should also be given access to state service in
ONMI's central, provincial and municipal councils. The Italian
government now welcomed diocesan bishops and parish priests into
public administration. This dramatic move reversed the 1890 prohi-
bition Prime Minister Crisp! had placed on the appointment of
ecciesiasts in the Congregations of Charity which oversaw the opere
pie and were accountable to the prefects." Recognition of the
predominance of pious over public institutions of welfare in Italy
seemed to be the motivation behind this policy. By encouraging lay
Catholics to embrace the new fascist institution, the regulation also
aimed to assure ONMI would have a dedicated following amongst the
nation's nobility and philantropists who formed the governing class
of private charities.20
The Catholic community gave official approbation to ONMI.
Beginning in early 1926, the Osserv8 tore Romano ran a number of
articles on the Christian content of social assistance under
fascism. 2 ' And in a series of addresses to Catholic Action's Uomini
Cattolici, GioventU Cattolica, and Unione delle Donne in January
1927, Pius XI called on Catholics to engage in an "effusion of
charity to affirm the sacred mission of the Church". 22 Although the
Pope drew a distinction between public provision and Church relief,
the mobilisation of the Catholic charitable establishment would
certainly be advantageous to a regime concerned with niinimising the
costs of welfare reform.
76
Welfare Administration
Granted the status of an autonomous state agency by the 1926
regulation, ONMI nonetheless never developed a stable administrative
structure. The organisatiori required officials equipped with precise
guidelines on' the exercise of responsibilities and some security of
tenure to plan policy. The conferment of bureaucratic rank and
contractual regimen on office may have helped national leaders make
pragmatic decisions about the future. But appointments were honourary
and temporary, and officials enjoyed no salary as reward for state
service.	 As a result, many ONMI leaders, including the organi-
sation's first president, Baron Gian Alberto Blanc, mixed their
casual comniitnients to ONMI with fixed employment elsewhere.24
ONMI's central administration had only the formal appearance of a
government bureaucracy. Together with the lack of any internal
mechanism for promotion from a provincial or municipal post to one in
Rome, the absence of a fixed leadership left institutional
consolidation to chance. Similarly, not until December 1929 did the
organisation begin to tackle the problem of a civil service personnel
at the central headquarters. Approved by the Interior Ministry at the
end of the month, a contract set standards for the employment of
clerical staff. The motive behind this move was the desperate need
the central headquarters had for office workers, librarians, and
researchers. After the announcement of an open competition for jobs,
the agency hired 76 employees. Although the 1926 regulation called
for a continued expansion of central administration to accommodate
the gradual implementation of ONMI's huge programme, the number of
salaried help in Rome had barely doubled by 1938.25
But ONMI never granted its white-collar staff the status of public
employees. By 1934, less than half of the office workers In Rome had
been systematised on fifteen-year civil service contracts which
qualified them for a number of benefits and perquisites. Four years
later, the majority of these government workers still remained
subject to the terms of labour in private industry. 2 This sort of
irregularity may have kept personnel expenditure to a minimum, but it
also placed constraints on institutional growth and efficiency.
On a provincial and municipal level too, ONMI relied on a
volunteer leadership. National leaders experienced great difficulty
creating local committees as a result. The work of organising ONMI
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federations devolved upon prefects and party secretaries, who chose
candidates. 27
 National leaders realised early in 1927 that a majority
of the 24 provincial federations which had been formed by that date
were comprised of officials who had no experience of welfare work. In
January 1927, Baron Blanc issued an angry circular to prefects and
party federal! warning them to follow the instructions outlined in
the 1926 regulation by appointing only qualified professionals. The
purpose of the new institution, he stated, was not to serve personal
or political interests but to improve the health and welfare of the
race. To remedy the situation, Blanc ordered more than half of the
federations to be dismantled and re-organised. Despite these direc-
tives, control over the process of administrative overhaul still
belonged to the party and the prefects.20
Recruitment practice as a rule narrowed ONMI's horizons. By 1936,
ONMI federations functioned in all 92 of the kingdom's provinces. But
the organisation's president from 1937 to 1940, Carlo Bergamaschi
admitted that this figure stretched the truth by a wide margin. Over
a third of these, he stated in an official publication, existed on
paper only, while a large portion of the remaining federations
implemented only selective programmes. He singled out a few federa-
tions, like those in Milan, Bologna and Rome which had managed to
create some form of integrated services, but these examples proved
the exception. Welfare organisation under fascism still differed
widely from one province to the next.2'
Another organisational liability, ONMI statutes specified that the
costs of building an administrative apparatus should fall on provin-
cial and municipal governments. The 1926 regulation and the revision
law of 24 December 1934 defined the exact terms of this obligation.
Government authorities were called upon to provide ONMI's federall
and cotnitati with free buildings, furniture, equipment, and staff.'°
When first implemented in late 1926, this requirement caused a great
deal of chaos. Many provincial and municipal governments had already
begun to remove welfare expenditure entirely from their budgets in
the expectation that ONMI would now carry the full administrative and
financial burden."
When ONMI leaders attempted to impose rulings on rent-free space
and administrative facilities in early 1927, they met with refusal
and obstruction from provincial delegations. Many provincial
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governments complained that they still faced a backlog of debts
dating back to the war and could not set aside scarce funds for ONMI.
Negotiations over this matter slowed the pace of Institutional
development on a provincial level. While 42 of ONMI's federations
eventually received venues from provincial governments, most of these
donations came In the middle of the next decade and even later. In
the meantime, provincial leaders had to make do with cramped office
space in foundling homes, party secretariats, hospitals, or the
prefecture. Many of the finer pal8zzI that housed ONMI provincial
headquarters were gifts from prominent philanthropic families. And,
in some cases, public appeals for funds managed to raise enough money
for the construction of new buildings. 32 The national leadership
faced the same problem of a makeshift and borrowed administration.
After over a decade of moving from one unsuitable building to
another, the national headquarters of the organisation opened its own
off ices along the Tiber in April 1938.
The development of the municipal committees dragged on even
longer. Provincial federations worked with mayors to mobilise local
elites and create comltatl. 3' To provide ONMI with offices, those
town governments actually committed to welfare reform sought
donations from private institutions and citizens, public bodies,
employer associations, and banks. By 1937, however, over 4,000 of the
kingdom's 7,350 communes still lacked an ONMI committee. And the
organisation's first official inspections that year revealed many of
those which had been deemed "functioning" in provincial reports to
Rome were largely "fictitious", according to Bergamaschi. Although
the national leadership had no clear idea about how many munici-
palities had actually carried on welfare work throughout the
preceding period, Bergamaschi estimated that as many as one third of
the 3,000 functional committees had been mismanaged, perfunctory, and
incompetent all along.3
The 1926 legislatIon defined welfare as an instrument of social
development. But ONMI never managed to break new ground in local
communities where its institutional presence remained scant
throughout the fascist period. A lack of adequate resources to build
a welfare apparatus figured as the single most important obstacle to
administrative growth. And without a network of municipal agencies,
ONMI stood little chance of ever implementing even a fraction of the
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1926 reform programme.
The Structure and Finance of Welfare
The 1926 enactment defined ONMI as the institutional means to
tighten the structure of services by centraitsing their control. New
welfare leaders repeatedly criticised liberalism for having abdicated
central authority over the edifice of welfare. The considerable
autonomy granted local governments in budgeting beneficent expendi-
ture during the liberal period, these arguments maintained, had
obstructed the development of an integrated system of social
assistance.	 According to the regolamento, and subsequent
legislation, ONMI would overcome this defect by regulating spending
and planning. The 1926 act stated that the relationship between
ONMI's central and peripheral organs would be "collaborative" and
"close".
In reality, however, centralisation proved to be a rigid and
impractical solution which did not befit such a geographically
diverse nation. The 1926 statutes preserved in essence the system of
beneficent funding established under liberalisin. 3 Rather than
channel money raised locally through the prefecture, the new
arrangement called on ONMI leaders to collect contributions from
private and public institutions, Congregations of Charity, and
communal governments and direct them to central headquarters. The
structure remained unaltered although ONMI now gained control over
the process. And, as in the old 1890 ruling, statutory contributions
from local authorities were redistributed from the central fund in
the form of grants. In the past, prefects had complained of
widespread evasion and continual arrears in their beneficent
accounts. ONMI federali were now placed in the same adversarial
position on the local level, and were not equipped with adequate
personnel and resources to supervise this complicated financial
system properly. As a result, many provincial federations would go on
to accumulate massive debts because they failed to collect mandatory
contributions from local authorities.
A big difference from the procedure established under liberalism,
however, ONMI provincial federations did not enjoy the same autonomy
local governments had previously exercised in budgeting allocations.
The grants' system which the national leadership put into effect in
early 1926 made the size of the award issued to provincial federa-
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tions conditional upon fulfilment of mandatory welfare targets. This
punitive guideline deprived already disadvanatged areas of financial
support from ONMI's central fund. From 1926 to 1929, for example,
Baron Blanc favoured those provinces which were better equipped with
services by making the grant proportional to the number of welfare
institutions and the number of women and children assisted In each
ONMI administration.40
As a consequence, a province like Milan with 262 active communal
committees and over 700 different welfare institutions received a
larger grant than a poor province like Mantua with 62 underfunded
comitati. 41 Provincial ONMI leaders in Mantua complained to the
central directorate that between 1926 and 1928 they had been unable
to distribute money to any of their communal committees, and, as a
result, only 48 of these actually functioned in any discernible way.
Because the province lacked a foundling home and other public and
private institutions, ONMI federali received a small grant from the
national leadership. The Inequalities built into the funding scheme
inevitably hindered welfare development. Milanese leaders proudly
claimed that between 1926 and 1928 they had assisted 5,500 women and
children; Mantuari authorities, by contrast, had handled only 78
relief cases during the same period.42
Blanc explained that his overall strategy was to promote the
"rationalisation" and Uco_ordinationu of services on a local level.4a
In practice, the grants' system freed ONMI of any financial
responsibility to create services where they did not already exist.
The pattern of grant disbursement varied geographically. Between 1926
and the end of the fiscal year in December 1931, national leaders
distributed over 30 million lire nationwide in provincial subsidies.
Northern provinces as a whole had received over twice as much money
as had southern provinces. But provinces in central Italy were the
main beneficiaries as they had acquired over half of all the funds.44
Because underdeveloped provinces ended up being cash-starved, their
communal committees were placed in the unenviable position of having
to raise money locally to meet targets set in Rome, which only then
qualified them for substantial awards. The conditional nature of
financial benefits effectively deadlocked institutional growth.
A revised funding scheme came into effect when Sileno Fabbri, a
Milanese lawyer, succeeded Blanc in January 1932. ONMI's new
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president tied the amount of aid provinces received to their
performance in the demographic campaign. Provinces now made requests
f or grants to cover a portion of outgoing expenditure on the basis of
the per c8pIta population within their administration. These base
rates were distributed regularly from Rome after national leaders
reviewed the reports federal! prepared, According to the 1926
statutes and the procedure which emerged in their aftermath, however,
national leaders could suspend funding when federall failed to make
progress in policy implementation. Clearly, this pressure to show
ONMI dirigenti in Rome continual Improvements encouraged provincial
federations to exaggerate their achievements.45
Under the new 1932 rulings, provincial federations could also
claim additional "extraordinary" allowances from ONMI's social fund.
The central directorate distributed 50 lire annually for every
newborn In a province. Ostensibly designed to meet the growing volume
of demand and the rising costs of care in areas with a high birthrate
and a dense population, the new scheme worked to the disadvantage of
many rural provinces. Northern and central provinces like Milan,
Padua, and Ferrara earned almost eight times as much money under the
1932 fundIng directives as did provinces with a steady or declining
number of inhabitants and births, like Taranto, Catania, and Cosenza.
With the exception of Naples, Palermo, Siracuse, and Sassari, whose
subsidies were high, the South and islands as a whole received less
than a third of the total national grants from 1932 to 1938.
The expressed policy commitment to the "improvement" rather than
the growth of services hampered institutional development. In the
South and islands, especially, ONMI's presence was destined to be
superficial because of the Insufficiency of local resources and state
funding. Prefects watched over provincial ONMI leaders, and were
required by law to send regular reports to Rome charting the progress
of welfare. The prefect of Agrigento, in western Sicily, sent a
memorandum in 1933 whose revelations contrasted with the claims made
by the office of the ONMI federation there. The provincial president
of ONMI had boasted that the organisat ton had created 24 mothers'
kitchens in the capital and outlying communes. The prefect conducted
an independent investigation when rumours finally reached him that
ONMI had failed to do much of anything In its seven years of exis-
tence. The prefect confirmed that the mothers' kitchens did not exist
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and ended his report by saying that the programme of relief which had
been Implemented consisted entirely of Mirregular and discontinuous
assistance in the form of occasional small subsidies to poor
families".
How many other southern provinces abandoned all attempts to
initiate welfare programmes remained unknown until 1940 when ONMI
conducted its first enquiry into the progress of reforms in Sicily.
The report of the ONMI inspectorate drew a sorry profile of the
network of services in Agrigento. With a population of over 400,000,
the province possessed 12 mothers 8
 kitchens by December 1938, but
none of these were administered or financed directly by ONMI. ONMI
leaders had managed to establish a system of home visits, but had
been able to find only two volunteers to perform this service. And
these "social asslstantsu were constrained to limit their activity to
the capital because of lack of transport. The organisation had
created an informal medical service by relying on the capital's seven
paediatricians to share turns at a clinic which opened for four hours
every week. This had been the extent of the achievement of ONMI,
largely because of lack of money, inspectors reported. They also
stressed that the province's high rate of infant mortality, which
stood at 132 deaths out of every 1,000 first-years, had not decreased
much during the fascist period,4e
In theory, ONMI had the potential to alter patterns of social
underdevelopment. In prosperous provinces endowed with professional
and philanthropic elites, ONMI leaders could offset the paucity of
state contributions with local resources, personnel, and insti-
tutions. To implement a full range of reforms, provincial federations
had to become largely self-financing. Enterprising leaders could
acquire donations of food, clothing, medicines, and buildings. But
the 1926 regulatIon, and the policy directives of the new organi-
sation, did not consider seriously enough the lack of uniformity in
the nation.
The reality of welfare development in Italy underscored a much
bigger role for private philanthropy than the 1926 regulation seemed
to suggest. Italian charities would do fairly well under fascism.
National statistics lumped all charities together, including fee-
charging bodies like colleges and convents; but figures do show that
the kingdom's gross charitable endowment grew enormously during the
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fascist period, and especially in the years 1925 to 1935. 	 The
social prestige attached to good works by the regime may have set
high standards for responsible citizenship among Italian elites. ONMI
certainly benefited enormously from private donations and bequests.
In Modena, the president of the federation, a nobleman and a doctor,
bought a villa for ONMI In 1928 and opened a dual-purpose home for
mentally handicapped children and for unwed mothers. 5° One of the
members of the Venetian federation organised a lottery of a clock
donated by the Duce In February 1928 to raise funds for the purchase
of an abandoned building in the countryside. When the countess failed
to realise much profit, she made up the difference and paid for the
conversion of the premises into a residential establishment for the
care of sick children.6'
Because of donations of this kind, which ONMI leaders rewarded
with medals of benemerenza in official ceremonies, the organisat ion
amassed an enormous patrimony by the end of the 1930s. 62 While
private funding in the voluntary sector underwent a progressive
growth under fascism, it is considerably more difficult to judge the
volume of state spending on welfare. Though public expenditure on all
items probably experienced its greatest net increase in the period
1925 to 1930, it continued to grow throughout the next decade.
Whether the share of welfare within the whole budget kept pace with
other areas like military and public works' spending appears very
doubtful.	 Notoriously unreliable, the regime's accounting methods
changed throughout the period. However, it seems clear that the
regime allocated a consistently very small percentage of public
revenue for what continued to be called ubeneficienceI in Treasury
accounts.
With regard to state spending on ONMI, the 1925 legislation
created a mixed public and private scheme. The statutes established a
special fondo which comprised a quarter of all the revenue raised
through municipal residence taxes and a variable percentage of the
money collected from public pawn shops.	 From an initial state
allowance of four million lire in 1926, the volume of public
investment in ONMI rose to over 108 mIllion lire in 1938. The
contribition from the state, however, represented only a small pro-
portion of ONMI's total budget, and never exceeded more than eight
percent of its funds. 57 To meet mounting costs after 1927, when ONMI
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began to implement its costly illegitimacy policy, 5 the state gave
the organisation a small portion of the money levied by fascist trade
unions, and increased its share of the revenue drawn from the
celibacy tax. In 1935, government withdrew the bachelor-tax contri-
butlon, although higher rates and harsher penalties progressively
increased the size of the annual levy from 46 million lire in 1927 to
over 150 million In 1934. Mussolini channeled this tax reserve into
the war effort and because of the massive budget deficit after 1936
did not re-issue it to 0NMI.5
After 1927, ONMI's own deficit grew so massive that Sileno Fabbri
suspended social programmes in 1932. Expensive forms of aid, like
cash subsidies, were particularly affected, though no single aspect
of reform escaped the financial crisis. In many respects, ONMI never
really recovered momentum after 1932.60 To regain solvency, ONMI
developed a plan for a monthly national lottery of substantial cash
prizes. Presented to the Council of Ministers in November 1934, the
proposal estimated that profits generated through the lottery would
allow ONMI to auction off Its substantial debts and eventually free
the organisation from the tyranny of short-term planning. If only a
small percentage of the interest payments off subscriptions were
invested, the plan stated, ONMI would have the makings for a lasting
financial security. Rejected initially and then again In March 1935
after re-submission of a revised version, the lottery scheme never
materialised under fascism.6'
The Mass Organisation of Welfare
The 1926 regulation outlined an ambitious and substantial reform
programme. ONMI promised to implement a number of important
innovations, not the least of which included provision for a widening
of access to statutory benefits. The new rulings abolished all
existing qualifications which limited entitlement to aid to only the
registered poor. Articles 121 and 122 conferred universal rights to
welfare to all claimants without regard to civil status, income, or
domicile.
The regulation devoted over 200 articles to a description of the
types of social services ONMI would co-ordinate. Municipal committees
were required by law to create clinics for mothers and babies in
every commune within their administration. When resources were
limited, local leaders were meant to establish mobile medical units
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providing routine and emergency obstetric and paediatric care.
Mothers 1 clinics were to be complete centres where local women would
find doctors, social workers, and other specialists like puericul-
turists and hygienists. The vital link between ONMI and the
community, clinics were conceived as institutions providing a full
range of services and a continuous form of aid for women from early
pregnancy to three years after the birth of their child. Through
interviews, case files, end regular check-ups, medical and social
staff at the clinics were to keep a close watch over the mother and
her child. Clinics, the law specified, were to provide economic aid
in the form of hand-outs of milk, baby clothes, and other neces-
sities. As a special incentive for women to frequent clinics, staff
were to set aside money for the regular distribution of childrearing
and breast-feeding subsidies to mothers.63
When clinics integrated all forms of medical, social, and economic
aid in one building, they were to be called Case delle Madrl e del
Bamblnl, ONMI's new model institution f or the "rational and modern
protection of mothers arid babies". For the "vigilance" and "control"
of childrearing, local committees were held by law to set up a system
of home visits and cash subsidies for regular clients at the clinics.
Home visitors were granted the right to place care orders on children
found to be abandoned or abused by their parents.64
A significant part of ONMI's programme involved the dissemination
of "scientific principles in breast-feeding and childrearing". To
encourage allattamento materno, ONMI leaders were required to launch
propaganda drives, using schools, clinics, factories, and unions as
the institutional bases for lectures, training courses, and the
distribution of literature on the merits and methods of nursing. In
addition to this initiative, the regulation gave ONMI the responsi-
bility to create a large Inspectorate for the enforcement of existing
protective legislation and the supervision of welfare institutions.
The regulation entitled ONMI to force the closure, the merger, and
the re-organisatlon of public and private institutions in the
interests of the co-ordination and modernisation of services. Apart
from providing assistance towards infants and pre-schoolers, ONMI
made special provision for certain categories of children, which
included the "physically and mentally abnormal", foundlings, and
"juvenile delinquents". The 1926 enactment set guidelines for
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provincial and municipal leaders to channel a significant portion of
their funds into the development of residential facilities for the
care of these ado1escents.
Although an ambitious project, ONMI seemed almost destined from
the start to have only a limited impact. In his address to the senate
on 20 May 1925, Ernesto Marchiafava spoke highly of the social
aspirations of fascism. But he also pointed out to his audience that
fervour alone was not enough to change Italian society. In contrast
to the immense volere of the state, he stated, stood the reality of
its meagre potere. 66 The regulation gave the organisation a vast
programme, but financial and Institutional constraints narrowed the
organisation's ability to implement reforms. Unless accompanied by a
more substantial cash investment from the state, ONMI would never be
able to operate on the grand scale anticipated by the 1926 statutes.
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WoLen, Work, and Welfare in Fascist Italy
In his Lectures on Fascism, Palmiro Togliatti alluded to the
"ideological hold" the regime gained over the working class by means
of social policy. Although he failed to mention ONMI in his list of
fascist institutions, Togliatti recognised the Importance of mass
organisation as a means by which to cultivate consent. And in his
appraisal of fascist forms of state intervention, Togliatti argued
that Mussolini possessed a keen understanding of the political
benefits of public provision. He portrayed the winter-relief work of
the Ente Opera Ass.fstenza as an especially ingenious scheme to ward
off popular discontent in a period of high unemployment.'
In her study of the regime's regimentation of leisure and sport,
Victoria de Grazia also made reference to the "stabilising" effects of
welfare in a fragile dictatorship. According to de Grazia, fascism
attempted to mobillse support through showy public programmes aimed at
"diverting" Italians from the nation's economic troubles. 2 Other
scholars too have argued that the depression forced a government
suffering from a loss of legitimacy to devise strategies for social
pacification.3
Population policy does not fit this model of the origins and
function of public provision under fascism. The objective of
demographic increment stood as the motivation behind ONMI. And that
the pronatalist campaign predated the depression challenges the
prevailing view of welfare as an opportunistic bid to buy off the
masses. Despite the weaknesses of a marxist interpretation of welfare,
those historians who have stressed the "mediating" functions of social
policies have touched upon very important questions about the nature
of fascist rule. 4 The following two chapters seek to examine the
substance of fascist reforms. Whether welfare could cause the Italian
people to embrace fascism depended to a large extent on whether the
regime could actually deliver the goods.
Women's Work under Fascism
Any discussion of the impact of welfare must also consider the
material condition of working women and their families. This section
gives a schematic outline of the changes and continuities of the
female labour force under fascism.
The pivot of the corporative order, the 1926 Labour Charter laid
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out the principles of government policy on women's work. The charter
revealed that the regime intended to redress striking disparities in
male and female earnings by guaranteeing women "equal pay f or equal
work". Low women's wages, the charter stressed, depressed men's pay
packets too. In the interests of class collaboration, the regime
advocated parity in pay scales. The document also declared fascism's
commitment to extending existing labour legislation to those hitherto
unprotected women workers engaged in farm and home labour. And the
third main objective was to organise women into fascist trade unions
and thereby draw them into the system of national contracts, social
insurance, the inspectorate, and the magistracy.5
Fascism did not pursue any of these goals seriously however. Nor
did the regime issue any discriminatory policy on women's work
comparable to that implemented in nazi Germany before 1936.6
Legislation to exclude women from paid employment arrived late and
remained relatively hesitant. 7 The lack of any decisive government
intervention seems to be a reflection of the fact that there was
little need f or formal Injunctions. The dictatorship had no cause to
promulgate official measures when its economic policies did its
bidding by acccentuating the structural inequalities in the Italian
labour market.
The long-term process of economic development in Italy caused a
progressive decrease in women's participation in manual employments.
From 45.3 percent of the total workforce engaged in industrial labour
In 1881, the percentage of female operatives fell to 30.7 percent in
1911, 27.1 percent in 1921, and 25.6 percent in 1931. The absolute
numbers of women factory workers also declined steadily during this
period. 9 Given continuous population growth from 1881 to 1931, the
contraction of women's economic opportunities appears especially
dramatic. 10 But the immediate contribution which fascist economic
policy made to this trend is by no means clear. Because statistics
compiled In the censuses of 1921, 1927, 1931, 1936, and 1937-1940 vary
enormously by category investigated and results obtained, en accurate
picture of the impact of fascism is difficult to reconstruct.''
Nonetheless, distinct patterns do emerge from this data.
The regime offered women equal pay for equal work, though most
female factory labourers in Italy were segregated in separate
occupations. Census reports give some Indication of the structure
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of the female labour force. The pattern which emerges Is one charac-
tensed by the overwhelming concentration of women workers in a few
branches of the economy. With a predominantly female workforce,
textile manufacture employed far more women than any other industry.
The 1901 census counted 367,000 women Involved In the production of
silk, cotton, wool, and linen fabrics and 249,000 women involved in
the plaiting of rough materials from straw, agave, and the like. In
the clothing and related industries, women also predominated over men.
Just over 150,000 women worked as seamstresses in the garment trade,
while 73,000 rieedleworkers made speclalised goods like hats, ties,
shoes, and lingerie. Another important sector of female labour
comprised servants, a category including workers in private homes and
commercial establishments, who numbered 400,000 women in 1901. Over
30,000 more listed their employment as ironers and washwomen. Apart
from these pursuits in factories and service industries, women also
engaged in domestic manufacture on a large scale. The 1901 census
estimated that 69,722 women spinned and sewed at home. 12
Women's representation In non-manual employments, by contrast,
remained minimal. But like their counterparts in industry, women in
these occupations tended to be concentrated in the lowest-paid jobs.
Middle-class women were effectively excluded from most prestigious
professions because of educational, legal and social discrimination.
The nation had only 47 women doctors and dentists in 1901, and no
women lawyers, architects, notaries, accountants, or engineers. In the
careers opening to them, like teaching and nursing, women were doing
much better, though their numbers were low compared to other European
countries. A large proportion of women still entered the exclusively
female profession of midwifery, but this category was declining. Only
661 women held secure positions in public administration, but the
numbers of female telephonists and telegraphists were rising. An
Important sector of female salaried work comprised shop attendents who
numbered over 160,000 women in 1901. And the Catholic Church provided
40,251 women with vocational and training opportunities.13
While relatively few women held better paid jobs, most were engaged
in "traditional" female occupations which were unprotected, unor-
ganised, and insecure. One of the peculiarities of the Italian economy
was the numerical preponderance of small firms and artisanal enter-
prises over large factories. As late as 1937, 78.7 percent of all
96
Italian firms employed fewer than 50 to 100 workers, the figures which
qualified them to be listed as "industrial TM concerns. The clothing
Industry, for example, counted 169,000 firms in 1937; but oniy 2,600
of these were industrial, while the overwhelming majority employed
fewer than five workers. In textiles, where women now comprised 75.6
percent of the labour force, 430,000 women worked in factories and
just under 30,000 In shops In 1937.'
The 1937-1940 census confirmed that the number of small shops in
clothing and textiles had risen during the fascist period. But the
regime had done almost nothing to improve the conditions of
homeworkers.' 5 As women were expelled from the labour force, because
of the economic crisis and rationalisation, they became increasingly
ghettoised in the least modern sectors of industry. But the number of
these women workers who toiled under sweated conditions for piece-rate
wages evaded official tabulations. Italian censuses do not reflect the
distinct pattern of women's employment either. As a category in
official statistics, women workers refer only to those engaged in some
form of regular and contractual employment. The structural imbalances
of Italian industry though made women's work casual and shifting. The
1901 fIgure for homeworkers, for example, underestimates by a wide
margin the number of women involved in a variety of crafts. The 1936
results show that 48,406 women engaged in homework in clothing and
furnishings, whIle 8,930 engaged in domestic textile work. But as the
census was completed in the spring, when homework declined in
importance, the results are wholly inaccurate. 1 By giving a static
picture of the labour force, the censuses do not capture the changing
rhythms of women's involvement In paid work. Because of the seasonal
nature of textile production, and the high turnover in the labour
force from one year to the next, many women mixed factory work with
farm and domestic by-employments. Bouts of unemployment and
underemployment regularly punctuated a woman's working life.
The structure of the female labour force underwent changes during
the fascist period. The immediate Impact of the economic crisis was
disastrous for female factory labour as over one million women lost
jobs beteen 1927 and 1932. ' This short-term effect was accompanied by
two other important trends which have a direct bearing on the question
of whether welfare, and in this case programmes aimed at mothers,
could offset material losses. Women workers were declining in age
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during the dictatorship, although the weaknesses of census reports
make cross-comparisons difficult. By 1936, the average woman worker
was aged between 15 and 24 years of age.' Historians have noted that
employers in artificial textiles were trend-setters with regard to
company welfare schemes. 	 While this industry employed only 11,499
women In 1937, the vast majority of these were minors. 20 When the
Baron Alberto Fassini Camossi opened the nursery at his rayon works In
1927, ONMI lavished attention on this industrialist who seemed to be
taking the regime's female labour policy seriously. Employing more
than 2,000 women at the Prenestina plant in Rome, the Baron also
provided worker housing in the form of dormitories on the large
industrial estate. But over 85 percent of his female labour force were
under the age of 18, a fact which made the day care centre a bit of an
irrelevance. 21
The attachment of married women to work outside the home seemed to
be declining during the dictatorship. The proportion of married women
to the total female industrial workforce dropped from 41.3 percent in
1927 to 22 percent In 1931, then rose slightly to 23.5 percent by
1936. 22
 Married women were not leaving factories for more comfortable
jobs in offices, as here too the majority of Italy's growing female
white-collar labour force were young and single. 22 They left the
workforce to become "attendenti dl casa", a category which rose by 2
million in the years 1921 to 1931, or they became part of the increas-
ing number of so-called housewives who participated in part-time and
irregular homework. 2 The expulsion of married women from the official
labour force, together with men's feeble earnings, boded ill for many
working families who were dependent on a dual income f or survival.
Other families would feel the worse effects of women's segregation in
impoverishing occupations. Demographic trends revealed that the number
of families with a woman as the primary breadwinner had increased by
over 14 percent from 1921 to 1931. Over a million and a half of the
nation's 9 million families were headed by a woman in 1931.25
These trends did not go unnoticed by contemporaries. Many observers
believed that the regime's failure to bring the Italian economy out of
crisis Jeopardised population policy. By the middle of the 1930s,
desperate pleas for government action to salvage the campaign became
more vocal. Some wanted the state to intervene more directly by
enacting legislation to prohibit women from work outside the home.
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This new more militant attitude towards women workers reflected
widespread recognition that fascism had not guaranteed working
families a decent wage or regular employment. In response to the
weaknesses of the economy, many felt the state should do more to
protect male workers. In an article published in 1936, Ernesto De
Marzio criticised the regime for having focused too much energy on
fertility incentive schemes like family allowances. Even if they were
extended to all workers in industry and agriculture, he argued, they
would never be a substantial enough encouragement for parents to
increase the size of their families. Poverty, bad housing and low
living standards In fascist Italy, he stressed, proved too powerful an
obstacle to birthrate increase for meagre tax deductions to redress.
Since the regime seemed reluctant to hazard potentially unpopular
moves to restrict female employment, he asserted, it should follow an
Indirect policy of discrimination. All women should be denied access
to education which was not compatible with the exercise of their
maternal and wifely duties. Only those without children should be
allowed to work outside the home, but they should be restricted to
" feminine" occupations In charity and social work.26
Not all fascist commentators agreed with these views. Daisy di
Robilant gave a lively riposte to De Marzlo by stating that his
opinions conflicted with the aims of population policy. Denying women
education, she believed, would have negative "eugenic 11 repurcussions
on their mothering skills. If De Marzio had his way, she argued,
Italian progeny would be raised by "ignorant and incompetent fattrlcl"
who had no understanding of the science of childrearing. To improve
the quality of the nation's offspring, she stressed, the regime should
try harder to fulfill the promises outlined in the Labour Charter. The
regime had made a formal sacrifice of women workers, she asserted, in
order to hide the structural unemployment which its economic policies
had created. Women workers, she felt, had suffered a loss in earnings,
job security, and economic opportunities under fascism. If women were
accorded their statutory rights and were allowed to earn a living
wage, she argued, they would be able to contribute more to the family
income and improve the level of domestic comfort. It was no use
teaching women how to be mothers, she pointed out, unless the regime
assured all workers would have sufficient means to provide for their
children's livelihood.2'
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By the end of the decade, the regime poised to make a last-ditch
effort at reducing male unemployment. A new law promulgated in
September 1938 aimed to hit women workers hard by setting up a 10
percent quota on their employment in public and private enterprises
and a ban on their hiring in white-collar jobs in small firms.2
Fascism, one enthusiastic observer remarked, had finally begun to
"protect the manly and virile Italian economy from female invasion".
The law defined what jobs were "feminine", and even though many of
these involved hard labour or health risks, Fernando Loff redo
commented, none of them threatened the "natural sexual division of the
economy" .
New Institutions of Welfare: Clinics and Kitchens
The aims of ONMI policy were confined to minitnising the effects of
poverty through welfare. The objectives were to reduce infant and
maternal mortality in Italy. The wider ambition of this programme, as
an official publication revealed, was "to gain the adhesion of the
masses to the regime's birthrate campaign". This could be done "only
when the Italian people come to have faith in the ability of the state
to care for families". 30
 To fulfill these goals the organisation
focused resources on developing new institutions for the medical,
social, and economic assistance of needy mothers.
The 1926 regulation defined maternal and paedlatric clinics as the
main institutional link between ONMI and mothers. Designed to function
as a form of community health centre, they were meant to attract
clients early in their first pregnancy and to provide continuous
assistance for the duration of their reproductive years. With regard
to infants, clinics were conceived not just as ambulatori where sick
babies could be brought, but also as observation centres for the
practice of preventive medicine. The primary goal was to assure that
babies from poor families had access to weekly medical examinations in
order to monitor diets and growth, to reduce levels of rickets and
malnutrition, and to persuade as many mothers as possible to breast-
feed. Medical experts were to instruct mothers on the proper care and
feeding of infants, to insure that mothers were well-fed enough to
nurse, and to supervise the weaning process.9'
Recognition of the mother's need to adequate nourishment led to the
development of plans for two forms of "maternal aid", mothers' kit-
chens and food parcels. Officials defined kitchens as the preferred
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type of assistance as mothers alone benefited from free meals. Food
parcels, on the other hand, could be taken home to feed the whole
family, thereby undermining the main objective which was to improve
the mother's ability to breast-feed.32
According to ONMI's statutes and policy, clinics were to be
directed by medical specialists in obstetrics, gynaecology, and
paediatrics. Although they were not meant to be fully equipped with
operating theatres, clinics, officials felt, could only run properly
if medical personnel were qualified experts. In addition, clinics were
seen as the institutional base for the development of new types of
professionals In social work and medical care. The organisation aimed
to provide general practioners and midwives with training in pueri-
culture to qualify them for jobs as supplementary staff in ONMI
institutions. Approved by the central committee in June 1926, a course
curriculum and trial scheme for these assistenti was distributed to
the leaders of the nation's institutions of higher learning for their
approval. By 1928, 16 universities across the nation participated in
the programme by running courses at their own expense. By the end of
that year 625 doctors and 240 midwives had received diplomas after the
successful completion of the six-week course.
ONMI failed to maintain the momentum of the training scheme. The
following year, Blanc decided to run only one course for doctors which
was based at the urilveristy in Rome. In 1933, the national leadership
organised two traineeships for assistenti In Rome and in Milan which
certified 52 nurses. Thereafter, the organisation dropped the
initiative entirely from its reform programme for lack of high
enrollments. 34 Part of the problem of the unpopularity of the
recruitment effort was due to the fact that ONMI did not develop a
workable plan for the employment of medical and social staff. Accord-
ing to the founding statutes, all ONMI personnel who worked in the
organisation's own institutions were volunteers who offered their
services free of charge. 35 This policy conflicted with the aim of
creating a permanent network of medical services throughout the
nation. As few Italian doctors received any specialised training in
new disciplines like paediatrics, ONMI would have to make a
considerable investment of resources in education. But unless the
organisation could attract recruits through financial and career
incentives, any attempt at forging a new administrative class of
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welfare experts was doomed from the start.
Because of this huge shortcoming, the organisation experienced
great difficulty enlisting the support of the medical profession.
Members of the specialist societies f or gynaecology, obstetrics and
paediatrics, who were all university professors and distinguished
practitioners, gave their full endorsement to the work of ONMI out of
a sense of mission. But the Italian Ordine dei Medici and the
Sindacato Nazionale del Medici Fascisti not only witheld their backing
but also lodged a formal complaint against the national leadership.
Brought to the attention of Mussolini in March 1928 and at least on
one other occasion in March 1933, the dispute arose over the question
of whether the nation's 8,000 medIc! condotti were legally bound to
cooperate with ONMI. The issue of pay figured as the most pressing
matter in the controversy, but general practitioners on the public
payroll also expressed other grievances. They resented having to work
for an organisat ion which undermined their importance to the demo-
graphic campaign.
The attitude of eugenicists and specialists came out clearly in
public addresses to the medical community. At a gathering of medic!
condotti in Rome in 1930, Cesare Micheli gave a lecture on the role of
the U old breed of condotta" In the fascist welfare revolution. A
surgeon at Rome's City Hospital and the director of the San Giovanni
Maternity Hospital, Micheli also held a chair in gynaecology at the
University. A member of the national commission appointed by Mussolini
in 1926 to propose legislation to stop the spread of "maithusianisni",
Micheli, along with other eugenicists, like the senator and obste-
trician Ernesto Pestalozza, had been Instrumental in formulating the
infamous June 1927 act, the public security act of November 1927, and
the act of 16 January 1929, which set more severe penalties against
abortion and contraception. 	 As an ONMI leader, Micheli also lobbied
government to consider promulgating a law requiring all poor women to
register with ONMI and municipal authorities when they became
pregnant. Had it been successful, the enactment would have introduced
substantial modifications to the national guardia ostetrica system
instituted in 1907 under Pestalozza's Influence. Under the proposed
guidelines for the "denuncla di gravidanz&', any woman who failed to
present herself for a medical evaluation early in her pregancy would
no longer be entitled to have a municipal midwife present at her
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birth.	 A fanatical and arrogant ONMI enthusiast who believed he had
a moral duty to bring "Italian mothers out of their ignorance",
Micheli saw medic! condotti as underlings in this struggle. In his
1930 talk, he stated that "the obstetrician, gynaecologist, and
paediatrician rule over the domain of ONMI clinics while general
practitioners are called up by fascism to follow the lead and command
of specialists". 39 And In his paper given at the 28th Congress of the
Italian Obstetrics and Gynaecology Society in 1930, Micheli bemoaned
the fact that there were not enough specialists to run clinics in
Italy. The nation's condotti, he lamented, did not know how to
practice eugenic medicine, and were little better able to supervise
the rearing of infants than were Italy's mothers.4°
This sort of attitude did not endear ONMI's experts to the wider
medical community. Doctors' complaints of ill-treatment by the
organisation's consultant specialists reached ONMI administrators. In
one such case in the small borgo of Monte Mario in Rome, a local
doctor working for the commune ran the clinic opened there by ONMI in
1931. Assisted by a nurse also paid by the municipality, he saw 50
infants and their mothers on average each of the three days a week he
devoted to ONMI work. According to the procedure adopted by Rome's
comitato, a visiting specialist arrived once a week to hold special
consultations and to review the case load. When the paediatrician from
town failed to show up for two weeks' running, the doctor asked ONMI
officials to explain his absence. The condotta had been forced to
refer some children he suspected were showing signs of tuberculosis to
the nearest hospital in a neighboring commune, and complained of the
delay this caused in their treatment, When the paediatrician finally
arrived one morning, an argument ensued because the visiting consul-
tant refused to stay for longer than two hours, his prescribed
schedule. ONMI leaders sent out an inspector to investigate the
matter. In his report, the Inspector stated that in normal circum-
stances he would advocate an official reprimand against the condotta
for diciplinary reasons, but that in this case no action should be
taken because the doctorwas running the clinic in an exceptionally
conscientious manner. '
Doctors were not the only ones who had cause for grievance. ONMI
did not offer pay to any of its clinic staff. And when these people
could not at least fall back on salaries from municipal government,
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they found themselves in the unenviable position of doing long hours
for no recompense and little recognition. In 1939, a letter arrived at
Mussolini's desk sent by a nurse from the commune of Aquillara Sabazia
in the province of Rome. She described herself as a widow who lived
off her "miserable" pension of 3 lIre a day, less than a third of what
an unskilled male factory worker earned in a daily wage, and less than
half what a female operative made. When she retired in 1929, she began
working in an ONMI clinic doing volunteer work both as "the doctors'
assistant and as the housekeeper", but had never received any reward
for her "service to the nation". Only after ten years had she unsuc-
cessfully attempted to ask the federation for "a little something". In
her letter, she cautiously stated that the ONMI federation in Rome had
seen fit to grant the doctors sharing clinic routine a Christmas bonus
every year as a gesture of their gratitude.42
The nurse did not mention the circumstances surrounding her pension
allowance. But evidence suggests that social insurance claims by women
workers covered by the Istituto Nazionale Fascista della Prevldenza
Sociale were determined on the basis of their reproductive perf or-
mance. In assessing female claimants, authorities in Novara inquired
about the number of a woman's offspring, and used this information as
a factor in deciding whether to grant a pension, a sickness benefit,
or a retirement bonus. Regardless of the number of years a woman had
worked, prolificity was seen to be a more important criterion of
entitlement. And the more prolific a mother was, the larger the award
she received. In one case, an old widowed woman with no other means of
support was judged "unworthy" of a pension because she had given birth
to only one chlld.4a
Perhaps reflecting wider attitudes, ONMI certainly took for
granted that women would perform selfless service in aid of the
fascist welfare revolution. But the voluntary nature of state
employment certainly worked at crosspurposes with the organisatiori's
objectives. In one instance, national leaders were forced to dismantle
an entire programme because they could not find enough doctors to
organise the effort. In late 1926, national leaders decided to
implement a policy for cattedre ambulanti, or "visiting instruction
centres for the dissemination of the scientific principles of child
nurture". Although not solely targeted at the South and islands, the
scheme aimed to compensate for the deficiency of welfare institutions
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in backward regions by establishing mobile units equipped with
"sanitary officers". Each cattedra was meant to cover an area no
larger than about 20 communes In one day, to set up an open clinic in
a public or party building, and to receive women for training sessions
in puericulture. ONMI leaders negotiated the itinerary in advance with
district doctors and midwives, and asked them to encourage their
clientele to attend. The national leadership claimed to have esta-
blished 7 such travelling centres in 1927, 11 more in 1928, and 33
more in 1929, all of which were located mainly in the deep South and
eastern Sicily. The cattedra opened in Rome's Campagna region on
reclaimed swamp land was used by ONMI and the regime as a "model
institution" to impress foreign governments and the League of Nations
who sent dignitaries to inspect Hone of the greatest victories of
fascism".
In reality, however, the policy was a complete disaster from the
start principally because ONMI authorities found public doctors and
midwives refused to co-operate with their efforts. Another reason for
the failure, provincial federations in rural areas complained that
they preferred to administer aid to the needy rather than divert
scarce funds into a mass propaganda initiative. All mention of the
cattedre ambulant! scheme disappeared from ONMI publications after
1930, and in 1933 the national leadership officially terminated the
programme.
In contrast to the mobile units, the development of clinics
proceeded apace. By 1929, ONMI had opened 82 mixed maternal and infant
clinics, mainly in northern and central regions, though none yet
qualified to be called an integrated Casa della Madre e del Bambino.
The number of women and children who had attended a clinic exceeded
60,000 by 1929, according to official statistics.' In 1930, 120
clinics functioned, but only about 30 of these provided any form of
medical care such as testing for tuberculosis or the distribution of
minor medicines. The majority functioned as centres where women
collected free foods, like bread and olive oil, and packets of dried
milk.'7 ONMI also reported that as many as 92,000 women nationwide had
been fed in mothers' kitchens during the years 1927 to 1930. By 1938,
the nation possessed 3,500 maternal clinics, 4,400 infant clinics,
1,300 kitchens, and 190 complete Case della Madre e del Bamblno.'°
But the actual success of this programme must be assessed through
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consideration of the substance of assistance women received in these
institutions. Firstly, clinics did implement a restrictive policy in
order to minimise costs. Although a clear contravention of the 1926
statutes, women were required to present a municipal tessera di
povertà as a condition of admittance. And potential candidates had to
be interviewed beforehand by ONMI communal authorities, be inscribed
in the organisation's registers, and be referred in writing to the
clinic directors. Secondly, the clinics only accepted children under
the age of six as patients. The principal competence of clinics was to
supervise the allevamento del lattante rather than care f or medical
problems. And thirdly, when a woman was given a prescription at the
clinic, she then had to go to the municipal poor office to have her
request for free medicines and remedies validated. In rural areas, the
local medico condotto generally ran clinics, so women did not need to
undergo the inconvenience of sorting out excessive bureaucratic
formalities. But ONMI consultants often presided over clinics in big
cities, and they were not empowered to authorise free-drug claims.49
Perhaps the greatest shortcoming, however, was that clinics were
created as the institutional vehicle for an "opera di persuaslone su
la massa della popolazione" to elevate standards of childrearing in
Italy. 90 The director's attention focused on convincing his clients to
breast-feed their babies. And his success rate comprised the prime
measure by which ONMI inspectors judged the functioning of a clinic.
In Rome, an official ONMI inquest conducted in 1932 revealed that 96
percent of the women who frequented the 12 clinics throughout the
province nursed their babies. The organisation's leaders took credit
for this achievement and determined to continue in their struggle to
disseminate "scientific norms f or motherhood".9'
Because of financial constraints, breast-feeding was made a
condition of assistance in clinics. To waive this requirement, a woman
had to present a medical certificate to clinic staff confirming that
she was unable to nurse her child. The attending doctor in the clinic
would then examine her breasts and send her to a local dispensarlo
antitubercolare to be tested for tuberculosis and syphillis. If she
tested positive for either disease, the mother was given a choice
between sending her child out to wetnurse f or a period of six to eight
months, or using the milk and baby formula supplied free of charge by
the clinic. There were a number of problems with this method of deter-
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mining qualification for benefits. Outside of large cities, clinic
authorities in great part had trouble organising the purchase of fresh
cow's milk with which the formula was mixed. And many could not afford
to pay commercial manufacturers f or bulk supplies of the more expen-
sive type of ready-made formula. As a consequence, clinics distributed
a powdered variety to clients who themselves were too poor to buy and
store their own fresh milk, even if they could find it readily avail-
able in shops. Another drawback, clinic directors were suspicious of
mothers who declined to breast-feed. They felt that many women paid
private doctors to write out false medical certificates and that they
used the clinics to acquire free food hand-outs. Women, on the other
hand, did complain to ONMI comltati that doctors made them feel guilty
about being somehow inadequate If they did not produce enough milk to
nurse or if they could not afford iartIficial M substItutes. 2 Meeting
eugenic specifications for the proper and scientific rearing of
infants seemed to be far beyond the budget of many mothers.
Conflicts arose out of resentment over the way doctors treated
women. In one case, a woman from a small commune outside of Rome went
to the ONMI comitato to complain about the condotto who ran the local
clinic. The doctor, a secretary of the neighborhood fascio, behaved as
if he were "God on earth", according to the woman. When she stopped
lactating suddenly four months after the birth of her first child, she
went to the clinic in a panic to ask for some farina and formula for
her infant. The doctor refused to give her any on the grounds that she
was young and healthy enough to nurse her Inf ant. She was forced to
beg for food from other mothers at the clinic. In her testimony, which
passed to the provincial federation, she accused the doctor of
distributing the packets only to local women whose husbands were
members of the fascist party. And she charged that the midwife who was
affiliated to the clinic had actually sold some of the formula to
regular clients at a rate just below the commercial price. Because of
the poverty and unemployment in the district, she concluded, many
women had been forced to pay 3 lIre a box for food which should have
been given to them free of charge.3
Whether or not the woman had embellished her story is less iinpor-
tant than the fact that the narrative illustrates that the regime had
certainly succeeded in making some people at least feel they deserved
state benefits, but that this new conception could become a source of
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resentment if ONMI failed to live up to rising expectations of public
responsibility for welfare. The charge of corruption did, however,
have a basis in fact. The condotto system under fascism had undergone
changes as party secretariats gained control of public appointments.
PNF membership, preferably dating back to the early days of the
struggle for power, became a mandatory application requirement, as did
close ties to the local hierarchy. In 1935, rumblings about favouri-
tism and declining employment qualifications reached the national PNF
secretary, Achille Starace, who then instigated an investigation into
hiring procedure. The inquiry conducted in the province of Milan by
the prefect's office revealed that local mayors and party officials
practiced a policy of scavalco by which they bypassed regulations
about open competitions and recruited their friends instead.54
The political outlook of ONMI leaders also marred the work of
welfare. Official reports from ONMI's Milanese federall to the
national leadership were full of florid references to the achievements
of the organisation. Thanks to the generosity of government and
elites, the federation had managed to complete a substantial portion
of its five-year plan for the "civilising penetration of the people"
by creating 28 mothers' kitchens and 5 clinics by 1928. Much of the
success of the programme was due to the "inspired leadership" of
Milan's city com.ttato who carried on a "tireless effort to correct the
astounding ignorance and carelessness of mothers through instruction
and assistance". 55 However, the attempt to bring mothers within the
protective arms of the state did not entirely succeed in Milan, mainly
because women showed hostility towards initiatives to educate them.
Initial anger amongst ONMI clientele at the clinic located in the
capital built up over the limited and inconvenient hours of the
service. For two days a week on Tuesdays and Thursdays, the clinic
opened for two-hour morning sessions. Because doctors often arrived
late, women had to wait a long time. They complained about missing
their free lunches at the mothers' mensa, which was run on a strict
schedule and was some distance away. Many worked and could not risk
losing their Jobs. But when violence finally broke out at the clinic
in November 1931, the "shouts and screams of protest" were all
targeted at the ONMI official who supervised the reception room. Local
women smashed her desk to pieces, and stormed out of the office,
vowing never to return again. Because of her "superior and condescend-
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ing attitude to women of the popular classes", a subsequent prefect's
investigation revealed, the member of the fasclo femminile who
volunteered her services as a doctor's assistant had managed to
"alienate the people".
Reports of women complaining about "not getting enough from the
state" abounded In ONMI's official correspondence with prefects.57
Provincial ONMI budgets for the kitchens were very tight, so directors
kept meal portions small and daily quotas limited. Here again, condi-
tional eligibility requirements came into effect in order to control
costs. In addition to holding a certificate of poverty, a potential
client had to be examined by a doctor in one of the clinics to qualify
for the food plan. Only when she could present a medical statement
showing she suffered from undernourishment or malnutrition could a
woman be allowed entry.	 Despite these constraints, however, the free
lunch programme provided a vital social service f or the community. By
recognising at least that poverty and unemployment existed in Italy
and caused significant health risks, the policy on kitchens, whatever
its ideological motivation, had the potential to improve the quality
of life of many people under the dictatorship.
ONMI leaders in poor communes had trouble organising this service.
In one such case in Rome's Valle dell'Inferno, a region of high infant
mortality and female fertility, the municipal leadership made repeated
requests to the federation for a special emergency grant to pay for
the building and maintenance costs of a kitchen. This suburb of Rome
was also the province's main wetnursing centre of the farming-out
trade conducted by foundling home authorities. After eight years of
trying, the local patron of ONMI wrote an angry letter to federall
explaining that in an area of chronic male unemployment where women
worked the fields, and suffered a high rate of miscarriage as a
result, a public cafeteria for families would help to alleviate "a
great deal of miseryN.&9 In another example, kitchen staff bended
rules in order to provide a substantive service. An inspection carried
out in one kitchen run by nuns raised suspicions about management
corruption. When brought before ONMI authorities on charges of food
theft, the sisters admitted that they had been lying about the numbers
of women and children who regularly attended. The nuns wanted to offer
their clients enough food to last them a whole day, and to give them
small parcels to take home to their husbands. The federation decided
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to introduce an "assiduous and rigorous system of accounting and
control" in order to prohibit this sort of "irregularity" from
happening again In the future.°
The qualitative evidence of the bureaucratic bungling, the
financial constraints, and the institutional limitations which plague
any large and underfunded organisation like ONMI is plenty.
Inspectors' reports revealed that not all kitchens lived up to
fascism's expectations for modern, hygienic, and efficient services.
In one surprise visit, a refectory was found to be: "crowded with
hungry women and screaming babies, some of whom are turned away at the
door for lack of space and sufficient food; filled with an incredibly
horrible odour and flies everywhere, even on plates; filthy and
disordered". The simple fare which consisted of a stew and bread may
have been without much taste, as the inspector noted, but the women
"appeared grateful f or what they got" nonetheless.1
Visits conducted by clinic authorities uncovered the fact that many
clients brought up their babies in homes which were: "unfit for human
habitation; unclean and unsafe; small; without running water and
electricity". Notwithstanding "our active hygienic propaganda",
visitors observed, mothers exhibited a "refractory mentality", and did
not seem to understand that "such environments endangered the health
of infants".	 And in one refectory, directors announced they would no
longer be giving out free food rations to cover the days when the
kitchen was closed on holidays and Sundays. This economising measure
met with "an outcry of discontent" by the 46 local women who regularly
frequented the establishment. Forced to make a concession, the
authorities now instituted a new policy which permitted mothers to
come to the mensa on Sundays for their free meals. But this change
caused more anger because women wanted to be with their families on
the weekend. Confused about the appropriate course of action, the
directors appealed to Mussolini for his help. The Duce pointed out to
them that their new policy had not actually saved the organisatlon any
money because of the extra administrative and running costs f or the
Sunday meals. The directors dutifully reverted to their original
system.
Of equal importance to the quality of service provided by these
Institutions is the question of the "mass" dimension of welfare.
Official figures on the kitchens' programme claim that ONMI fed 61,858
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women in 1933, 77,011 in 1934, and 84,502 in 1935. The clinics'
dispensari di latte attended to the needs of 46,109 infants in 1933,
110,139 in 1934, and 144,855 In 1935. National statistics on the
numbers "assisted" in ONMI clinics also show remarkable achievements:
from 139,956 women In 1933, the annual total rose to 255,505 by
1935.	 However impressive they may seem, these data do not reveal
whether women received sporadic, minimal and discontinuous contact
with fascist welfare or whether the regime actually "penetrated" the
daily life of its people.
The Regime's 'Ideological Hold' over Italian Women
Because of problems of resources and personnel, the clinics and
kitchens functioned as instruments for the distribution of propaganda
literature by the regime and ONMI's experts. Especially as ONMI's own
financial crisis worsened in the early 1930s, cutbacks adversely
affected forms of direct economic aid like subsidies to mothers in
need. Sileno Fabbri shifted welfare even further away from economic
and medical benefits by placing more emphasis in his directives to
leaders on the less costly schemes f or the "education of the masses".
Although this bias had been written into ONMI's founding statutes,
funding pressures forced provincial administrations to resign
themselves to the fact that clinics would never become fully-fledged
medical centres.
Clinics followed a policy of "social prophylaxis by reaching out to
mothers" through popular publications aimed at improving the "hygiene
of infancy and childhood". According to directives from national
leaders, home visits consisted of "Informal instruction by the ONMI
volunteer on modern methods of childcare". And in clinics too,
mothercraft lessons would be followed by the distribution of
"scientific propaganda" explaining in simple diagrams, drawings and
prose the regimen a mother should follow to safeguard her infant's
development. In addition, policy statements stressed, women should be
"gently persuaded" to appreciate the enormity of their task and the
importance of their "maternal duty" to the national community. With
the significant exception of food and milk parcels, the "social
assistance" provided by clinics consisted almost entirely of this
programme for the state modernisation and regimentation of
motherhood. 6
Distributed freely to all women who attended clinics and kitchens,
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educational manuals adopted a patent inoralising tone about the
requisites of good mothering. In one such publication entitled The
Hygienic Home, a physician advised women to be economical and
efficient in household management. Overwhelmed at first after the
birth of a baby, young mothers should learn early on to budget their
time f or chores, baby care and wifely duties. Asking himself whether
working-class parents had the financial means to guarantee a healthy
and happy home for children, he answered that the most important thing
was Muna buona volontà". Mothers, he advised, must use their good
sense to organise family expenditure more prudently. Every year, he
remarked, Italians spent between 8 and 9 billion lire on wine. If
those on a tight budget eliminated alcohol entirely from shopping
lists, he asserted, they would have more Income to spend on their
children.
Other publications, like The Maternity Book, came complete with
photos of mother and baby and madonna and child performing nurturant
activities. As well as containing words of warning and advice to
expectant mothers, each page had a caption with some of the more
encouraging statements by the Duce, such as: "The whims of fashion are
so deleterious to the race. The craze of women to lose weight is
dangerous and threatening. If only women knew how men find motherhood
enhances feminine beauty." 67 And others dealt with specific aspects of
childrearing like the manual on baby bath-giving which mistakenly took
as an implicit assumption that all working-class households were
equippped with such amenities as running water and heat.6
Middle-class assumptions were also replete in official propaganda
about the achievements of fascism. In his A Home for the Masses and
Fascist Ideology, Antonio Lamaro claimed that the regime had elevated
the labouring poor, who had been "morally retarded by socialism", into
disciplined and industrious workers. The home, he affirmed, was the
prime educational tool of a dictatorship which had proved to Its
people that even those who earn a slim wage were entitled to "enjoy
the spiritual joys of family life, despite material dissatisfaction."
The aim of fascism was not to obliterate class distinctions, but
rather to Improve the moral character of the lavora tore delle braccia
so he would no longer feel socially inferior to the lavoratore del
cervello. Even for those families whose incomes were compressed, the
conveniences of the Ideal home were indeed within reach. In the not
112
too distant future, he promised, fascism would realise its goal of
constructing abundant public housing fit with running water, elec-
tricity, and other domestic comforts.69
Through publications like these, the state support of food aid and
clinics imposed on women a fulsome assortment of the prejudices of
welfare ideology. Eugenic calls for a civic training of mothers had
become a reality through ONMI. But these manuals also expose a
fundamental weakness of fascist provision. Despite repeated claims to
the contrary, the regime expressed a clear preference for the chief
reponsibility for rearing healthy children to fall on women. Under
fascism, the pressures placed on women as mothers, workers and
consumers, however, were manifold and contradictory. On the one hand,
the regime purported to have socially elevated motherhood. On the
other hand, the regime presided over the disbarment of women from
occupations which were other than irregular, casual and badly-paid. In
essence, the regime made it exceedingly hard for women to fulfill the
aims of population policy. Unless accompanied by a significant
improvement in the living standards of working people, the advice
literature on infant care simply had little relevance to most women.
Pamphlets extolling the redeeming mission of mothers of the race
contrasted too sharply with the daily realities of working-class life
for the message to have had much persuasive force. The domestic ideals
espoused in this educational propaganda must have given very little
comfort indeed to women who struggled for family survival.
Perhaps the most compelling proof of the inadequacies of fascist
welfare, maternal mortality levels did not fall during the dicta-
torship. The regime's experts recognised that much of the illness and
death associated with pregnancy and childbirth was "preventable".
Significant factors affecting deathrates included poverty, malnu-
trition, and the conditions of the home and work environment. While
national levels of maternal mortality declined from 26 deaths per
10,000 births in 1887 to 23.6 in 1914, they rose to 27.1 during the
war. They remained stationary at the wartime level throughout the
fascist period. And as f or infant deaths, general levels continued to
decline, while prenatal and neonatal mortality experienced no
reduction. °
The chief protagonists in fascism's battle for the birthrate have
left some evidence of what they really wanted from the regime. On the
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morning of 18 April 1928, police arrested a doctor In private practice
in the town of Busto Arslzlo outside Milan. A house search uncovered
the paraphernalia of an abortionist, as well as two Jars of fully-
formed fetuses. Payment receipts found in the doctor's surgery
contained the names of four women who were subsequently brought In for
interrogation. All four admitted to having procured an abortion for
200 lire. Two women had decided to abort because they were unmarried,
while the remaining two women did not wish to have any more children.
Subsequent investigations revealed that at least one married woman
aged 32 had recently died in hospital as a result of an Infection due
to an Incomplete procedure. The four women were fined 500 lire each,
and released in the "interests of public peace". Two of them faced an
additional fine of 50 lire each for refusing to obey police authority
while in custody.7'
A few days later, a contingent of angry women arrived at town hail
demanding the immediate and unconditional release of the doctor. The
police who arrived at the scene described the women as a "threatening
force who Intended to liberate the doctor personally". Forcibly
disbanded that day, over 100 women returned to hold an all-night vigil
outside of police headquarters where the doctor was being detained.
They carried fasci di fiori and sang while they waited. Agitated by
this "offence to public decency", police officers arrested eight women
on the spot f or civil disobedience and dispersed the rest. What the
police described as "a phenomenon of collective female solidarity"
continued throughout the following two weeks. Groups of women
regularly held public demonstrations and sent others to police
headquarters with bunches of flowers for the doctor. On 5 May, the
police decided to release the doctor on condition he leave town
quietly under their escort. Under orders from their superiors, police
in Busto Arsizio subsequently intensified vigilance to protect public
order. 72
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WoMen Agricultural Workers and Welfare Provision: The 'battaglia del
riso', 1927-1938
This chapter explores public provision f or women agricultural
workers. Reluctant to develop a coherent policy on women factory
labourers, the regime, nonetheless, gave ONMI leaders a clear mandate
to implement reforms affecting female rice workers. The national
organisation launched a campaign in 1927 and intensified efforts to
build social services in rice-producing provinces as the depression
worsened. This chapter continues to address the question of the social
and political impact of welfare under fascism.
Rural Women in Fascist Italy
The Italian countryside experienced profound changes during the
fascist period, many of which adversely affected women. The proportion
of women within the rural labour force fell from well over 60 percent
in 1881 to just over 35 percent in 1938.' The greatest drop occurred
in the period 1921 to 1931, when the size of the female labour force
shrank by over 50 percent from 3,116,885 to 1,582,503.2 Although the
number of male workers, a category which comprised peasant
smallholders, tenant farmers, and landless labourers, decreased too as
a consequence of fascist agrarian policy, 3 men shared much less In the
process of disemployment. The male rural workforce reduced by a little
over 9 percent from 7,085,124 in 1921 to 6,392,639 in 1931.'
Official statistics confirmed that the fascist regime's politica
salariale of reduced wages, high unemployment, and limited consumption
had a more disastrous impact on women workers than it did on men
workers. 5 Female rural unemployment rose higher than that of men
during the height of the agricultural crisis from 1927 to 1931, when
fascist trade unions permitted employers to fire women and children
and rehire men at lower wages. Women workers also failed to share in
the trend towards partial re-employment in the period of stabilisation
from 1932 to 1936. In breakdowns of average daily diets, the calory
intake of peasant women was far lower than that of any other category
in the economically active population. 7 Disparities in the wages men
and women received, even for the same work, grew wider during the
depression, as agrarian capitalists throughout the North and Centre
followed official policy to salvage male pay packets at the expense of
women and children. Less than half those of men at the peak of the
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agricultural crisis, the average monthly earnings of female casual
labourers continued to fall by a larger percentage than did those of
men from 1931 to 1936.
The deterioration in the income and living standards of women
agricultural workers must be set against patterns of female fertility.
The 1928 inquest into the geographic distribution of large families,
conducted by ISTAT during the presidency of Corrado Gini, showed that
the burden of child upkeep fell more heavily upon rural than urban
parents. Out of Italy's nine million families, over one and a half
million were comprised of seven or more child dependents, and almost
half a million households had at least ten children who lived at home.
Concentrated in rural Italy, the nation's most prolific families had
produced almost half of the total population of just under 17 million
children. And the poorest regions in the mezzoglorno, Apulia,
Basilicata, and the Abruzzi had the highest density of big families in
the nation.9
While almost 20 percent of urban working-class mothers who
completed their childbearing years in the 1920s had given birth to at
least seven live children, just under 25 percent of peasant women had
produced the same number of offspring. 10 The demographic census
results of 1931 revealed marked social class variations in family
size. The average middle-class household contained three children;
that of industrial workers five; that of the lower middle class of
artisans, shopkeepers, and merchants five; that of white-collar
employees in services and administration three; and that of agri-
cultural labourers six.1'
And other studies showed that rural women began to have children at
an earlier age than did urban women and prolonged their fertility well
into middle-age.' 2 While demographic statistics on rural women are
fairly reliable, those on employment patterns are not. Female
agricultural workers, according to censuses, were a disparate group
which comprised small proprietors, renters, peasants on fixed
contracts, leaseholders, casual day labourers, and sharecroppers.
Because of the relatively high proportion of widows amongst the
agricultural population, arid the nature of the rural household
economy, women took an active part in family farm work, a fact which
is not fully reflected in census reports. In a small minority in all
other rural occupations, women predominated over men in the category
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of usufruttuarl, those intermediate strata of peasants who held
inheritable farming rights to lend they did not own.' 3
 By far the
largest percentage of economically active rural women were engaged In
intermittent and seasonal field work In corn, flax, wheat, olive and
rice cultivation which provided fewer than 50 days of regular employ-
inent a year. Many of these caine from sharecropping families, and
especially from the compartecipanti in Lombardy, the Veneto, and
Einilia who enjoyed less profitable contracts than traditional
mezzadr!.
The number of rural "housewives" rose considerably during the
fascist period. 16 But many of these rural massale mixed field work on
family allotments with various forms of home manufacture of foodstuffs
and finished goods. Sericulture flourished everywhere middling
tenantry proliferated and sharecropping women predominated amongst the
bacinelle who tended worms and wound the thread. 16 Hit badly by the
agricultural depression after 1925, small-time silk spinning failed to
recover.' 7 The rise of the corporate conglomerates in artificial
fibres in the following decade eclipsed this sector, but failed to
absorb the surplus of women left out of work as some traditional
industries declined. '
The fascist government's response to female rural unemployment
centred on the organisation of women into the party's housewives'
association. Founded on 28 September 1934, the federation of Massale
Rural! became recognised soon after as a separate section of
provincial party organisations subordinate to the fasci ferziminili."
Funded primarily by contributions from agricultural labour syndicates,
and the annual collection of dues from its own members, the associ-
ation aimed to "educate" women in the skills of garden cultivation,
animal husbandry, home crafts, and all those piccole Industrie
casal!nghe which formed an important component in rural household
economy.° With a membership of 571,658 In 1934 which grew to
1,242,514 by 1939, the association drew strength mostly from
sharecropping and peasant landowning families.' The regime attempted
to use the Massale Rural! as a vehicle for mass propaganda to monitor
discontent and to mobilise support for the colonial campaign in 1935
and the war effort after 1940. An important part of the rural
organisation of housewives consisted of the development of co-
operative farms on reclaimed land. On Massa!e Rural! estates outside
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Rome, for example, women produced fruit and vegetables for ONMI
kitchens. 22
The regime carried out a plan to recruit female labour for a
patriotic venture organised around small workshops catering primarily
to the party's demand for paramilitary paraphernalia. Together with
the fasci femrnlnlll, and the Ente Opera Ass!stenza, which provided
unemployment relief, ONMI worked to create laboratori femininil!.
Organised in informal gatherings, rural women took courses in
tessiture rustiche which taught them to spin and weave rough natural
fibres. And while some urban women learned how to sew fabrics into
uniforms and flags, others made garments for repatriated citizens,
baby clothes for the poor, and similar products in the various
initiatives launched by different federations. Beginning in 1931,
these centres sprang up in provinces where PNF federal! felt inclined
to focus energy on this mixed form of mass organisation and social
welfare. By 1937, the party controlled over 200 such establishments in
both rural and urban areas throughout the North and Centre.23
The regime provided equipment for these centres by patronising the
nation's only sewing-machine manufacturer. President of the firm, the
Anonymous Society Necchi, Victorio Necchi began making hefty donations
to the Duce's social fund for premiums to large families In 1930. In
exchange, the industrialist asked the Duce to salvage his company
which failed to produce goods which could compete in price or quality
with the superior Singer machine. With government backing in the form
of protection, Necchi eventually squeezed his foreign rivals out of
the Italian market, re-organised plant, streamlined production, and
expanded his workforce. By 1934, Necchi supplied his re-modelled
machines to all party, public, educational, and charitable insti-
tutions in the country. And annually from 1929, he donated 2,000
machines a year to the Duce who held lotteries in every province f or
their distribution amongst the nation's unemployed women workers.24
Complementing the work of the Massale Rural! stood the party's
ancillary organisation f or urban housewives, the Sezioni Operaie e
Lavoranti a Dom!cilio, which were created in March 1938. 2B While the
role and development of the fascio lemininili was even less a concern
for the regime than that of the formal party apparatus, the home-
workers' section became a top priority for provincial federations in
industrialised regions. By 1939, over 200,000 women, some friends and
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relatives of party members, others recruits from the urban working
class, joined the army of piece-rate workers organised into state
workshops. One month after the declaration of war against France In
June 1940, the Ministry of War made a formal request soliciting the
service of these seamstresses. At the behest of the national PNF
directorate, rural and urban housewives commenced war work a few
months later.2
Italian Rice Production
Not until 1936 did the regime re-issue the social insurance
coverage to agricultural labourers which it had withdrawn in 1923.27
The syndical orgenisation of female rural workers proceeded
haphazardly, especially amongst landless labourers of northern and
central regions. 2 But one sector of the female rural population
attracted much Interest by fascism's corporative organisations. While
labour exchanges controlling the movement of migrant rice workers were
amongst the first to be established In fascist Italy, 2 national
contracts covering planters, weeders, and harvesters came into effect
in 1924.°
Paddies extended over scattered patches of wetland in Sicily,
Tuscany, Enillia, the Veneto, and in Latium. In the aftermath of a
decline in the price of rice on the world market which began in 1925,
many of the growers In these regions converted fields to two-crop
methods of cultivation, which interspersed wheat and rice, or gave
land over entirely to more profitable grain production. The largest
and most modern estates were concentrated in Piedmont and Lombardy
where over 122,000 hectares produced 5 million quintals of the grain
annually. While heat retarded plant growth in Sicily, rice flourished
in the northwestern Po delta because of the natural abundance of water
supply and marsh land, as well as a moderate climate.31
A large exporter of rice, and Europe's biggest grower, Italy
produced grains which were inferior In quality and less uniform in
shape than those of its big North American and Egyptian competitors
who had begun to Invade the European market in 1921.32 Rice production
was an important agricultural sector primarily because of the size of
Its labour force. Intensive methods of cultivation kept capital
investment lower than outlays in wheat production. Profit margins
could be high, especially for those large latifundists and
enterprising leaseholders who dominated the Piedmontese plains.
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Cultivation of the cereal consisted of three phases which provided
seasonal jobs f or day labourers. Women and children almost exclusively
performed the most gruelling, badly paid, and unhealthy work, the
mondatura, which involved uprooting dead plants infested with alghae
and clearing away weeds. Mothers carrying infants on their backs,
young children, and old women alike, the mondThe stood bent over knee
deep in water from dawn until dusk. Though the start of the season
differed by region, weeding most frequently began In mid-June and
lasted 36 days. In 1926, 233,000 women and children worked the rice
fields of northwestern Italy, and 195,000 of these rlsalae were
migrant labourers.
Travelling by special trains from destinations as far afield as
Emilia, the rice workers arrived to find work conditions bad. Huddled
in crowded and humid dormitories without furnishing, drinking water,
or amenities, they slept on dirt floors on the dank hay their
employers provided but did not replace for the duration of their stay.
Though contracts varied by locality, most mondine brought their own
bedding, but received room and board In exchange for a fixed portion
of their wages. In local legend, the agrarians of Vercelli who owned
and managed the great landed estates of the Po delta were mean
providers and prof erred broth made with decaying sausage meat as daily
fare. 35 But, compared to the rations of rice soup and stale bread most
workers received in neighboring provinces, the Vercelli mondine were
comparatively lucky. In general, food and hygiene were poor
everywhere, evidenced by the high incidence of gastro-intestinal
diseases afflicting the mondIne.
Public sanitation laws passed in August 1907 prohibited the
employment of minors younger than 14, of pregnant women in the last
month before term, and of postpartum women in their first month after
birth. The enactment entitled nursing mothers to breast-feeding time
of f from work, and made some schematic provision for mandatory health
certification from authorities in the home commune and weekly health
visits by district doctors in their place of work. 37 But like
legislation on maternity leave and factory nurseries, employers
largely ignored these rulings in the interests of economy. Outbreaks
of malaria, tuberculosis, and bronchitis occurred regularly and struck
the mondine more frequently than the men and boys engaged in hoeing
and harvesting.	 Because of the enormous health risks associated with
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rice work, the 1907 sanitation act outlined a set of financial accords
binding employers and municipal government to share the cost of
medical services.
The act held communes responsible for distributing quinine, which
was used In the prevention and treatment of malaria, radium lamps f or
tuberculosis therapy, and disinfectants and medicines for the cure of
water-borne rashes, infections, and fevers, other common ailments
amongst the risaiae.	 Procedure dictated that employers reimburse
municipal authorities on a fixed per capita rate for the expenses
incurred by public doctors. Beginning with a circular dated 23 May
1928, the fascist regime put pressure on local prefects, police and
trade unionists to enforce employer compliance with the 1907 health
norms. 40 The promulgation of revised laws on sanitation on the 22
March 1934 set even more stringent guidelines on statutory worker
health provision. 41 Despite these efforts, nonetheless, conditions
improved only nomimally for the risaiae during the fascist period.
The regime may have stepped up the reporting of infractions, but
prefects and labour unionists had no real power to force intransigent
employers to pay for improvements. Especialy at a time when profit
margins reached new lows, calls for a substantial injection of cash
into expenditure agrarians long considered inessential had little
chance of success. Prefect reports for the whole of the fascist period
show just how commonplace were open contraventions of the law. 42 The
high Incidence of miscarriage and infant mortality which continued to
prevail, prefects revealed, testified to the fact that employers
regularly hired heavily pregnant women and new nursing mothers.43
While few routinely provided medicines to prevent illness, most failed
to observe even elementary health precautions. Many farmers refused to
build sufficient huts to shelter all workers, to run pipes for potable
water, and to install windows in barracks to keep out flies and
mosquitoes. 44 Others were lax about paying their statutory
contribution to municipal governments for the provision of health
visits. Less than a handful of the 794 serious violations reported by
the police to the prefect of Pavia after the 1926 season had been
corrected by the following year. 4 And in a small commune in the
province of Novara in 1936, 1,053 of the 2,383 migrant rice workers,
as well as 349 local harvesters, fell ill with diseases identif led as
typhoid fever, tuberculosis, malaria, diptheria, and boils and other
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minor complaints. '
The fascist regime justified heightened government concern for rice
workers on moral grounds. Official spokesmen expressed alarm over the
terrible plight of the oppressed rlsalae who worked hard, were under-
fed, and badly paid. Commentators voiced concern about the poor health
of these workers and their children. And they also expressed anxiety
about the conditions of life on the campsites where men and women
lived together and allegedly indulged in evening parties and sexual
liaisons. The desire to see employers build proper dormitories to
segregate male and female workers formed a part of the motivation
behind their outrage. And calls f or the strict enforcement of laws on
child labour reflected the fear that male workers and local men had
easy access to a store of young and nubile women.'7
Another reason why the regime should chose to implement a selective
campaign for rice workers was purely political. First a socialist and
then a communist stronghold, the rice-growing provinces of the upper
Po basin erupted into periodic unrest. In the spring of 1920, local
rice workers throughout Piedmont started a strike which was met by a
show of solidarity by migrant labourers who also held work stoppages.
The longest to date from the beginning of organised militancy at the
turn of the century, the action lasted 54 days and completely
paralysed national production. And in the summer of 1923, mondlne and
braccThntl throughout Vercelli had come out In full force to support a
strike on the large latifundium of San Damiano in Carisio, long
considered to be a model of landlord entrepreneurship and technical
efficiency.
On 8 June 1927, the fascist government asked ONMI to mount a broad
campaign for social assistance in those Lombard and Piedmontese
provinces in the Po valley which constituted the largest rice-
producing region in Italy.'9
 This move coincided with disturbances
which broke out after a collective announcement by provincial employer
associations of wage reductions. Local agrarlans now felt the worse
effects of the collapse in prices. Many producers in Lombardy and
Piedmont had borrowed during the boom of 1923 to 1925 in order to
finance technical improvements, boost production, and Increase crop
yields. °
In Vercelli, which produced 48 percent of the nation's annual rice
crop, growers had bought chemicals and machinery, extended cultivation
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into the pre-alpine lowlands by means of irrigation, built huge silos,
and stockpiled a large surplus.' In the ensuing crisis, credit
facilities froze everywhere throughout the basin, and banks and
associations demanded debt repayment. Middling proprietors throughout
the irrigated plain strained under the pressure of financial strangu-
lation, while peasant families abandoned their small allotments
throughout the baraggia, the patch of loamy terrain well away from the
embankment. Many of the formerly prosperous renters who held farms
carved out of the large estates bordering the provincial capital
during the crisis of 1923 now went bankrupt. The monetary policy of
the regime only worsened their plight, since revaluation caused land
value to depreciate but rents to rise.&2
Issued on the 1 June when the first influx of workers arrived, the
proposed cut of 5 lIre per day, which was equivalent to a 30 percent
reduction, applied only to the rlsalae. Not consulted by employers
before the announcement 1 fascist trade unionists from Novara,
Vercelli, Pavia, and Alessandria complained about the illegality. They
issued a demand that agrarians respect negotiated labour contracts
drawn up the previous March which set minimum pay scales for all
categories of labourers. Submitted for arbitration, the dispute
dragged on as the Magistracy of Labour in Rome, which covered all rice
workers In Italy, deferred judgement. In the meantime, employers
issued a compromise settlement on the 29 of that month when they
announced they would be imposing 16 percent wage cuts on the mondine.
When the court in Rome finally took a decision on the 14 July,
magistrates supported agrarians in their move to reduce the costs of
labour.
A labour offensive stirred up by underground communist cadres met
the first wage reduction in June 1927. Strike action which began in
Trecate on the 28, where weeders abstained from work for two days,
spread throughout the province of Novara, then hit Vercelli, Pavia,
Milan, and Alessandria, involving as many as 20,000 workers. Local
communists, who had contacts with comrades in the nearby textile towns
of Biella, Gallarate, and Busto Arsizio, had already begun a campaign
to unite factory women and rice workers into a political force of
resistance against the regime. Beginning on the 20 June, they distri-
buted by courier clandestine newspapers denouncing Mussolini as a pawn
of the bourgeosie. On the 30 June, round-ups and arrests began. While
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the police detained over 100 strikers, they charged only seven
bracciant!, whom the special tribunal then condemned as subversives to
two months' imprisonment in a labour colony. The forces of repression
had shown some clemency in order to diffuse the turmoil.54
ONMI and Rice Workers, 192 7-1 938
ONMI federations began to implement policy in this tense and
hostile environment. The periodic briefs leaders received from the
police made no attempt to hide the political character of welfare in
this region. The police commissioner of Vercelli asked ONMI federal!
to assist the police in their efforts to "enforce discipline",
especially during winter months when discontent rose, and to uncover
"suspected agitators" amongst the populace. 	 The 1927 "programme of
action" undertaken by the ONMI federation of Novara stressed the
"delicate nature" of social provision in a province whose one cash
crop gave local peasants only four months of regular work a year.
Prefects encouraged ONMI to build a tight network of home visitors,
using women party members as recruits in a drive to create "political
collaboration amongst mothers of different classes". Domiciliary aid,
they stressed, kept people from gathering outside government offices
requesting relief. One of their concerns was to control crowds, while
another was to minimise public awareness of the visible symptoms of
poverty. Prefects also stressed that home aid gave public authorities
the continuous contact they needed in order to monitor public
opinion. 57 And the communiqués which passed between police and
prefects revealed Just how anxiously they waited to see whether
welfare could in fact pacify the people.
The orchestration of mass spectacle had a political resonance in
these provinces too. Local prefects asked party and ONMI federal! to
organise festivities coinciding with the Giornata della Madre e del
Fancuillo, declared a public holiday in 1932 and first celebrated on
Christmas eve the following year when 5,788 municipalities across the
nation, official reports claimed, held events ranging from baby beauty
contests to exhibitions of Italian-produced kitchen ware, 5' In Pavia,
Vercelli, and Novara, authorities defined these occasions as a "maxi-
mum political priority" and began planning for them months in advance.
Local PNF and ONMI functionaries gave speeches on the "tutela della
razza" and "Magna Mater1 , themes which focused on the wholesomeness of
peasant toil and the benevolence of the state. 6° Determined to exploit
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all channels of mass mobilisation, the regime pursued a policy which
blurred the distinction between welfare and propaganda.
Mussolini showed a keen appreciation of the power of special
benefits and privileges to influence public opinion. Each annual
Mothers' Day celebration ended with public gatherings where PNF and
ONMI authorities distributed cash premiums to carefully selected
winners. After the creation of empire in 1936, the state sponsored
nationwide competitions for the title of "Prolific Mothers of the
Year" which also culminated on the Giornata della Madre e del Bambino.
ONMI leaders lavished publicity on these annual events and encouraged
all party and public Institutions to participate. According to
guidelines on entry, women contestants wrote letters describing
themselves and their families; many of these contained detailed and
desperate pleas for housing, jobs, and pay increases. While ONMI
officials vetted applicants, prefects, the police, and PNF federal!
conducted investigations concerning the moral character and the
political persuasion of candidates. The letters were sent to Rome f or
Mussolini's final decision.6'
In local celebrations, and at the final reception at the Palazzo
Venezia in Rome, fascist officialdom made a great display of public
gratitude by granting a few of the requests made by mothers and by
bestowing financial benefits like income tax rebates, public transport
discounts, food coupons, and free holidays on the most prolific. 62 In
addition to medals of honour and childrearing diplomas, these elected
exemplars of Italian motherhood received especially large premi di
natal! tà, commemorating those who had borne the most offspring since
1929.	 The birth premiums were scaled according to reproductive
output, with 50 lire given for each child produced up to the sixth,
100 lire for each child up to the tenth, and 200 lire for each child
up to the twentieth. Not all winners were members of the fascist
party. And each year's theme differed so factory workers, peasants,
public employees, and artisans all had a chance at the cash prizes. In
1937, Novara sent its first prolific couple, both braccianti who
worked the rice fields, to Rome to be received by the Duce.	 An
economical form of propaganda, the benefit scheme included premi di
nuptialltà, which were given to young married women who had produced a
child annually in their first five years of marriage.
Somewhat more difficult to organise, and considerably more costly
131
to run, welfare programmes in rice provinces focused on opening state
nurseries for rlsaiae. For access to free childmlnding facilities
available from May until September each year, mondine paid a small
inscription fee of 2 lire, which was waived for party members. This
provision constituted the single largest expenditure In the budget of
the provincial federation of ONMI In Vercelli, which was the main
receiving province for migrant labour and had the highest number of
rice workers. Secondary policy targets included the creation of
clinics for migrants, home visits for resident workers, and forms of
poverty relief such as the distribution of milk, food, and occasional
subsidies. Expenses f or these initiatives varied enormously in rice-
producing provinces. As in all other projects, ONMI tried to minimise
its share of the funding by soliciting donations from employer and
labour organisations, other public institutions, private charities,
citizens and local governments.
Provincial federations, however, encountered a great deal of
indifference to ONMI and its 'campaign for rice workers'. And the
administrative and organisational difficulties experienced by most
ONMI feder8li across the nation disrupted welfare development here
too. When In April 1926 ONMI authorities in Novara began to implement
the finance procedure outlined by the 1926 regulation, municipal
governments, beneficient institutions, and Congregations of Charity
refused to part with those funds which comprised their statutory
contributions to the institution. Failure to create an efficient
bureaucratic mechanism for the collection of money from these sources
affected social programmes by obstructing Institutional growth on a
local level. By early 1928, about 150 of the 230 communes in ONMI's
provincial administration of Novara still lacked committees; and 50 of
the roughly 80 standing comitati had yet to begin effecting any form
of assistenza mondariso because of what authorities defined as a
"total lack of sufficient resourcesh.6B
Another obstacle to institutional development, many poor communes
simply could not afford to invest a portion of their tax revenue In
ONMI at a time when revaluation caused government debts to swell. And
other municipalities lacked private charitable institutions
altogether, so the contributions they made to ONMI's central social
fund proved negligible. 66 By 1928, some communes and Institutions in
Novara began to pay their quarterly dues in arrears, but the
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federation accounts for the whole of the following decade show
backlogs and Indebtedness continued. 67 A significant amount of the
administrative work of provincial federations consisted of this
constant haggling over finance.
But some of the responsibility for the slowness of institutional
development lay with the rigidity of financial rulings in the 1926
regulation. Though an Important rice-growing area, the commune of
Olegglo in Novara had not yet received any grant from provincial
headquarters by 1941. Yearly rejections from the provincial capital
focused on the failure of municipal leaders to open a clinic, a
condition f or release of funds laid down by ONMI's founding statutes.
ONMI leaders In Olegglo had been unable to do so because local
government had never donated suitable buildings. When the commune
finally found an abandoned villa in the centre of town in the spring
of 1941, the provincial federation came up with a grant of 3,500 lire
for its upkeep. The clinic never opened during the fascist period,
however, since ONMI authorities could find no doctors or nurses to run
the consultancy on a volunteer basis.69
ONMI provincial leaders In Novara deferred welfare development in
Oleggio because of their strict adherence to the law. They never even
considered the policy option of bending regulations by supporting
Olegglo authorities in their efforts to organise programmes more
appropriate to local resources and needs. Plans for a food and milk
distribution service for mothers who worked the rice fields remained
frustrated. ONMI never really got off the ground in Olegglo despite
years of wasteful bureaucratic negotiations. 69 Welfare organisation at
the local level proceeded at a piecemeal pace because ONMI had to
appeal not just to government agencies but also to the general public
to provide buildings, money, and volunteers for projects.
When ONMI federal! in Novara approached the association of rice
producers in the autumn of 1927 with a plan to share the costs of
campsite nurseries, they discovered that not one agrarian in the
province was prepared to comply. 7° The federation received assurances
from provincial leaders of the fasci femininili that the party would
assist them in their efforts. But the ensuing process of creating
these impromptu nurseries in an area where neither local elites nor
the general public were keen supporters of the regime went badly.
Members of the female fascio promised to make arrangements for the
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Glovani Itallane organisat ion to launch training courses In
puericulture and cultura Iglenica to prepare young fascists to become
a corps of childminders. Negotiations though fell through abruptly in
November 1927, partly because the tenuous hold the PNF had in these
provinces precluded an active involvement in welfare organisation.71
The president of the ONMI federation in Novara turned to the
directors of the public hospital and the foundling home In the
provincial capital for help, but both proved unwilling to provide
space and personnel for a crèche. And when he appealed to the general
public to open up improvised nurseries In their homes, this strategy
achieved fewer results than anticipated. 72 Federal leaders of ONMI
abandoned all hope of ever creating a network of nurseries in rural
communes since they had failed to do so In the provincial capital
where most of the welfare institutions were located and landowning
elites resided. They decided Instead to concentrate funds on poverty
and unemployment relief through the distribution of small subsidies
and food packets to families In extreme hardship.73
In Vercelli, the nursery scheme had more success due mostly to
local backing. Here too rice producers refused to fund the project,
but private citizens and Institutions filled this gap by setting up
nurseries. The active involvement of female party members proved an
Important asset, as did the participation of prominent women philan-
thropists. While ONMI carried almost the full cost for the maintenance
of nurseries and for the food given to children at lunch-time, the
federation received a substantial contribution from the union of
agricultural labourers. In addition to these funds, provincial leaders
managed to negotiate an agreement for a sizable annual donation from
two local banks.74
By October 1932, however, the provincial federation in Vercelli had
managed to create public ash! nt dl In only 32 of the hundreds of
communes in its administration. Most functioned as casual shelters in
private homes or public venues provided by the local Congregation of
Charity, the foundling home, or a similar Institution. The provision
of free meals, and in some cases medical care, may have filled a real
social need in this province where wage reductions, unemployment, and
the cost of living rose dramatically after 1927. But the total number
of children minded at public expense seems minute in comparison to the
actual size of the agricultural labour force involved in rice produc-
134
tion. With over 40,000 migrant women, 16,000 local female rice
workers, and 30,000 male harvesters, Vercelli was the largest produ-
cing province in Italy. Throughout the period 1927 to 1932, however,
ONMI assisted little over 2,300 children under the age of six years in
the agency's nurseries; and in any one season during those years, only
between 400 and 700 children of the rlsafae could be found in state
nurseries.
While the federation in Vercelli blamed employer disregard for the
failure of the nursery campaign, leaders actually encountered the same
problem which had influenced ONMI officials in Novara to abandon the
project. Women rice workers, ONMI leaders admitted reluctantly,
simply refused to relinquish their children to the care of impersonal
government agencies. ONMI authorities encountered a great deal of
popular hostility to their intrusions in private life, some of which
was clearly politically motivated. While many women resisted state
incursions because of the long-standing custom for r!saiae to bring
their children with them into the paddies, others did so because they
did not want to be associated with a fascist institution. Especially
In those few communes where ONMI had managed to secure the involvement
of female party members, working women seemed almost defiant in their
renunciation of any collaboration with the regime's agents. Even when
in 1929 the PNF and ONMI together decided to launch a premlo dl monda
scheme in Vercelli offering women 50 lIre to abstain from work or to
bring their babies to public nurseries, the scheme failed to attract
any popular support.76
Other programmes had a limited impact too. Plans to establish
permanent clinics for working families in all communes under rice
cultivation never niaterialised. By 1932, the federation In Vercelli
had managed to open only one such consultorlo in the province, and
even this was run directly by the nuns who governed a foundling home
in the capital city. Far from providing medical services, the centre
administered alms to the poor by distributing olive oil, powdered
milk, and bread to a couple hundred women a year. 77 Because the
federation had been unable to create a permanent social fund for
mondariso aid by banking residual cash and using interest payments to
cover costs, leaders lived hand to mouth accruing debts in their
accounts only partially relieved by annual grants from central
headquarters in Rome.78
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The plan for mothers' kitchens had seemed a sensible way to
alleviate the chronic malnutrition of working women. But this
programme too had a limited impact, since mondine in rural outposts
were effectively excluded from taking part in free-lunch programmes
established in the provincial capital. Because of the anticipated
costs and transport problems, a mobile unit carrying food parcels to
campsites and the surrounding villages of the baraggld proved an
impractical objective. In the end, Vercelli federall expressed some
considerable dissatisfaction that ONMI had been reduced to providing
only occasional relief to unemployed townfolk. Created in 1928, the
province's only refectory was located in the city centre, was managed
by the Congregation of Charity on OMNI's behalf, and provided free
meals for roughly fifty women and their children daily. But the
kitchen was open for only four months of the year.79
In the neighboring province of Alessandria where unemployment rose
considerably when local agrarians curtailed rice production by over 50
percent in 1927, ONMI leaders also witnessed their plans for lasting
welfare organisation collapse into frantic emergency-relief
operations. Reflecting the gravity of the economic crisis, ONMI's
provincial delegation decided in late 1927 to provide continuous cash
subsidies to the poor rather than one-off handouts. Following this
unusual course of action In 1928, the agency supported 116 families
from Asti, Casale, Novi, and Tortona for over a year with monthly
allowances covering food and housing expenditure.° Between 1927 and
1931, ONMI leaders in Alessandria also instituted an independent
initiative for assistenza Invernale which involved the mass collection
and distribution of clothing, coal, sugar, rice flour, and powdered
milk to 21,816 families throughout the province, who numbered 64,082
people in all.' Despite donations from institutions and Individuals,
the federation reported to the prefect, who kept in close contact with
welfare leaders, that as of April 1932 all resources for this costly
project were "spent". Leaders announced that they were forced to
suspend forms of continuous economic aid in order to rebuild the
budget. Only in the most urgent cases involving the death of a parent
or extreme hardship could ONMI now offer prolonged cash benefits. As a
consequence, 14 famIlies received subsidies f or a three-month period
each during the winter of 1932 when unemployment reached unprecedented
levels.
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Nor did this situation improve after 1932. The economic troubles
plaguing central headquarters affected budgeting and planning in all
provincial federations. While subsidies comprised a major cash outlay
only in Alessaridria, other provinces in this region were forced to cut
back on their more costly initiatives. As elsewhere in Italy, forms of
social assistance shifted to become more periodic and less substantial
after 1932.
	
In these provinces, welfare did not develop in the 1930s
so much as stagger along at a faltering pace. Prefects were still
sending circulars to ONMI leaders in 1941 imploring them to create the
broad collaboration with the fasci femmlnll,f needed in order to
implement reforms fully.e4 By recognising the acute hardship suffered
by rlsalae, the regime did set in motion a long overdue process of
building an institutional infrastructure for social welfare. But the
loose framework of services which ONMI built during the depression
would have to wait until the postwar period for further development.
The stirrings of discontent did not disappear after 1927. Police
reports stressed that the public mood grew tense as the depression
worsened. Salaries, they confirmed, were far below subsistence given
rising costs of food and housing. While shopkeepers in Vercelli had
widely publicised 10 percent price cuts on all goods in the aftermath
of the initial wage reduction in June 1927, they quickly reverted to
standard business practice to insure growing profits. The clandestine
literature and the public graffiti which they uncovered in greater
frequency, the police revealed, reflected popular desperation at the
crisis which had turned the whole rice-growing area into a national
disaster. The police attempted to keep a close grip on the situation
in these provinces by intensifying surveillance operations to discover
communist cells.
The political instability of the whole region increased too because
of harsh controls on population movement. The regime's lotta contro
urbanesimo took on a new political meaning as prefects and the police
frantically sought to keep the indigent off the streets of big cities.
When the depression deepened, Mussolini personally authorised state
support to cover the costs of free transport and food for the journey
for those who were forcibly "repatriated". Monthly prefect reports
revealed that thousands of unemployed and homeless people regularly
received banishment orders to return to their village of domicile.
Prefects and police also worked through labour exchange centres in
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rural areas whose staff were authorised to refuse to relinquish
libretti to agricultural workers who wished to escape to Milan and
Turin. With channels of rural flight closed, the Piedcnontese and
Lombard countryside became flooded with the jobless and hungry. The
Council of Ministers, who sent regular circulars to prefects about the
programme, explained that they wanted to crack down on urban migration
because when people arrived in the city they went door to door begging
for jobs and food. The "spectacle of mass poverty", they stated, was a
political embarassment to the regime.07
Fascist Agrarian Policy: The 'battaglia del riso', 1927-1938
In the summer of 1927, producers throughout the Piedmontese plains
began dumping stockpiled rice on the home market at 70 lire a quintal
in order to recoup losses. The export price had fallen to just over
115 lire a quintal, but the continued contraction of world markets
accentuated the panic overcoming commercial farmers who were dependent
on foreign outlets for profits. In response to this crisis, prominent
growers organised into a consortium In the winter of 1927. With Its
headquarters in Vercelli, the Consorzio Nazionale Fascista Risicultori
determined to regain control of pricing, squeeze out small and
inefficient producers, and strengthen the market position of Italian
rice.
Through links with the banking and business community, the
consortium promoted the creation of the Istituto Federale di Credito
Agrario in 1927. The association granted large landowners and
leaseholders more favourable credit terms by rescheduling their annual
debt repayments from November to February. The extension on loans gave
agrarians more time to sell their crops after the October harvest.09
The consortium fulfilled its main goal of regulating the market by
imposing the marchto nazionale on farmers and Industrialists in the
spring of 1928. The trademark list assigned fixed prices to various
brands of rice on the basis of size and level of refinement.
Ostensibly designed to protect the consumer from inferior and broken
grains by enforcing strict quality controls, the grading system
favoured the producer since the consortium reserved the finer rice
purchased from members for exportation. The marchio also worked to the
detriment of small growers who could not afford to invest sufficient
capital to produce a consistently better product.9°
The strategy to defend the competitiveness of export rice failed,
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for between 1927 and 1931 prices on the world market fell by over 58
percent to 64 lire a quintal. The consortium sold stock amassed over
these years at an increasing loss, and was finally compelled to
liquidate assets in 1931. From this crisis emerged the Ente Ndzionale
Risi, a powerful lobby determined to put pressure on government to
protect the interests of rice growers. Pursuing different commercial
alms from the consorzio, ENRISI sought primarily to encourage the
growth of the home market for rice.9'
In January 1931, the president of the national orgaritsation, Aldo
Rossini, began negotiations with Mussolini, Giacomo Acerbo, the
Minister of Agriculture and Forests, and Guiseppe Bottal, Under-
Secretary of Corporations. Rossinl pressed for acceptance of his
proposal for Italian refiners of cereal products to blend rice flour
into wheat meal. Eager to protect native agriculture, Mussolini gave
Rossini full assurance the government would see rice producers through
the crIsis. 9 In February 1931, Acerbo approved the miscela scheme,
though he set a three percent quota on the maximum quantity of rice
permitted in grain mixtures. Rice farmers had asked government for a
five percent minimum.
To prepare public opinion for these reforms, ENRISI launched a
massive publicity campaign imploring Italian mothers to improve the
health of their children by feeding them white risotto and rice-based
porridge. 94
 The government also granted merchants permission to sell
these and other products in pharmacies as part of a plan to market
rice as a specialty health food. 99 Accorded a lucrative contract with
the armed forces in 1931, ENRISI began to supply the military at a
reduced rate in exchange for the security of a long-term client. Other
benefits included an agreement with the Ministry of Communications
guaranteeing special discounts on trains to cover the high costs of
transport. To salvage the sector, Mussolini also issued a hefty state
subsidy. ENRISI used the grant of 80 million lire to buy stock from
members and encourage exports. The national organisation artificially
inflated the price of rice on the home market by forcing producers to
sell a percentage of their crop, amassing a huge reserve, and control-
ling market distribution. The organisation offered a premium to expor-
ters to offset the lower price rice commanded on the international
market.
The new system of quality controls to insure a high price and
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market regulation to minimise the risks of competition failed to
redress the vulnerability of Italian rice to market fluctuations. The
price of rice on the world market rose to just over 84 lire in 1932,
but the volume of Italian exports of the grain continued to shrink
annually thereafter. 97 ENRISI presented new opportunities for
protected producers to exploit the system of state concessions. The
organisat ion issued numerous complaints of fraud against agrarians who
made false declarations of low yields in order to avoid giving ENRISI
a large portion of their crop. Refiners too took advantage of subsi-
dies by lying about the price they had paid f or raw rice in order to
claim big premiums. Periodic dumping at lower prices than those fixed
by the ente also undermined the policy of making the consumer pay for
the costs of restructuring Italian agriculture.90
Fascism was losing the "battaglia del riso" both at home and
abroad. The regime's intervention to increase internal demand for the
product failed as per capita consumption declined after 1931. 	 The
continuing crisis of market contraction provoked further bankruptcies
and buyouts, a higher concentration of ownership, and the instability
of tenancies and leaseholds throughout the northwestern Po region.
National production continued to fall despite state protection. 00
Those agrarian capitalists who survived did so largely because they
managed to realise profits by compressing labour costs.
The wage offensive which began in 1927 gained momentum as the
earnings of female rice workers shrank from 21 to 14 lire a day by
1930. 101
 Employers also introduced wider differentials between the pay
rates of local and migrant labourers. By offering migrants lower
wages, agrarians made considerable savings because forestieri
comprised the bulk of the labour force in all rice-producing
provinces. In Novara, 9,700 local inhabitants worked the mondatura,
while over 13,000 mIgrant women weeded. 102 And while the number of
migrant workers in Vercelli had dropped from 40,000 in 1927 to 23,000
in 1931, they still predominated over the local labour force which
remained constant at just over 16,000 weeders.'°
The forestieri suffered greater unemployment than local labourers
as growers now discriminated against them in hiring practice. The
staff of local labour exchanges were instructed to give employment
preference to local residents in producing provinces. Part of the
economising trend, Piedmontese growers took advantage of the compe-
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tition for jobs In a shrinking labour market by imposing harsher
employment terms on workers. They began to make larger proportional
deductions f or room and board from the already reduced wage packets of
impoverished risaiae. Rumours about bailiffs on the big estates who
charged a percentage of wages as bribe money in exchange for scarce
jobs reached trade union officers who were powerless to prohibit
illegalities of this nature.'°m
 The assault on the livelihood of women
agricultural workers did not abate during the fascist period. Official
day rates for inondine fell to 11 lIre for locals and 10 for migrants
In 1931, but remained somewhat stationary in the following two years.
They dropped again to 9.75 lire for locals and 9.50 for migrants in
the period 1934 to 1935. Pay scales began to rise again In 1936 for
the first time In almost a decade, but they failed to reach earlier
levels. By 1938, women's salaries arrived at 13.22 lire for locals and
12.93 for migrants. The wages women workers received In 1938 were 62
percent lower than they had been in 1927.
Fascist unions continued to oppose employers despite government
pressure on them to support the policy of wage cuts. Labour syndicates
proved unable to combat illegal wage reductions. While they managed to
bring wages up to 11 lire in 1931 from the 8 lire proposed by the
agrarian association, they failed to enforce the agreement so some
employers offered desperate workers only 6 lire a day. 1O Violations
of labour contract stipulations on mimimurn pay and a growing awareness
of employers' exploitation of the unemployment crisis provoked a
massive strike action in 1931. Notwithstanding the increased police
presence at labour exchanges and train stations after 1927, an
organised labour offensive began on the 3 June 1931 when thousands of
mondine throughout the Piedmontese plains refused to accept the meagre
pay offers of agrarians.'°7
For the next two weeks, abstentions and delays in the arrival of
migrants continued to cripple rice production. Communist cadres
encouraged labour insurgency by distributing resistance literature and
by holding sporadic underground meetings throughout Novara, Vercelli,
Pavia, Alessandria, and Milan. The police arrested agitators, rounded
up hundreds of workers, and attempted to impose some discipline on
campsites by encircling them with road-blocks. But It was employers
who gained the upper hand in the dispute and managed to deflect the
movement. Agrarians lured risaiae back to work with promises to pay
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their wages in full before weeding began. By the end of the month,
militancy subsided everywhere as mondine begrudgingly accepted their 8
lire a day in anticipo. Reduced demand for labour and rising
unemployment had made rice workers desperate enough for jobs to
conclude the stoppage for a mere cash advance. But the political
quiescence which economic depression and police repression brought to
the region proved to be fragile. First in 1943 and again in 1944 and
1945, rIce workers and factory women throughout Piedmont and Lombardy
rose up in support of mass strikes against the regime.'°6
Fascist Welfare and Women Workers
This section of the thesis has attempted to reveal the achievements
and limitations of fascist welfare. Though progressive and far-
reaching in nature, most of the objectives in the 1926 package of
reforms remained unrealised by 1938. TrainIng courses for ONMI
personnel had not created a new elite of social workers; the much
vaunted cash premiums to poor mothers as encouragements to frequent
clinics never materialised nationwide; and, most importantly, the
promise to protect women and children at work had had few tangible
results.
Factory women as a whole received paltry benefits from government.
Partly because the regime chose to see women as mothers rather than as
workers, ONMI never developed a determined response to the depression.
Plans for the gradual development of a welfare apparatus on the local
level collapsed as ONMI federations were forced to dole out alms to
the poor. While kitchens filled a real need, they failed to emerge as
a planning priority everywhere in the peninsula and islands. The
enormous variation in the type and quality of welfare institutions
local authorities provided remained a reality under fascism despite
moves to create a national health system. And it seems doubtful that
women received enough sustained and meaningful social assistance from
these agencies to actually improve their health and that of their
children. Clinics did not go beyond the mere provision of occasional
hardship relief with a propagandistic purpose to become a truly mass
organisation of medical services. The educational aspect of social
welfare severely limited the scope and effectiveness of these insti-
tut ions. The evidence suggests that while the numbers of women and
children ONMI "assisted" during the 1930s increased, the benefits
provided became more periodic and superficial. Selective policies
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aimed at rural women workers also failed to secure the adhesion of the
masses to the state.
This section of the thesis has attempted to show Just how capri-
cious and insubstantial fascist welfare was when set against the
economic conditions under which many working women were forced to
raise their families. The few social gains granted to women as mothers
seem especially insignificant given the real losses they experienced
as workers. Wage reductions and unemployment of growing magnitude and
the continuing reality of women's underpaid and unprotected work
contrive to expose the fundamental weakness of fascist welfarism.
Improvements In public provision were destined to have a limited
effect, either as a political palliative or as an incentive for
population increase, unless accompanied by a substantial betterment in
the material standing of the working class under the dictatorship.
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PART III.
FROM CHURCH CHARITY TO STATE WELFARE:
THE ILLEGITIMACY QUESTION, 1890-1938
Credo che esista contro 18 carità legale un immenso preguid!zio e
che Si possa predire che tutte le società arrivate ad un certo
punto di sviluppo, debbano necessariaRente ricorrere alla carltà
legale. E porto avv!so che l'esperienza dilLosterà in un non
lontano avvenire cone la carità legale, bene amministrata,
governata da savie norie, possa produrre immensi benefici senza
avere queue funestre consequenze che alcuni teiiono.
Count Camillo Benso di Cavour,
1851
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Illegitimate Infants and the Liberal State
This section of the thesis explores social provision for
illegitimate children in Italy. The section begins in the liberal
period when central government began to legislate on behalf of
foundlings and ends in the fascist period when ONMI launched a major
campaign against child abandonment. The second part of this thesis
examined the nature of the care provided by new agencies created
during the dictatorship, kitchens and clinics. The central hypothesis
offered was that the regime placed limits on the growth of ONMI
because of Its outlook on planning and investment. Ideological con-
straints also restricted the impact of welfare because of eugenics'
clear preference for educational programmes. This part of the thesis
asks how fascism changed those institutions which it inherited from
liberalism.
This section charts the slow and uneasy transformation of opere pie
first into enti morali under liberalism and then into serv'izi sociali
during the dictatorship. Private charities became public beneficent
institutions during the liberal period. Fascism attempted to modernise
the character and Improve the efficiency of the institutional edifice
liberalism bequeathed to the regime. Because both the liberal and the
fascist governments sought to reduce the rates of mortality of found-
lings, illegitimacy policy affords the historian an opportunity to
assess the problem of long-term welfare development. This section
focuses on the changes and continuities in state provision from liber-
alism to fascism.
The discussion of foundling homes and the system of provision which
surrounded these institutions during the liberal period serves two
main purposes which tie into the broader theme of this thesis. First-
ly, the description of the shortcomings of social assistance under
liberalism aims to highlight the enormity of the task which fascism
undertook in 1927 when ONMI began to implement illegitimacy policy.
Despite moves by liberal reformers to improve the survival rates of
children who were reared publically, foundlings homes remained
unclean, unsafe, and uncaring institutions which failed to provide
even the minimum requirements for the maintenance of life. Secondly,
fascism's experiment to promote alternatives to institutionalised and
impersonal care failed and in 1934 ONMI dismantled the illegitimacy
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programme. New rulings that year caused the foundling home to re-
assert itself as the institutional centre of state welfare for chil-
dren who were born outside the comparatively protective confines of
the family.
The Problem of Illegitimacy from Liberalism to Fascism
In the nineteenth century, the unifying state began to change the
structure of the nation's rich ecclesiastical and charitable
establishment. Motivated by new notions of public responsibility for
the well-being of trovatelli, successive liberal governments attempted
to impose secular authority over private institutions. From 1865
onwards, they engaged in a struggle to abolish the Church's ruote and
to reform Its foundling homes. Customary devices for the deposit of
unwanted infants throughout Catholic Europe, these turnstiles dated
back to the papacy of Innocent III who founded the first ruota in
Rome's Santo Spirito convent during a plague In 1198.' A revolving
window with a tray attached to the bottom, the ruota was inserted in a
niche in the walls of pious "receiving societies", most commonly
organised by a sisterhood in a parish church or convent. Once the
infant was placed within the wheel, a bell was rung to alert the nuns
of the new arrival. An outgrowth of the Church's wish to hide sin from
society and to save the souls of un-baptised infants, the arrangement
sustained the social attitudes which shrouded "unwed motherhood" in
secrecy and shame.
Babies sometimes arrived with notes attached to their swaddling
clothes which gave the name of the child, a confession of guilt on the
part of the mother, a promise to return, and reasons for the abandon-
ment. The less fortunate were found in a state of exposure, illness,
or hunger. If the abandonment had taken place at night, the nuns often
discovered a corpse at sunrise. Some establishments reported that they
collected an alarmingly high number of dead babies from the turn-
stiles. Despite the suspicion that ruote were used as a form of
infanticide or as a way f or poor people to avoid paying burial costs,
the sisters made no inquiries as to the identity of the mother.2
In the liberal period, this system came under increasing attack
from reformers who called the ruota a "barbaric and ingenious
invention of Christian charity for child murder". 3 The Church
considered it immoral that an unwed mother should nurse and rear her
own child because of the strong belief that procreation should take
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place only within marriage. Catholic dogma viewed the unwed mother as
a woman who had fallen from grace and her child as the fruit of sin.
Both religious doctrine and Roman law classified an illegitimate
infant as a fillus nullius, a 'child of nobody' because it had been
born outside the legal and Christian family. The prime purpose of
receiving societies was to save the child's soul from perpetual limbo
after death by reclaiming the infant into the Christian congregation
through the ritual of baptism and the bestowal of a name. Infants were
farmed out to wetnurse and then raised in orphanages and colleges.
Critics of the turnstile also focused their attention on the
foundling hospital. As government authorities became more aware of
problems of public health, they came to see the brefotroflo as an
archaic institution. In 837, Archbishop Datius opened the first
foundling home in Milan which took at its motto bimbo nutro, words
which appeared on plaques on many foundling homes' doors. In one of a
number of parliamentary discussions on abandoned infants In January
1891, Prime Minister Crispi stated that above the portals of all
brefotroti the following warning should appear: "Here children are
killed at great public expense".4
Foundling homes depended on external wetnurses and farmed-out
infants suffered high levels of death. The directors of these
institutions were often the most outspoken critics of the system of
u mercenary feeding" which they struggled to supervise. Decio Albini,
who ran the nation's second oldest brefotrof Jo, the Santo Spirito in
Rome, blamed the balia for the very poor rates of survival amongst
foundlings. In 1895, he wrote: "We send espoused infants out to
wetnurse in the same way that a shepherd sends his sheep to the
but cher".
New ideas about how society should care for outcast infants had a
growing impact in the nineteenth century. In their attempts to save
the lives of foundlings, authorities In the liberal period took a dim
view of women who abandoned their babies to the clutches of mercenary
feeders. They argued that unwed mothers had a moral responsibility to
breast-feed their own infants. The directors of foundling homes
determined to uncover the identity of unwed mothers and to force these
women to reclaim their infants. Reformers justified these measures by
asserting that maternal reclamation rehabilitated fallen women. As the
ruote slowly disappeared from the Italian countryside, new coercive
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and restrictive forms of public beneficence replaced the device which
had made abandonment an anonymous act. The fascist regime continued
these efforts to reform single mothers by building on the ideological
and institutional foundation which had been set during the liberal
period.
Froa Church Charity to Public Beneficence, 1855-1890
During the unification of Italy, Church charity came under attack
by government authorities who argued that traditional alnisgiving was
not appropriate to a modern society. One motive behind the successive
enactments which abolished the privileges enjoyed by the ecclesi-
astical establishment and its charitable institutions was the belief
that public forms of relief would better serve the interests of social
and economic progress. Church charity was felt to be an encouragement
to pauperism and dependence at a time when the unifying state needed
to increase its productive and military capabilIties.
Other arguments focused on the alleged corruption of rich chari-
table foundations. Both those charities administered by confra-
ternities and those run by old Catholic noble families enjoyed
ecclesiastical privileges and dispensed relief at their own discre-
tion. The desire to abolish the corporate autonomy of charities and to
place them under the control of government grew out of recognition
that for all their wealth these institutions were not spending a large
proportion of their Incomes on alms. Enmity against the huge patri-
monies of charities did not spare their governing bodies from charges
of profligacy. As far as many liberal politicians were concerned,
nuns, monks, priests, and philanthropists were a parasitic elite who
lived lavishly of f the parish contributions, the benefaction, and the
returns on the investment of legacies which were not going to the
poor.'
Excluding those still within Austrian and papal territories,
charities numbered over 17,000 in existing 1861 lands and these
institutions possessed an enviable fortune in properties and endow-
ments. The wealth of opere pie tempted liberal politicians who wished
to increase state revenue. The Piedmontese law of 22 May 1855
suppressed religious corporations and instituted a cassa eccieslastica
with the purpose of administering the estates which were confiscated
by the state. In the following decades, the abolition of the Church's
feudal inortmain rights extended to new provinces as the nation
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unified.'
The progressive removal of many of the exemptions which opere pie
previously enjoyed meant that these institutions were taxed for the
first time. The ecclesiastical establishment protested that the state
was appropriating the "patrimony of the poor" in order to build roads
and wage campaigns.'° Italian parliamentarians justified their
encroachments on Church property and privileges as a means to
"nationalise" private wealth and release money for the benefit of
public beneficence.'' An enactment on 3 August 1862 prohibited
Catholic clergy from "meddling" in the administration of charities
which now fell under government control. The law conceded to munici-
palities and provinces the right to force the closure of those
institutions such as seminaries which had a religious or educational
purpose rather than a purely charitable one. And the legislation
granted local governments the authority to appoint public officials to
direct charities. In addition, private institutions were no longer
able to withold from government information on their incomes,
expenditure, statutes, and functioning.'2
The dissolution of monasteries, convents, confraternities, and
congregations destroyed much of the charitable foundation of many of
the nation's opere pie. The implementation of anti-clerical enactments
also met with resistance by opere pie. The Interior Ministry published
the initial results of the first comprehensive investigation of the
functioning of the kingdom's opere pie in 1877. This inquiry revealed
that over 3,000 opere pie did not keep regular accounts covering
outgoing expenditure, over 2,000 did not record donations and legacies
as part of their working budgets, and over 5,000 did not yet comply
with rulings on taxation. Many evaded regulations on mandatory
contributions to the state by diverting money into costly restoration
work in order to pay lower income tax. Investigators judged the
majority of the nation's opere pie to be inefficient and mismanaged
institutions. '
In June 1880, another royal commission began to publish general
surveys on the geographic distribution of charitable institutions. The
results of this investigation worried reformers who wanted the nation
to have a more uniform system of public services. The majority of
Italy's 61 foundling homes were located in Tuscany, Lombardy, Piedmont
and the Veneto. Piedmont, Sicily, Latium, and the Veneto possessed the
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only refuges f or unwed mothers, which numbered just 6. Over 87 percent
of the kingdom's communes lacked a hospital and many poor munici-
palities lacked charitable institutions of any kind.'4
Concern over the problem of the administration of charities grew
because of these findings. Reformers believed the state had to take a
more active role in the management of charities in order to promote
their growth and efficiency. By 1889, however, 18 legislatures had
dismissed reform proposals on financial grounds. The promulgation of
Francesco Crispi's law of 17 July 1890 on public beneficence seemed to
have appeased those sceptics who worried over what an administrative
overhaul of opere pie would cost the Treasury. In the first
parliamentary reading of the bill in November 1889, the Interior
Minister had assured deputies that an Increase In the authority of
central government over opere pie would allow the state to untap a
"national treasure of untold wealth". The state could better manage
the money of charities, he argued, which would form the financial
basis of the nation's system of beneficenza pubblica.'5
Hailed by contemporaries as a progressive move forward for a modern
state devoted to the "social renovation" of the nation, the 1890 act
revealed that public beneficence was going to be much less munificent
than Church charity had been before. The effect of the legislation was
to reduce national private endowment and force parsimony on charities
without substantially Increasing state funding. The enactment conso-
lidated efforts to create a central beneficent fund which offered
discretionary grants to the institutions which paid taxes. Throughout
the liberal period, however, less than two percent of state revenue
was spent on public beneficence despite the tremendous capital influx
from dispossessions of Church assets and taxation.' The state may
have imposed some order on pious institutions by making their
classification and registration mandatory, but the true distinction
between public beneficence and private charity remained obscure.
Foundling Hoaes and Infant Welfare
Throughout the liberal period, the responsibility of local
government grew as the central state drew up statutory specifications
for municipal and provincial budgets. From 1865 to 1898, successive
local government acts required communes and provinces to share the
cost for the provision of sanitation, Intercity roads and railways,
port facilities, the care of forests, and beneficence. According to
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these rulings, expenditure on foundlings became compulsory, while
spending on maternal refuges, hospitals, asylums, workhouses, and
wetnurse agencies was purely facultative. Despite these efforts to
unify public administration, much diversity in the amounts different
local governments allotted to beneficent funding remained. Great
geographic variation in the number and quality of relief institutions
continued throughout the liberal period as a consequence.'7
The increase in the financial burdens of local governments to care
for abandoned children comprised the principal motive behind the
spread of reformist ideas about foundling homes. Especially as efforts
to close turnstiles began to show tangible results, authorities grew
deeply concerned that the costs of public provision would progres-
sively rise. By 1879, 506 of the 1,153 ruote which functioned in 1860
had been fitted with shutters. Those still open predominated in the
South, where the Abruzzi and Molise, Campania, Apulia, Basilicata,
Calabria, and Sicily possessed 586 of the 647 turnstiles in 1879.
Between 1865 and 1879, 509,840 trovatelll had been found in
turnstiles. In the same period, about 2,500 esposti were left each
year in places like hospitals, city hall, churches, doorsteps, and
roadsides. Added to this high number of abandoned babies, the nation's
foundling homes, which were located in 27 provinces mainly in northern
Italy, collected about 40,000 infants annually during those years.
In response to such high levels of social dependency in a poor
country, Italian reformers began to search for ways to decrease public
responsibility f or unwanted infants. The directors of foundling homes
were at the forefront of a movement which advocated the active
involvement of the unwed mother In the rearing of her child. In the
autumn of 1880, the First International Congress on Public Beneficence
took place in Milan. One of the foremost activists for foundling home
reform in Italy, Decio Albini believed that the prevention of aban-
donment should be the aim of the new public beneficence which was
slowly emerging after centuries of Church control. Foundling homes
encouraged immorality, he believed, by offering women the opportunity
to dispose of their infants easily. They were the institutional
expression of a society which did not care for its children, he argued
at the convention. It was no longer morally acceptable, he asserted,
to condemn infants to an "almost certain death" because they were born
illegitimate. He referred to ruote as "little cemeteries" and looked
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forward to time when they would all be closed down. Commonly called
"fig)! della caritã" or "fig)! della madonna", these infants, he
stated, were really the "fig)! della malvag!ta umana": "victims of the
wickedness of the mothers who abandon them, of the wetnurses who
mistreat them, and of the institutions which neglect them". Public
providers, he felt, had to begin to protect infant life by assuring
that all babies had access to "allevamento materno"."
Romolo Griffini, director of the foundling home in Milan, endorsed
this view and spared no criticism of the women who abandoned their
babies. At the 1880 convention, he argued that public beneficence was
really a question of public order. The Catholic Church, he charged,
had been the unwed mothers' chief accomplice in a silent "massacre of
the innocents". Rather than protect the woman from the shame of her
unwed motherhood, a "more enlightened and provident lay beneficence",
he argued, should try to care for the needs of illegitimate infants.20
Griffini made a number of recommendations to the foundling home
directors who attended the congress. He believed that public providers
should focus their energies and resources on increasing levels of
maternal reclamation. In order to do this, foundling homes had to
offer the unwed mother residential care and economic support in the
form of monthly nursing stipends. The exact terms and the amount of
the subsidies, he argued, should be left to the discretion of local
authorities. They should be neither so small as to discourage women
from caring for their infants nor so large as to encourage women to
have more bastard babies. But to realise this plan, he admitted, meant
that foundling home directors would have to destroy deeply ingrained
attitudes about unwed motherhood. Unmarried mothers should rio longer
be able to protect their identity and deny their motherhood, he
argued. He recommended that they be forced to make a declaration of
maternity and that this verbal or written act should have the
immediate legal effect of a formal reclamation.2'
Griffini believed that harsher treatment of the unwed mother would
act as a moral deterrent to bastardy. While enforced feeding of
infants would reduce levels of death amongst illegitimate infants,
mandatory reclamation would decrease the cost of public assistance.
When put to the vote, this plan f or the reorganisat ion of the
foundling hospital received approval by members of the convention.
Maternal declarations, they resolved, should be made obligatory;
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details in such documentation would include the mother's name, family
background, and proof of poverty and domicile.
Others also believed that public beneficence should become more
conditional. As reformers confronted the problem of illegitimacy, they
embarked on a path towards greater austerity in public provision. In
early 1880, distinguished members of the medical community met in
Turin for the Third International Congress on Hygiene. These
authorities recognised too the economic advantages of an enforced
engagement of unwed mothers in child rearing. Antonio Agostini, who
directed the foundling home in Verona, spoke about the need to
restrict social assistance to the most needy. He mentioned the fact
that many legitimate infants were also abandoned In ruote and
foundling homes. The reformer professed his moral outrage that uncar-
ing parents should be allowed to "impose death sentences on their own
children". Along with measures to prohibit married couples from taking
advantage of the public purse, foundling homes, he warned, should also
impose strict qualification criteria on the women to whom they granted
maintenance. Only the "most wretched and poor" women should be
entitled to support under the new regime.22
These reformers proposed a number of important changes to the
system of foundling aid. They believed the state should care for
riconosciuti, who fell outside the bounds of statutory public
beneficence, and aimed to ensure that mothers complied with their
plans. They advocated that foundling homes should be recast into
residential care facilities for mothers and their infants. They saw
these reorganised institutions as the means by which they could
rehabilitate the fallen woman by forcing her to accept responsibility
for the welfare of her own child. In exchange for refuge and support,
these women would be enlisted as "internal feeders" who nursed not
only their own children, but also other foundlings. They upheld a
strong belief in maternal reclamation as a spiritual reconquest of the
peccatrice and as a moral deterrent in society. They justified the
controls they wished to implement as a progressive move towards a
"social regeneration" through a reformation of "barbaric" attitudes
towards children. By uncovering the unmarried mother, they aimed to
decrease not only abandonment, but also abortion and infanticide too.
The horrible shame and secrecy of extramarital pregancy, they argued,
caused a woman to commit child murder in order to protect her
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"honour".
Public Authorities and Wetnursing
Infant mortality In Italy was estimated to be somewhere between 20
and 25 percent for legitimate infants under the age of one.
	 Though
more unreliable, statistical evidence on Illegitimates suggested that
the mortality of these Infants was at least double that for legiti-
inates. 2&
 The social conditions of care would advise in favour of a
pessimistic appraisal of the life chances of children reared publi-
cally. In 1895, national newspapers picked up on a public scandal
taking place at the third oldest foundling home in Italy, the Saint
Mary of the Annunciation in Naples. Of the 856 infants which the home
had farmed out in 1894, authorities discovered only 3 to be still
alive by the following year. An official Inquiry commenced and the
home converted to the new system of requiring mothers to nurse their
own babies. An independent investigation carried out by a journalist
revealed that wetnurses had not been paid in months, that babies had
been given over to them nude and malnourished, and that the home had
no internal medical facilities or staff for health visits. Despite
these revelations, public debate focused on the evils of wetnursing
which was responsible for the tragedy of "novecento cadaverini".26
Representative of this new outlook on infant life protection, a
public health official in Milan condemned unwed mothers of the "double
crime" of getting pregnant out of wedlock and of deserting their
infants. Angelo Valdaineri thought that mothers who left their babies
in the hands of "mercenary feeders" were more morally depraved than
prostitutes. He believed that wetnurses were "corrupt and venal" and
the foundling trade the "most nauseating and filthy around". Because
of their appalling ignorance, he maintained, wetnurses lacked "even an
elementary understanding of infant hygiene".2'
In the spring of 1899, hundreds of the nation's physicians and
public authorities convened in Milan to discuss wetnursing. At the
First National Congress for the Hygiene of Mercenary Feeding, the view
of the wetnurse as an ignorant and neglectful rearer prevailed over
discussion. Left to their own devices, wetnurses, one home director
stated, willfully failed to make foundlings thrive. Because they
suckled their own children first, he alleged, paid feeders deprived
foundlings of adequate nourishment. He went on to draw a profile of
the wetnurse as a superstitious and conniving villain. When dry from
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her own malnourishment or over-feeding, the nutrice resorted to
"artificial" milk substitutes which were noxious. The farinose pappa,
a mixture of cow's or goat's milk with wheat flour or bread soaked in
water, then baked or boiled, served to "procure for the poor creature
a case of gastro-enteric disorder". Too sticky and dense f or delicate
digestive tracts, the mealy gruel, he argued, caused constipation
which could be fatal for newborns. To make matters worse, the balia
resorted to home-made laxatives to cleanse the child. The woman relied
on folklore and prayer to heal the moribund infant, but called a
doctor only In extremis. Cunning and unscrupulous, this peasant woman
then went on to conceal the child's death from the foundling home's
authorities in order to continue in their employ. The baUa borrowed a
neighbour's baby on pay day, and collected her monthly wage for the
cost of childcare.
Other charges against wetnurses included "speculation" and illegal
registration with municipal authorities who were responsible for
certification. Reform advocates believed that many balte registered in
more than one commune, collected a number of foundlings, and set up
"farms" where children were kept in squalid conditions. 29
 Foundling
home administrators also asserted that an illicit traffic in unwanted
Infants was taking place on a large scale. According to them,
"disreputable" wetnurses, or those struck off the list of municipal
registers because they had syphilis or were old, engaged In a
widespread commercial trade in infants with the help of mandarine who
worked as agents for homes. Acting as intermediaries between the
foundling hospital and the wetnurses, rnandarine arranged contracts and
transported babies to the countryside. Probably retired wetnurses
themselves, these women, authorities felt, made private arrangements
with women through midwives, and contacts in bordellos and maternity
wards. Reformers held the system of madarinagglo responsible for the
spread of syphilis and the death of an untold number of infants at the
hands of child-murdering farmers.°
Despite the seriousness of these allegations, however, the
directors of foundling homes and municipal authorities remained very
lax with regard to the regulation of wetnursing. Parliament too
appeared to be entirely disinterested in this social problem, as no
formal inquiry into baby-farming was ever called. 1 The state proved
reluctant to channel funds into improvements in the running of
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municipal agencies involved in health and sanitation, and officials in
charge of supervising wetnursing simply did not have the resources
needed to apply checks. According to procedure, no wetnurse could be
hired if a high percentage of her own children had died or If she were
still nursing her own child. But wetnursirig, as commentators were well
aware, was a significant occupation for rural women, provided peasant
families with a regular income, and involved the poorest strata of the
agricultural population.
Women sold their milk because they were forced to earn extra money
f or their own families. Wetnursing exploited the numerous oppor-
tunities for the engagement of women in badly paid bye-employments
which the rural setting provided. The legal and illegal commerce in
Infants was inextricably bound up with the demographic structure of
rural Italy. Functional precisely because of high female fertility,
wetnursing may have contributed to high Infant mortality in the
countryside by forcing the most destitute of families to spread
limited resources too thinly. In making their accusation that
wetnurses destroyed their source of income by wilfully killing off
babies, reformers neglected to consider the social context within
which the trade flourished. High general Infant mortality in rural
Italy was tied to the periodic cycle of food scarcity, poverty,
hunger, and disease which followed seasonal agricultural rhythms.
The heavy migration of infants from towns to the country almost
certainly strained already precariously balanced rural communities.
Reformers also failed to put into perspective how the system
actually worked. Foundling homes experienced regular wetnurse
shortages due to shifting seasonal labour supply. During times when
women worked the fields, authorities encountered great difficulty
finding places for their infants. Because homes were not equipped to
be residential institutions for long-term care, authorities were
forced to be much less selective than they should have been.33
Foundling home and municipal health authorities did not make a
wetnurse's job any easier. Although they were public employees, women
were badly paid. Contracts varied enormously from one township to
another, but generally authorities made no provision for any medical
expenses for childcare. While municipalities and foundling homes
stopped payments to sick wetnurses and those with sick babies on their
hands, very few Indeed provided any additional benefit such as
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medicine, special emergency subsidies, food packets, or even infant
necessities, like clothing and beddlng. 4 Though an essential part of
the entire welfare system, paid feeders had to make do with a pittance
even in times of great hardship. Wages remained notoriously small
given social demand and a fluctuating market.
By their own admission, foundling homes undervalued and underpaid
the public service performed by wetnurses. Government enquiries after
1898 disclosed that some authorities accumulated huge backlogs in
their payments of wetnurse subsidies. Account entries in many homes,
like those in Milan, Bergamo, and Turin for example, showed wetnurses'
wages regularly fell in arrears, and In some cases by as much as a
full year or more. 	 The amount of the subsidy varied greatly, but, on
the whole, women in northern and central Italy enjoyed better pay.
From a maximum of 15 lIre a month, reported in provinces like Ravenna
and Bergamo, wages descended to a minimum of 4 per month in Teramo and
other southern provinces. And the duration of the contract differed.
Limited to one year at Naples, Trapani, Catania, Messina, Palerino, and
other localities where authorities restricted wetnurse funding, the
contract exceeded the normal three year period in only a few areas.
Mainly the richer northern authorities furnished some form of direct
economic aid and supplementary support beyond the mere provision of a
meagre subsidy: the Turin home gave out premiums to wetnurses with
good records of reliable service; others, like those in Rovigo,
Brescia, and Padova extended subsidies on a declining scale for up to
12 to 14 years; some, like those in Bologna, Pavia, Verona, and Forll
issued educational grants to foundlings once they reached adolescence;
and, a few distributed occasional marriage premiums to foundlings
raised in orphanages.
On balance, the complaints of reformers reflected real weaknesses
within the system of foundling aid. Foundling home directors recog-
nised that they had little control over wetnursing. In 1892, 7,381
children who had been kept on by wetnurses were removed from their
homes because of mistreatment and abuse. At the turn of the century,
medic! condotti in Vicenza, who performed home visits to the homes of
balie, discovered babies with scrofula and rickets, and others
mysteriously absent though wetnurses had continued to collect
subsidies. In a number of provinces, inspections revealed that infants
had been given over to women with pellagra and tuberculosis. And other
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investigators reported that children who had stayed on with wetnurses
were found to be illiterate, battered, exploited as farm labour, and
generally "treated as animals". Some foundling homes did hire their
own health visitors, but most did not. The job of home visits fell
upon already overworked municipal doctors. In Naples, the condotto in
charge of the wetnursirig circuit was meant to carry out monthly checks
on over 15,000 Infants dispersed throughout the province.37
The Italian parliament chose to ignore the cries of reformers about
the evils of the baliatico and did not promulgate health norms
regulating the practice of wetnursing until August 1918.
	 It has to
be said, however, that foundling homes hardly set elevated standards
f or the humane treatment of children either. Although reform advocates
criticised wetnurses for being Ignorant and negligent, they failed to
offer infants a better chance of survival than balie did.
Foundling Hoies
The nation's brefotrof I were places where foundlings died.
According to government statistics, the average rate of infant
mortality within foundling homes was between 80 and 100 percent. As
many were mediaeval convents, they were not designed to provide
comfort and few had any of the amenities considered to be basic
necessities by nineteenth-century standards. A government investi-
gation completed in 1900 judged all of the nation's 121 foundling
homes to be unacceptable for a whole number of reasons. Inspectors
reported that the overwhelming majority of Institutions were unclean,
unsafe, Ill-equipped, and unfit for infant life. Some lacked heating
altogether, others drinking water, windows, and lighting; at Spoleto,
Orvieto, and Gubbio, cribs were found to be without mattresses; at
Faenza and Lucca, they discovered half-naked infants crying,
unattended, and covered in their own excrement. Only 13 institutions
made the regular bathing of infants routine procedure. In other
cities, examiners found living conditions cramped as six or more
babies were forced to share the same bed and bottle. In Turin and
Naples, inspectors discovered nuns feeding newborns premasticated
solid food and spotted sickly infants lying amongst those apparently
still well.
Foundling homes were supposed to function as hospitals where sick
ritornelli, those Infants returned to authorities by wetnurses, could
receive treatment. And they functioned too as institutions for the
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care of infants until a wetnurse could be found, which sometimes took
months. Inspectors reported that medical facilities, Including basic
provision for separate wards to isolate the ill, were virtually non-
existent. Only one brefotroflo In the kingdom possessed an Incubator
for the care of premature infants. Inspections revealed that
institutions which had declared that they made adequate provision for
the preparation of milk did not in fact do so. Staff left milk
standing for hours on end and passed bottles from one infant to the
next. Only a handful had been found to regularly boil milk before use;
and only one owned a proper steriliser. Given these conditions,
infections and diseases spread rapidly through foundling homes.4°
In defending their poor record on infant mortality, foundling home
directors claimed that most infants who were left with them were weak,
underweight, premature, and malnourished. The journey from the
countryside to the town where most foundling homes were located could
take up to a week. Those who brought the Infants exposed them to
horrible privations, bad weather, and insufficient food. Authorities
complained that Infants arrived in a frail state, failed to thrive,
and were destined to die.4'
In liberal Italy, the life chances of a foundling were very low.
Neither homes nor wetnurses offered much hope f or survival. New
attitudes towards children may have emerged but the whole foundling
home system proved resistant to change. Only a few decades before the
turn of the century, infants reared in brefotrof .1 were regularly
suckled at the teats of goats and donkeys. Some doctors actually
advised that all Infants should be nursed in this manner since animals
were not subject to the emotions which might sour milk. 42 Those who
wished to reform public beneficence came to see mother's milk as the
solution to the problem of how to care for foundlings. Their efforts
to enforce the creed of responsible unwed motherhood is the subject of
the following chapter.
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Unwed Mothers and Foundling Hoie Ref orli
The progressive abolition of the turnstile in Italy caused chaos.
The 1900 inquest revealed that many foundling home authorities
believed that they would be Inundated with abandoned babies in the
aftermath of turnstile closures. Many provinces were still without
brefotroft, so welfare reformers feared that Infanticide and abortion
would rise as the Christian apparatus of charity slowly disappeared.
Because of the lack of any central government policy or legislation on
Illegitimates, efforts to reorganise foundling homes proceeded very
erratically. An uneven pattern of progress emerged as one consequence
of the failure of the state to coordinate reform initiatives
nationally. While some authorities began to alter the terms of public
beneficence by involving unwed mothers in the care of infants, others
stuck tenaciously to the old ruota regime. As a result, the impact of
the reform movement accentuated regional differences in the rate of
social development. The South as a whole failed to capture the
momentum of change and became a region marked by chronically high
levels of child abandonment and stubbornly low levels of maternal
reclamation. But in those regions where reform gradually took off, the
new system of arrangements for foundling relief had a dramatic effect
on single mothers. This chapter explores the varied attempts by public
authorities throughout the nation to prevent abandonment.
The Southern Problem
Turnstile abolition progressed rapidly throughout northern and
central regions. By the end of the nineteenth century, only a few
provinces appeared resistant to change. In addition, many more
foundling home directors began to change policy on admissions after
1880. Attempts to force maternal declarations and reclamations became
increasingly widespread. In answer to questionnaires distributed
nationally, some foundling home authorities did provide strong
arguments outlining reasons why they chose not to Implement ini-
tiatives to uncover the unwed mother. Those In Piacenza, Genoa,
Orvieto, Siena, Arezzo, and Florence believed abandonment and
infanticide would increase if they put pressure on women to divulge
their Identity. The director of the foundling home In Parma objected
to maternal declarations on legal grounds, and stated that so long as
their legality remained In doubt, he would not make women reclaim
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their infants. In Fano and Jest, officials feared suicides would rise
if they attempted to trace mothers. And others felt that obligatory
reclamations would disgrace families and Jeopardise the marriage
prospects of unwed mothers.'
But on the whole, public authorities in northern and central
regions embraced the new creed of responsible unwed motherhood. In the
South, by contrast, they resisted change. The responses of southern
authorities to government inquiries all focused on how different
customs were in the mezzoglorno where attitudes about female chastity
and family honour remained backward. In Palermo and Catania,
authorities believed that women would murder their infants rather than
risk exposure as unwed mothers. The stigma attached to unwed
motherhood was still so strong, they argued, that maternal declar-
ations would cause public order to crumble. Fathers would kill their
daughters, and brothers would kill their sister's "seducers". In an
already violent society, crimes associated with vendetta would
increase, they believed, as would abortion and infanticide. Mainland
southern authorities in Campania and Calabria shared the anxieties of
their Sicilian colleagues. In Naples and Catanzaro too, officials
feared women would be subjected to rituals of public humiliation,
banishment, and murder.2
Another obstacle to change was the relative paucity of institutions
dispensing foundling relief in the South. The mezzogiorno possessed
only 15 of the nation's 121 foundling homes in 19O0. In Italy as a
whole, 2,240 municipalities out of 8,269 had some form of wetnurse
registration and placement agency by the turn of the century, but very
few of these were found in the South; only Ban, Lecce, Potenza,
Caltanisetta, Cagliani, Campobasso, and Sassari had these communal
facilities. Some townships created inter-communal agencies where
babies could be left; four of these services existed in the Abruzzi,
four in Molise, two in Calabrie, and four in Sicily. In contrast, the
number of functioning ruota in southern regions remained very high. Of
the kingdom's 464 open turnstiles in 1906, 427 were located in the
mezzoglorno. 4 The South remained a stronghold for church charity
partly because of the failure of local authorities to create any
institutional alternatives to the wheel.
Some foundling home authorities in the South did attempt to
implement new restrictive controls. In Palermo, brefotroflo officials
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sought to bring infant mortality down by requiring unwed mothers to
breast-feed their Infants f or a minimum period of three months as a
condition of aid. Officials there opened a mothers' shelter in 1898
where women were housed during their confinement as feeders. They kept
mothers busy in a domestic routine which Involved the sewing of baby
clothes in workrooms supervised by nuns. Authorities did stop short of
making reclamation obligatory, however.
Although southern foundling home authorities were reluctant to
force women to reclaim, they did attempt to impose new limits on the
numbers of infants they admitted. The directors of brefotrofi in
Messina, Caltanisetta, Trapani, Girgenti, and Siracusa focused on
reducing the levels of abandonment of legitimate inf ants. Married
peasant women relinquished their infants to foundling homes one day,
officials believed, and offered their services as wetnurses the next.
Apparently this was evident to authorities because wetnurses singled
out particular infants, this practice seemed to them to be fairly
widespread. Relying on support from midwives, who had contact with
civil registration offices, the system worked to the exasperation of
foundling home authorities because they realised that false
documentation alleging illegitimacy was still easily obtainable. Many
foundling homes in the past had made provision in their governing
statutes for poor families to leave their children f or short spells
during times of famine, but this custom was rapidly disappearing
throughout the nat1on.
In Messina, authorities realised that if they could provide free
shelter for unwed women up to birth, they might be able to reduce
abandonment. After 1897, the provincial foundling home annexed a
maternity ward where women received free medical attendance at birth.
The purpose of this innovation was to gain access to the woman at the
birth of her child when she was most vulnerable to the "subtle
persuasion" of nuns who brought the baby to her breast. Medical
opinion held that once a woman breast-fed, she was well on her way to
"recovering" her maternal instinct and would be unable to part with
the infant. In this instance, however, the plan backfired because
women shied away from the charity hospital.'
On balance, the accomplishments of southern reform operations were
mixed. Some authorities believed that conditions had become slightly
better within foundling homes by the turn of the century. Illegi-
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timate mortality levels did appear to be decreasing though they
remained very high indeed.' It seems, however, that the main impulse
behind the decline in the mortality of foundlings was the fall in
illegitimate fertility after 1880.' In the decades after 1880,
foundling home authorities witnessed a slight increase in the numbers
of infants raised at their expense. But, the numbers of infants
brought to municipal wetnurse bureaux did experience a sharp decline
after 1880, and dropped by almost sixty percent by 1906. 10
 Perhaps
efforts to prevent abandonment may have had some limited impact. But,
whether this trend was attributable to the long-term decline in
abandonment, or, more significantly, to the clampdown on legitimate
abandonment is impossible to deduce from the sources.1'
The conditions of care for foundlings remained grim. One index f or
assessing how much was done to Improve the survival chances of ille-
gitimate Infants was the volume of public expenditure. With the
exception of Sicily, southern authorities invested very little money
In foundlings. Emilia, Lombardy, Sicily, and Piedmont each spent on
average 139 lire per foundling. The cost of child maintenance in
Apulla, Basilicata, and Calabria, however, averaged between 60 and 70
lire a year. 12
Abandonment continued to be a big problem in Italy. The national
rate stood at 2.3 percent in the first decade of the twentieth
century. Regional differences in abandonment levels, however, were
very pronounced. Whereas between 1.8 and 1.9 percent of all infants
born In Lombardy and Piedmont were abandoned, over 3.2 percent of
newborns In Sicily were left as foundlings. And, although gradually
decreasing, the absolute level of abandonment in Calabria was the
highest In the nation at just over 3.9 percent of all livebirths. In
aggregate terms, the nation produced about 25,000 unwanted infants a
year and almost half of these were abandoned In southern regions.'
With 126 of the 464 functionIng ruote in 1906, Sicily stood out as
a region with an enormous abandonment problem. Almost 60 percent of
all infants left at the turnstile and Just under 20 percent of all
infants left at foundling homes In Italy were Sicilian.' 4 Abandonment
in the South was a symptom of social and economic backwardness that
liberalism failed to redress. In the rnezzogiorno, the "archaic"
turnstile remained in place despite efforts to introduce "modern"
institutional alternatives.
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Refora Efforts in the North
In Liguria, the Veneto, Piedmont, and Lombardy, municipalities
closed all remaining turnstiles by 1884. By 1893, authorities dis-
mantled the 12 surviving wheels in Emilia; and, by the turn of the
century, only a handful of these remnants still functioned in Tuscany,
the Marches, and Umbria.	 More efficient local government perhaps
distinguished the achievements of northern regions from the short-
comings of beneficent reform in the south.
Easing the efforts of foundling home reform, brefotrofi in northern
and central regions were placed under local government control. By
deliberation of individual provincial delegations throughout the
earlier overhaul of the opere pie, the direction of most homes had
fallen to public officials as ecclesiastical and lay governing bodies
were removed. By the 1870s, municipalities and provinces together
appointed officials to manage foundling homes.' 6 The dissolution of
charitable orders, however, deprived foundling homes of their
endowments and many fell into debt. Together with the failure of local
governments to invest sufficiently in beneficent funding, financial
considerations spurred attempts to reorganise homes.
In some areas, foundling home reform brought tangible improvements
to the quality of care, despite financial obstacles. The small hospice
in Viterbo saw its income drop drastically in the wake of state
incursions on the Church. By 1875, the home's authorities decided to
restrict entries to only verified illegitimates whose mothers could
not be traced as married women. The sizable reduction in the number of
admissions allowed authorities to channel resources into refurbish-
ment. Internal reorganisation involved the extension of buildings and
the creation of a proper nursery for infants. Other improvements
included the hiring of a nurse to make up for the lack of a full-time
doctor on staff. In addition to wetnurse subsidies, the home began to
distribute food hand-outs to needy balie. These changes seemed to have
had a favourable impact as authorities claimed that inf ant mortality
fell considerably in the following two decades. '
Not all homes were as well-equipped as that in Viterbo to maintain
infants in comparatively decent conditions. Quite unique in organi-
sation, the Viterbo hospital was annexed to an orphanage run by a
branch of the sisterhood of Mount Calvary. The nuns raised the
foundlings who were returned from the countryside. The foundling home
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authorities shortened wetnursing contracts to four years after 1875 in
order to save on costs. The nuns helped to manage finances by taking a
percentage of the goods sold through the institution's sewing and
art isanal shops.
The reform route taken by authorities in Viterbo proved to be the
exception. Increasingly, foundling home officials chose to limit
unconditional access to relief to ignotl, those infants declared
children of "unknown parents" in civil registration proceedings. And
they sought to increase levels of reclamation as part of the plan to
decrease public responsibility f or care. In the Veneto, the foundling
home in Rovigo was long considered to be a model institution. In 1877,
authorities had started to offer unwed mothers nursing subsidies. The
policy change, however, had not resulted in reduced rates of abandon-
ment. So from 1888, officials introduced maternity declarations as a
condition of care. Authorities imposed strict observance of rulings on
domicile and poverty and refused to allow entry to children born
outside their administrative jurisdiction. The home also began to
carry out ricerche della maternità to determine whether unwed mothers
qualified for assistance. Authorities employed new staff to inves-
tigate each claimant's eligibility at competent municipal public
records offices. When presenting their babies, mothers were required
to bring along documentation which Included a certificate of poverty,
a doctor's assessment of ability to breast-feed, a character reference
from a priest or some other person, and proof of residence and civil
status. Additionally, in return for the small monthly stipend, given
for a shorter period than those I or wetnurses, successful applicants
were bound to nurse their Infants for a minimum six month period.'9
The only noticeable outcome of greater strictness in Rovigo seemed
to be a slight decrease in the number of foundlings raised with public
funds. In the five years from 1893 to 1897, illegitiinates figured at
887 in the province's registry, but only 711 of these infants were
surrendered to the foundling home. The prospect of formal application
and bureaucratic controls on admissions may have proved intimidating
enough to scare some women of f subsidised childrearing. The home's own
record of reclamation, however, did not improve during this period, a
significant reminder that the stigma of unwed motherhood would not
disappear overnight. The meagreness and provisory nature of the sub-
sidy system too may have persuaded some women to make private arrange-
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ments for the disposal of their infants. As uknownu cases of
infanticide did not Increase, unmarried women may have farmed out
infants Independently.20
Foundling home authorities in Milan, Como, Verona, Turin, and
elsewhere, did manage to bring expenditure down when new restrictive
qualifications came into effect. 21 Previous to reform, some homes,
like those in Rome and Milan, did seek documentation from municipal
registry offices to prove whether the child was truly illegltmate.22
The brefotroflo of Saint Catherine in Milan began to limit aid to
esposti in 1868, but not until 1887 did they make unwed mothers
breast-feed their infants as a condition of care. 	 In 1877, the
foundling home of the Holy Spirit in Rome began limiting admissions of
legitimate infants to only those whose mothers had died or whose
fathers were in prison; by the early part of the next decade, the
hospital authorities determined to further restrict entries to esposti
ortly. 2
 By the end of the century, both establishments had
significantly cut by over a quarter the number of their annual
admissions. 25
The trend towards restrictive qualification Increasingly evidenced
as the century progressed received formal sanction. On 28 October
1882, the Council of State decided to grant foundling homes the right
to set their own standards for admissions policy. They could now
decide for themselves what categories of infants qualified for aid.26
But the practice of maternity declarations did not receive
authorisation. The 1865 Civil Code and the 1889 Penal Code both
guaranteed the right of unwed mothers to withold their signature on
birth certificates and civil registration acts. 2' To force women to
reclaim their infants was illegal. The attempt by foundling home
authorities to bind women to breast-feed was admissable so long as the
unwed mother's right to confidentiality was not violated. These legal
constraints put authorities in the difficult position of trying to
increase reclamations without breaking the law.
Matern8l Shelters
Foundling home authorities came to see the early recovery of the
woman as a solution to their problem. They believed that as much as 97
percent of unmarried women who gave birth at home abandoned their
infants. If they could reach her at birth, they argued, they would be
able to exert the subtle pressure needed to make her accept her
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responsibility.	 What authorities were struggling to do was establish
a formal cliental relationship between themselves and unwed mothers.
They wanted all women to accept their duty and breast-feed rather than
abandon babies at birth. And they hoped to set the groundwork f or a
change in attitudes which would allow women to reclaim their infants
openly.
In practice, however, the procedure they implemented to gain access
to the woman was quite coercive. Beginning at the turn of the century,
authorities at the foundling home in Rome began to send envoys to the
nearby public hospital in San Giovanni whose maternity ward had been
opened by Pius IX in 1865. The director of the foundling home made a
formal agreement with the provincial board of hospitals to allow such
representatives to be present in wards. Closed soon after 1865 because
of a dearth in female patients, the ward had reopened in 1872 and
functioned as a charity for women who were too poor to pay for home
deliveries. Used as a teaching centre for third year medical students,
the San Giovanni hospital was affiliated to the University of Rome's
faculty of surgery. The agreement between the foundling home and the
hospital authorities released the staff of San Giovanni of any legal
responsibility for maternity declarations.29
The foundling home representatives attempted to convince each woman
to nurse her infant as a condition of the child's admission to the
brefotrotlo. According to the statutes of the institution, authorities
had the right to demand the woman pay a tax of 60 lIre if she refused
to breast-feed. This tax equalled what she would earn as a paid feeder
for four months. The official also promised her room and board, conf I-
dentiality, and no formal obligation to reclaim. The actual docu-
mentation accompanying the negotiations involved only her contract as
a paid nutrlce. The removal of the mother and child to the foundling
home brought immense benefits to the institution. The home's authori-
ties would attempt to gain her consent to reclaim within the time
allowed for birth registration. By law, registration had to take place
within five days of the birth. To expedite matters, the home offered
to pay for the registration, which cost 15 lIre, and to send
representatives in her place to the record office.3°
Although the home's authorities preferred to get reclamation over
with at the time of birth registration, they still had four months to
persuade the woman to accept her responsibility. The internal organi-
179
sation of the home promoted their efforts. The woman was completely
Isolated from the outside world during her time as a nutrice. She was
not allowed to receive visitors or to leave the grounds of the
institution. Along with ascetic living conditions, the Institutional
regimen included a fixed breast-feeding schedule, sewing and cleaning,
and religious instruction under the supervision of nuns. Feeders wore
special uniforms with detachable fronts while breast-feeding and
nursed as many babies as they could. '
By the turn of the century, 21 foundling homes had moved to make
maternal confinements a part of their routine procedure. After they
opened shelters, authorities in Milan, Comb, Bologna, Ferrara, Ancona,
and Orvieto reported that reclamations were beginning to rise as a
result. 3 Other foundling home authorities established direct links
with autonomous mothers' refuges which were starting to increase in
number as a consequence of growing philanthropic interest In rescuing
unwed mothers. And In Alessandria, Turin, Pavia, and Padue, authori-
ties sent representatives to maternity hospitals In order to reach the
women directly.
Foundling home authorities were beginning to change the insti-
tutional contours of the brefotroflo. The growth in the number of
public hospitals and maternity wards in Italy facilitated this
process. Out of a total of 1,167 hospitals, 55 had a maternity ward by
the turn of the century. These, institutions, however, were located
primarily in northern regions; while Lombardy had the highest
percentage, for example, Basilicata had no public hospital of any
kind.	 The gradual increase in hospital births also consolidated the
efforts of authorities to reach out to the unwed mother. From 5,880
hospital births in 1886, the number rose to 16,608 by 1898 and
continued to grow.
Married and unmarried women, moreover, lived an entirely different
experience of hospital births. Unwed women were segregated in special
wards for nubill. Medical men chose to explain this symbolic gulf as a
gesture of respect towards decent women. 	 These attitudes spilled
over into the sort of medical treatment unwed mothers received.
Science and Beneficence
During unification, obstetrics developed as a postgraduate
specialisation within Italy's five major medical schools. 	 Because
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obstetrics grew out of surgery, practitioners expressed a clear
preference for instrumental and manual interventions in childbirth. A
leading figure In the movement to professlonalise the discipline,
Scipione Giordano wrote a medical text In 1860 which defined vaginal
"exploration" during birth as a recommended procedure to monitor the
course of d1latation.	 And In 1883, another prominent obstetrician
who began his career as a military doctor during the wars of liber-
ation, advised students to perform a full hysterectomy as a
precautionary measure on patients who seemed prone to long and
troublesome labours.
A leading specialist in his field, Sciplone Giordano became a
professor of obstetrics and took over direction of the lying-in ward
of the public maternity hospital in Turin. The ward provided shelter
for women during their last two months of confinement. A special
reparto of the hospital housed the unwed women who awaited birth. In
1862, Giordano added new beds to the ward, expanded the operating
theatre, and made internships there mandatory for his students at the
University. Giordano practised interventionist methods in the deli-
veries he performed at the ward. The use of forceps, the doctor's own
pref erred method to reduce labour time, and other intrusive measures,
like the manipulation of the cervix to stimulate the onset of birth,
became standard procedures.4°
These practices resulted in a high rate of maternal mortality due
to "accidents in birth", a phenomenon also evidenced in national
statistics during this period. 4' And, in this era before antiseptic
agents were used in medical interventions, Giordano did not realise
that these techniques increased a woman's risk of bacterial infection.
Quite soon after these institutional changes, the clinic also
experienced a wave of puerperal fever. The first of its kind in the
ward's 21 years of existence, this outbreak was no isolated incident;
in the following decades, puerperal fever erupted sporadically and
seldom failed to reach epidemic proportions.42
Medical intervention rio doubt played a crucial role in this
development. And, interestingly, Giordano recorded that the first
outbreak was confined to the section for nublif. He also left a clue
as to why this occurrence should happen. Though he assigned no
particular importance to his observation, Giordano noted that
refurbishments had made the married women's ward more clean, spacious,
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and functional. But the rooms where the unmarried patients stayed, he
recounted, were badly equipped and had no running water, ventilation,
lighting or disposal facilities. In this wing, women did not receive
clean linen regularly; nor did orderlies take any particular sanitary
precautions to remove natal waste efficiently from crowded
dormitories. 43 Because the mortality from puerperal fever was nearly
absolute, Giordano was determined to diagnose the causes of this
important disease. The spread, he observed, seemed almost entirely
confined to his M unfortunate charity casesu. By performing full
autopsies on the victims, including craniectomies, he aimed to
decipher the means of transmission.44
In the course of Its emergence as a major medical and social
problem engendering much debate, puerperal fever came to be identif led
as an affliction of unwed mothers. While French clinicians had already
made some progress towards diagnosing the disease as Infectious,
Italian experts refused to accept this line of scientific reasoning.4
Giordano, among others, prided himself on having made a major break-
through in understanding the causes when he isolated unwed mothers as
the source of the contagion. An outwardly healthy woman, he deduced,
harboured some inherent psychological and physiological predispo-
sition. The Nhumoursu, he affirmed, provided a clue as the autopsies
had revealed that blood congealed around the left ventricle of the
heart. This symptom owed its origin to some defect at birth which
predisposed certain women to the disease. But the prime cause f or the
quick onset of the disease, the uncontrollable chills, and the raging
fever which overcame victims was in woman's own excitable nature.46
The moral imbecility and emotional instability of unwed mothers,
Giordano believed, predisposed them to puerperal fever. Because of
their wretched condition, these women fell victim to bouts of
uncontrollable sadness, guilt, and remorse which were the first
symptoms of their pathological state and high susceptibility to the
Illness. He remarked in his clinical notes that he had never seen an
unwed mother who had been happy before the physical signs appeared.
These women on the whole were "disturbed, inquiet, anxious, imploring,
and Insecure." Although the doctor did his best to calm them with wine
and laudanum, they often cried or showed fear without the least
apparent provocation. The regimen and monotony of the lying-in ward
contributed to the mayhem and hysteria which regularly overcame women
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patients, he stated. And, the religious instruction given by nuns, the
doctor remarked, did not lend them any solace. The nuns' haranguing,
he believed, was an "Instrument of terror", which forced women to
undergo daily rituals of penitence.47
The tyranny exercised by Catholic dogma, Giordano recounted,
explained the "maniacal' manisfestatlons of the illness. In their
"demoniacal deliriums", he stated, these women would utter rapid
confessions and prayers In an uncontrolled frenzy. Other medical
observers similarly described the sufferings of puerperal madness, and
mistook these probably drug and alcohol heightened symptoms to mean
that the woman was possessed of a chaotic and unruly character.
Giordano himself offered an interpretation never clear or consistent;
he muddled environmental, congenital, social, and emotional causes but
always came back to the moral disorder in woman's nature that seemed
the root of it all. He could not explain why the incidence remained
extremely low in southern Italy where women by and large still gave
birth at home. But he argued that southern women were demonstrably
more robust in character and constitution than their frail northern
counterparts. '
No fewer than ten major theories about puerperal fever circulated
throughout the medical community. Each had its own idiosyncracy in a
variety of' attributions to female nervous psychosis and psychic
languor, puerperal poison, and uterine morbidity, secretions, arrest,
disintegration, pollution, and self-putrefaction. 5° Meanwhile, child-
bearing was becoming a leading cause of accidental and sickness-
related death amongst women of reproductive age. By 1918, maternal
casualties reached levels almost equal to the deathrates amongst the
male war-wounded. '
Par1iaent's Position on Unwed Motherhood
In December 1907, the Italian senate met to discuss a reform bill
which proposed that parliament enact legislation to abolish the
nation's 462 remainIng ruote. The discussion turned to the question of
whether unwed mothers should be forcibly confined and held bound to
breast-feed their infants. Prime Minister Glolitti admitted that some
foundling homes abused their authority, violated rulings on women's
right to privacy, tricked women into making declarations of maternity,
instigated searches to uncover the identity of women, and coerced
women into reclamations. Beneficence, he stated, had begun to treat
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unwed mothers as fugitives and to punish them with a prison-like
confinement. The institutional isolation of the maternity refuges
imposed a strict regimen which seemed to him to be uncivilised and
harsh. 2
The three-day debate concluded in tacit approval of the various
strategies used by foundling homes to prevent abandonment. The opi-
nions expressed by legislators focused on how beneficial the new
methods were for public providers who were concerned about combatting
this social problem. Enforced access to mother's milk, one senator
asserted, was the only way foundling homes were ever going to reduce
rates of Infant mortality which were between 90 and 95 percent.
Confinements before and after birth, he believed, allowed authorities
the time they needed to cultivate maternal instinct. Daily contact
with the child stimulated a mother's protective and nurturant nature
and resulted in reclamation.
Another senator argued that foundling homes were at the forefront
of a social struggle for the moral regeneration of the nation. The
same law-maker ended his defense of the right of foundling homes to
force women to accept motherhood with an anecdote. In 1898, he
related, one of two foundling homes in Bologna had become frustrated
enough with seasonal fluctuations in the wetnurse market that
directors decided to Initiate a policy of mandatory maternal
confinements for a minimum of three months. An intrepid female filed a
lawsuit against the home on the grounds of unlawful detention. The
foundling home authorities settled out of court and paid the mother
compensation. Fearful of more scandal, the home's officials decided to
revert back to the old method of bottle-feeding infants waiting to be
farmed out to the countryside. The 25 percent deathrate achieved
during the brief interlude when mothers breast-fed skyrocketed to over
90 percent as a consequence of "artifical methods of feeding". When
the press and town leaders picked up on the case, the senator
remarked, the woman was suitably condemned for her selfishness. The
favourable publicity permitted the governing body to approve of re-
installment of the controversial method. Ending his account, the
senator added that once women were again confined within the
brefotrof Jo a bewildered mortician had gone to the home wondering what
had become of the doctor who had been killing so many babies.
Parliament did not approve of the proposed passage of national
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legislation to force the closure of the turnstiles yet in use.
Although they realised that rates of abandonment were much higher in
areas where the turnstile still existed, law-makers deferred their
decision on the future of opere pie. Parliamentarians could not act
resolutely without committing central government to a long-term plan
for a financial investment in the infrastructure of beneficence. They
recognised the fact that the nation's brefotrofi were underfunded and
rundown and that many provinces still lacked any facilities for
foundlings. Only 2,240 of the nation's 8,269 communes made provision
for foundlings in their budgets. They feared, however, that by
deepening the debate on foundlings they would be forced to address the
pressing need to put other forms of statutory provision on the books.
Giolitti mentioned the failures of the law of 19 November 1889 on
public security to help homeless minors. Designed to halt the spread
of pauperism, the law held communes responsible for the obligatory
recovery of adolescents in public alms houses. The enactment, Giolitti
stated, was patently inhumane because it put young children In the
same legal category as vagabonds. He pointed out what seemed to him to
be the central dilemma of the state. Since the Treasury had failed to
forward extra cash to municipalities to help them build more poor-
houses, the act had only a very limited impact anyway. Parliament
could go on debating f or decades about pubblic8 beneficenza, Giolitti
remarked, but without more funds, the state would never be able to
protect the welfare of the nation's least fortunate citizens.
On practical terms, parliamentarians could not object to the
achievements which foundling home reform had already realised. They
gave their endorsement to the measures implemented by foundling home
authorities to seek out and detain unwed mothers. But when the
discussion turned to whether law-makers should condone paternity
searches too, they all seemed to agree that such a move was unwise and
premature. The question of whether putative fathers should be held
liable to claims for child support by unmarried mothers had been on
the agenda since the beginning of the movement for foundling home
reform. But parliamentarians chose not to open up this debate either
on the grounds that innocent men would fall victim to false allega-
tions of paternity.
Parliament's endorsement of maternity searches edged the debate on
beneficence away from a serious discussion of the structural defici-
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encles of public provision. The problem of the number and quality of
care institutions remained a secondary issue though chronic insuff I-
ciencies on both counts kept the whole beneficent apparatus wanting.
National legislation to clarify the legal parameters of aid towards
illegitimates did not seem forthcoming. And so the administration of
programmes, like those for maternal subsidies, did not become standard
and uniform procedure everywhere in the nation.
The liberal period saw the emergence of the unwed mother as an
object for rehabilitation and control. Forced out from behind the
protective shroud of the turnstile, the unwed mother was exposed to
the rigours and risks accompanying redemptive medical and social
strategies. Reformers preserved traditional attitudes about unwed
mothers and treated them as a caste best secluded from respectable
society. Foundling home authorities used women as a source of life for
infants, while doctors treated them as a source of contagion. In the
debate about puerperal fever, the disease became fixed in the medical
mind as a symptom of the social pathology of unwed motherhood. Yet
both reformers and doctors imposed a new concealment on women who were
isolated In wards and shelters.
The Legacy of Liberalls.
In September 1917, directors of the nation's foundling homes
assembled in Rome for a conference jointly hosted by the Ministry of
Health. Delegates voted to invoke government to pass far reaching
legislation on the "protection of infancy and childhood". Authorities
did not confince their demands to an appeal for state involvement in
the process of foundling home reform. They put a whole range of issues
on the agenda. They called for central government support f or the
creation of milk depots, maternal kitchens, and crèches. They wanted
parliament to consider placing laws on affiliation, adoption, and
paternity on the books. And they proposed that the legislature enact
laws on all categories of "morally and materially abandoned ado-
lescents", including "juvenile delinquents" and "mentally and
physically deficient children".57
The war had broadened the reformist platform. Foundling home
authorities were convinced that the whole machinery of beneficence had
collapsed. Homes had been forced to take in more infants as abandon-
ment rates escalated throughout the war. The director of the home in
Reggio Emilia complained that he had to relax rulings on poverty and
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domicile and extend the geographic radius of his administration from
15 to 45 municipalities. During the war, the brefotrof to had gone into
debt as provincial and municipal government haggled over their
respective shares in finance.	 Other arguments revived old issues
which dated back to the era of the reform of opere pie. Foundling home
directors admitted that their institutions were still unsafe, unclean
and inefficient.59
The war also put new burdens on beneficence and further strained
its old institutional structure. Military authorities began to
requisition hospitals beginning in late 1916. Needed for returning
soldiers suffering psychological and physical disabilities, available
beds in specialised Institutions were found to be exceedingly scarce.
Still more cracks appeared in the beneficent foundation. Many local
government authorities had seen income reserves drained soon after the
onset of hostilities. Provinces and municipalities found themselves
entirely unable to cope with the pressures of increased demand for
social assistance. In an effort to provide some form of aid for
returning veterans, foundling homes and mental asylums were quickly
converted into military hospitals. With residents hurriedly removed to
institutions adapted to provide entirely different facilities, a
complete breakdown of services seemed imminent. Injured soldiers were
shuffled into orphanages and alms houses too. 6° This chaos paralysed
the recovery effort and brought home to authorities Just how weak the
institutional structure of public beneficence was. Throughout the
remainder of the war, the growing reform lobby managed to secure
repeated claims of parliamentary commitment to change. 61 On the
peacetime agenda stood their demand for a final solution to the
question of the future of beneficenza pubblica.
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The Illegitimacy Campaign under Fascism: 1923-1938
This chapter seeks to explore the nature of fascist illegitimacy
policy in an attempt to draw out continuities and changes in state
administration from the liberal period. Fascist policy differed little
from liberal policy in so far as maternal reclamation remained the
primary goal of rescue efforts. But the regime did tie the question of
illegitimacy to the demographic campaign. New concerns dominated
public debate about methods to combat this social problem. Other
significant departures occurred, the most important of which resulted
from centralised control of social programmes under ONMI.
Discussion of these changes attempts to highlight the main
characteristics of welfare organisatton under fascism. On 8 May 1926,
ONMI issued a policy statement outlining plans to devote a
disproportionately large share of its budget to a trial campaign. The
'battle' against illegitimacy which ensued was the regime's first
serious challenge in the area of social reform. There was much that
was progressive in new fascist laws and practice. The immediate
abolition of the turnstile and the gradual dissolution of the
foundling home stood out as two especially ambitious aims. But easy
policy implementation continued to elude public bureaucracy even under
a central ising dictatorship. By all accounts, the campaign came to a
less than spectacular close in 1932. The experiment to promote
'modern' forms of welfare was a brief interlude marked by promise but
marred in practice. The subsequent period saw a dismantling of
services and a deterioration In care as public Institutions under ONMI
reverted to past procedure.
The Alias of the 1923 and 1927 LegIslation
A decree law issued on 16 December 1923 abolished the archaic
ruota.' As momentous as this legislation seemed to be, the law merely
formalised the demise of the wheel in places where closures had long
since taken place. And it had little effect in those areas where open
turnstiles still existed. ONMI investigations found many wheels
functioning well into the next decade, an important factor in
assessing the impact of fascist policy. Weak public incursions on the
charitable establishment proved no match for the force of resistance
mounted in some southern and central regions. 2 Survival of the system
of anonymous abandonment showed up the fragility of fascist welfare in
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those strongholds where the Church sustained the institutional
traditions of charity.
On 21 June 1926, ONMI's central council approved nominations for a
commission to review all existing guidelines on aid to illegitilnates.
The members of the commission Included directors of those major
foundlings homes in Rome, Turin, and Milan, as well as ONMI officials.
They based their recommendations on foundling home inspections begun
in December 1925 and finished in the first six month's of ONMI's
existence. The speed with which ONMI leaders acted reflected just how
much a priority this single issue was for the organisation.
The first government inquiry since the 1900 inquest, the 1926
investigations were not published or publicised in the press. The
results were kept secret because most of the nation's 121 foundling
homes were exposed as unsafe, unclean, and inefficient institutions.4
ONMI officials expressed surprise about how little brefotrof I had
changed since the 1900 report. Only a few of the richer establishments
had implemented any of the Improvements made mandatory by the 1923
legislation. Most lacked any medical staff or facilities for sick
babies. Still under the direction of charitable sisterhoods, many had
failed to hire any trained administrative personnel. Evidence of
extremely high levels of mortality amongst internally-maintained
infants influenced the decision to hush the matter. Findings revealed
that the majority of Italian homes had deathrates of 50 percent and
upwards. Some especially poor institutions admitted to 100 percent
mortality for internal babies. Because many homes obstructed efforts
to search premises and sequester records, ONMI investigators concluded
their directors had much to hide. They suspected farmed-out infants
also had low chances of survival since so few homes organised any
system of wetnurse medical certification or health visits.s
The 1926 inquIry recommended rapid centralisation of services under
ONMI. Commissioners voiced their criticism of the "absolute inability
of provincial governments to handle the responsibility of assistance
towards foundlings". The consequences of provincial maladministration,
they believed, were "a wasteful and inefficient squandering of revenue
without any benefit to the tens of thousands of infants who died each
year at great public expense". Members of the commission voted to
express their full endorsement of the proposal to give control of
budgeting and targeting of programmes to the ONMI central
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directorate.
Almost Immediately after completion of their report, the ONMI
commission began to draft a bill which passed with few amendments.
With the promulgation of the law of 8 May 1927, the regime completed
the long-standing agenda for statutory social assistance towards
illegitimates. The act finally established the uniform and national
system of provision which the liberal parliament had promised for
decades. The legislation was far reaching and progressive In design.
The new system outlined in the 1927 legislation differed from the
framework established under the successive local government acts
during the liberal period. Provincial governments still administered
aid for abbandonati arid esposti, but this mandatory service now came
under ONMI direction, While still allowing provincial administrations
some control over the types of programmes appropriate to local needs,
the enactment set a clear precedent for national uniformity of
provision. Article 1, for example, showed a preference f or nursing
subsidies to be changed from mere discretionary expenditures to fixed
and large portions of provincial budgets. Although advocating some
measure for nationwide minimum pay scales, the article acknowledged
the diversity of resources in different regions and the difficulty of
setting unrealistically high standards for poor provinces.7
The law considerably expanded the eligibility and entitlements of
unwed mothers. ONMPs own regulation of 25 December 1925 had outlined
statutory requirements for assistance to all unmarried women without
regard to domicile, age, character, number of preceding pregnancies,
and the conditions of previous children. e The 1927 legislation
maintained this broad definition of need and further specified that
foundling homes and public hospitals had no right to refuse access to
women on the grounds of insufficient proof of poverty or settlement.
Especially significant, article 18 stated that it was now illegal for
a public or private institution to require women to register as
paupers in their commune of birth before applying for aid in another
district. The abolition of restrictive qualifications was a major
improvement over existing procedure. These guidelines effectively
liberated women from the bureaucratic regime of disclosure and
documentation imposed under liberalism. But enforcing implementation
of such radical measures would prove no easy task.9
Further evidence of the progressive spirit of this legislation,
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clauses made mandatory provision for early recovery of pregnant women.
Article 4 specified that in provinces with sufficient resources
assistance should begin at the earliest possible moment in the
pregnancy, preferably sometime between the third and sixth month.
Besides making provision for mothers' kitchens as part of a
prospective nationwide free meal plan, the law specified that
provinces should aim to create shelters for homeless women. Different
in conception from those wards opened during the maternal hospice
movement, these albergi were not meant to be medical facilities for
enforced confinement but rather purely residential establishments.
Maternal reclamation though remained the main objective of social
welfare. In addition to the nursing subsidies already dispursed In
some provinces, the benefit scheme outlined in the 1927 law included a
reclamation premium. This award was designed as a new positive
incentive to attract more women to reclaim, The aim behind all these
measures was to provide unmarried women with an adequate system of
continuous prenatal and postnatal care integrating forms of direct
economic aid with auxiliary services. °
With regard to the differing legal categories of Illegitimates, the
1927 enactment preserved in principle the existing framework of
services for abbandonat! and esposti. The foundling home remained
intact though the makers of the 1927 law hoped to render the
institution obsolete by offering unwed mothers viable alternatives to
abandonment. The law marked a significant turning point in this
respect by making provision for reclaimed infants statutory. In
contrast to the organisation of assistance towards foundlings by
provincial governments, ONMI would administer services for reclaimed
Infants. The provincial federations of ONMI were required to set the
amounts of subsidies due nursing mothers and supervise the functioning
of the whole programme. This measure for direct control by ONMI
underlined the priority of reclamation in the organisation's policy.'1
The principal weakness of the 1927 law pertained to guidelines
covering finance procedure. The provinces and municipalities together
would still share the costs of foundling provision according to the
first article. This measure preserved the existing financial
structure, which had long proven to be thoroughly unwieldy to manage.
As in the past, provincial governments had to anticipate the full
expense in advance and then negotiate the terms of reimbursement with
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municipalities. The chief drawback of this system of administration
had been that provinces were so burdened that they made stingy
allowances for this service in their budgets. Why lawmakers should now
expect local governments to improve on past performance by setting
aside even larger sums than before seemed rather mysterious. 12
Another shortcoming of budgeting arrangements, rulings on the
contributions made by ONMI to the cost of public provision complicated
matters. Sums earmarked for the reclamation programmes, as well as
those covering foundling care, were destined for provincial
governments. The central directorate of ONMI determined the amount of
each grant on the basis of per capita expenditure within each
provincial administration. Once again, however, provincial governments
had to anticipate these monies when setting expenditure and then await
reimbursement after spending. Twice a year in December and July, ONMI
would issue back payments but only after review of provincial
accounts. If ONMI officials found some provinces had over spent or
misappropriated their budgets, the law allowed them to withold
repayment altogether. While giving no revenue incentive to those local
authorities who took a miserly approach, these measures gave no
guarantee to more extravagant governments that ONMI would help them in
the end to discharge heavy debts.'3
Notwithstanding these obvious weaknesses, the 1927 legislatIon
changed the terms of illegitimacy policy to the betterment of
unmarried mothers. The strong position on maternity searches was
especially impressive. Article 9 did grant foundling homes and
wetnurse agencies the right to conduct "reserved investigations to
seek out the mother of an abandoned baby". Doctors and midwives in
attendance at birth were also held legally responsible to co-operate
with competent authorities by divulging the names and whereabouts of
mothers. The article made mention of the illegality of a false
registration of civil status and the harsh penalties for such crimes
in the civil code. After extracting a declaration of maternity,
foundling homes were now legally empowered to "gently induce women to
reclaim their infants".' 4 In contrast to the tacit endorsement
offerred by the liberal parliament, these provisions gave formal
sanction to the practice of searches. However, the law set very clear
limits to the exercise of these powers by receiving institutions.
The law deprived foundling homes of the right to break the civil
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code's confidentiality clause, article 376. Strict observance of
"secrecy" and "respect for women's wishes" was demanded of public and
private authorities. And the enactment defended the right of women to
withold consent and refuse to make a formal declaration of
motherhood. 18 In theory at least, this provision afforded women a
large measure of protection from undue harassment. But it was not
enough for the fascist government to put admirable statutes on the
books without ensuring adequate provision for enforcement. The 1927
ruling on women's right to privacy did not bring an end to the old
enmity foundling homes felt for outside interference in maternity
searches. Nor did ONMI ever succeed in breaking the fierce
independence of these institutions. Central directives and threat of
closure proved lamentably lame as foundling homes carried on much as
before.
ONMI issued the first of many angry circulars to foundling home
directors in May 1930. The organisation's investigations had revealed
widespread violations of the law. Typical infractions included the
continued preference shown by foundling homes for written contracts
which bound the mother to nurse for a specified period. Other
contraventions comprised revelations about frequent abuses of the
power of maternity searches resulting in the unwarranted exposure of
the identity of mothers. Many foundling homes did not accept the baby
if not presented personally by the mother. Others refused entry even
when a birth certificate showed the child to be legally registered as
an Ignoto. But the most common offense involved the charge that
foundling homes treated mothers in a "thoroughly brusque and uncivil
manner in their official interrogations". In their frantic attempt to
obtain formal reclamation, they hassled women "while the law requires
the utmost delicacy and patience in the work of subtle persuasion".
All these and other illegalities, the report stated, had become so
commonplace that many foundling homes actually made provision for them
In their governing statutes. 16
These irregularities demonstrated the difficulty ONMI had in policy
implementation when confronted with such obstruction. The position of
the organisation's leaders was that maternity searches "seriously
compromised the development of the regime's demographic campaign."
Fear of increasing already rising rates of abortion, abandonment, and
infanticide proved sufficient cause to issue caution. Involuntary
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entrapment of women into single parenthood, they believed, did little
to excite popular support for the government. Fascism, they stated,
recognised that the "collaboration of unwed mothers" with the
campaign to combat abandonment was "absolutely indispensable".'7
The Medical Profession and Motherhood
Despite government resolve that single parenthood should be a free
choice, the problem remained of how best to protect infant life.
Public providers faced the formidable prospect of caring for a huge
population of child dependents from earliest infancy through
adolescence. In a nation depleted of resources by war and
reconstruction, the costs of social dependency seemed to some a drain
the country could ill afford. Demographic evidence appeared to
confirm the worst of suspicions. Contemporary observers believed
social welfare would have to confront a progressive growth in the
sheer volume of need. ONMI authorities noted with some alarm that
50,834 illegitlmates were born in 1922, 49,272 in 1923, and 53,834 In
1924. These annual totals were higher by over 20,000 than the number
of illegitimates born in 1900. In the three years between 1922 and
1924, just under 40,000 infants were abandoned to foundling homes.
Only about 1 in every 6 illegitlmates born between 1922 and 1924 was
later reclaimed by at least one parent and this average was lower
than reclamation rates had been in the prewar period.'
An especially worrying trend for many commentators, evidence
compiled by public health authorities seemed to indicate a
progressive decline in breast-feeding as a customary practice.19
Postwar data collected at one paediatric clinic showed that a growing
generational divide in women's attitudes towards nursing was
occurring. Published results of a study noted that older women giving
birth to second or third children during and after the war breast-fed
as a matter of course while younger women giving birth for the first
time during the same period preferred both the commercial and home-
made alternatives. 20
 Other studies pointed to class and geographic
variations in feeding practice. One such investigation charted the
rapid diffusion of "modern" methods in northern regions, but
concluded that in the South "artificial" feeding remained scarce
while "mixed" methods were only slowly gaining ground. 2 ' And a
government inquiry completed in 1933 concluded optimistically that
mothers from the urban and rural working classes in Latium still
199
breast-fed their infants "as a rule" though they probably weaned
infants earlier now than their mothers had done in the prewar
period.
These findings showed less than a complete profile of feeding
practice for the nation as a whole. But the medical community still
found sufficient cause for complaint. Mortality for illegitimate and
legitimate infants continued to differ so dramatically and "digestive
disorders" ranked high on the list of major causes of death.23
Foundling hospitals were a major contributor to this since many had
relied almost exclusively on bottle-feeding during the war and had
yet to Improve hygienic standards by 1927.24 The collapse of the
wetnurse market after mobilisation when rural women turned to farm
and field work instead became chronic and acute in the postwar
period. Although wetnursing remained an important source of income in
areas of low female employment and migration, some provinces in even
northern and central regions where the system prevailed reported
sharp declines in the practice.25
These trends left their mark on social policy. Beginning in 1926,
ONMI helped launch a wide publicity drive aimed at encouraging
Italian women to "offer their breasts to the patria". Spokesmen used
the full panoply of scientific racism to give a new eugenic dimension
to postwar debate. The official propaganda machine enlisted medical
arguments about the natural goodness of mothers' milk in an onslaught
of public applause for breast-feeding as a patriotic duty. This
"blood and milk" campaign focused on the estimable honour given women
to nourish the race. The fascist government even went so far as to
criminalise the importation and sale of baby-bottles in Italy. The
new legislation protecting the "hygiene of infancy" came into effect
on 29 December 1927.25
But this initiative failed to satisfy many physicians and public
providers who wanted government to take a more hard-line approach.
The 9th Congress of Italian Paediatricians held in Trieste in 1920
had voted to render breast-feeding an absolute condition of
assistance for unwed mothers. Again in September 1929, delegates at
the Turin paediatric convention voted to make an "infant's right to
mother's milk" a statutory provision in a prospective fascist
children's charter. The 1928 National Congress of Nepiology in Ancona
declared the bond between mother and child "sacred and indissoluble"
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and breast-feeding "the supreme duty of all women". At the
organisation's Boizano Congress in 1930, nepiologists fully endorsed
maternity searches, obligatory confinement, and forced feeding. The
Italian Gynaecological and Obstetric Society as view women's primary
role as the maternal one. In September 1929 representatives gathered
in Rome and voted to lobby government for a legislative enactment
compelling all Italian mothers to breast-feed their infants. Though
doctors depicted breast-feeding as a "natural function of womanhood",
they still wanted to supervise women in the act. Some paedlatricians
pressured government to establish "centres for the collection of
human milk". Because they believed many women nursed their babies
rather badly, and others failed to observe even elementary personal
hygiene, they proposed that medical professionals should teach women
to nurse "more rationally and scientifically".27
Some members of the medical profession believed that a "biological
crisis" confronted the Italian race as women in Increasing numbers
"ignored the fundamental law of human evolution" by "refusing to
nourish their youngI.2e The fascist government did not respond to the
continuing pressure by organised medicine for admittedly unenfor-
ceable and possibly unpopular initiatives. This did not stymie the
scientific community. The fascist period saw the impact of Ideas for
a truly social eugenics grow stronger and more widespread. The
chronic malnourishnient of women who then gave birth to underweight
Infants gained some medical recognition. Failure on the mothers' part
to yield sufficient milk had long been seen as one cause of Infant
mortality, but now doctors began to perceive the problem as largely
preventable. Members of the gynaecological and obstetrical community
wished for better "prenatal prophylaxis" to prepare the mother to
fulfill her mission by monitoring pregnancy.
Recognition of the need to have well-nourished mothers reflected
underlying concerns for racial hygiene. Unwed mothers, one
commentator believed, produced milk of Inferior quality to that of
married women, so many illegitimate Infants failed to thrive. Others
transmitted through their defective milk the germs causing disease
and death in later life. Programmes to Improve the lot of unwed
mothers, he continued, should become part of the wider agenda f or
racial improvement under fascism. More money spent on health projects
to feed and shelter the lone woman, he stressed, must be generally
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accepted as a worthwhile investment for the survival of the nation.
Fascism, he hoped, would transform the "sickly organism of the unwed
mother" into a "perfect nursing system".°
As the eugenic platform broadened in scope, spokesmen uncovered
new aspects of the problem of Illegitimacy. This found expression in
the rise of social medicine specialising in infant and child
development. In the postwar period, neplology and puericulture both
became established fields of medicine, while paediatrics gained some
professional standing as a discipline. Nepiology did not limit study
to the fetus alone, but rather encouraged research into the wider
questions of the relative effects of heredity and environment on
Individual constitution. Practitioners espoused differing views about
the biological merits to the race of mother-based health care, but
all adhered to some belief in a degenerative pedigree somehow passed
through the placenta.
Puericulturists saw their science as the study of infant nutrition
with the aim of the prevention of morbidity and mortality due to
mistakes In feeding. 32 In December 1929, the national assembly of the
Italian Obstetric and Gynaecological Society voted in favour of
promoting the entry of clinical puericulture into the operating
theatre. They asked public hospital authorities to subsidise the
employment of trained puericulturists. The plan involved neonatal
detection of hereditary imperfections and close monitoring of early
growth. Society members endorsed these moves because they believed
that by allowing experts to examine infants, compile arithropometric
data, and draw up charts of daily nutritional needs, they could save
the lives of infants.33
Out of this interest in infancy grew the belief that child
development could be controlled. Some nutritionists within the
eugenic movement envisaged a future biotechnology which would be able
to manipulate infant growth in a desired way. 	 A new wave of eugenic
works appeared In the postwar period addressing the misery and
deprivation inflicted upon illegitimates by an uncaring and inhumane
society. These referred variously to unwanted infants as "social
refuse" or "social outcasts" but all stressed the damage done to them
by abandonment. For the first time in the long foundling home debate,
attention focused on the harmful effects of institutionalised care on
child psychology.
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Not just the physical costs but also the emotional legacy of
abandonment gained prominence in scientific discussions. All experts
now agreed that illegitimate infants suffered impaired psychological
development because of impersonal rearing and maternal rejection.
Beginning first in 1920, these matters rose to the top of the list of
complaints by medical specialists concerned with welfare reform.
This focus on the complexity of child development turned into a
concerted attack on the foundling home as an "unsupportive" and
"unfamilial" institution. The foundling home, these arguments
stressed, had not yet shed its harsh institutional image as a cross
between a hospital and convent despite efforts to incorporate
residential facilities for nursing mothers. Nor could the archaic and
outmoded institution ever respond to the newly recognised emotional
and psychic needs of children.
During the liberal period, many commentators referred to
illegitimates as the "fruit of sin" and "un-named souls". These
children were unknown persons who existed outside civil society and
the Christian community for lack of parentage and family. But during
the fascist period, the focus shifted to the emotional welfare of
Illegitimates. Abandoned infants now came to be seen as individuals
formed by heredity and environment. On the one hand, this development
lay the preparatory ideological groundwork for a more humane approach
to public childrearing than had prevailed under liberalism. Expec-
tations about the responsibility of society towards these dependents
rose considerably during this period. But on the other hand, new
scientific ideas reinforced old prejudice about the primary role
played by mothers in the biological and emotional evolution of
children. And, most significantly, wide recognition of the forces
which shape personality and behaviour exposed these 'problem-
children' to new forms of social diagnosis and control.
Illegitiiacy and the Scare of Juvenile Delinquency
The question of whether dependent infants and children fared
better under fascism than before can not be answered without
reference to significant but hitherto neglected aspects of the
regime's social policy. One of these is the "battle against juvenile
delinquency" which was intimately connected to the illegitimacy
campaign. One commentator applauded the government for its efforts to
contain "social deviance" and lamented the "horrifying contribution
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illegitiinates make towards raising levels of infant mortality,
tuberculosis, alcoholism, and, above all, precocious delinquency". He
continued:
N••• shunned to the margins of middle-class society, humiliated and
scorned, illegitlinates are esposed to awful privations which destroy
physical health and morality..., they become for society a burden
and even a threat".
Touching the authoritarian sensibilities of the regime, the problem,
he believed, had to be solved because "fascism can not tolerate
persons who have rio official status and live outside the sphere of
influence of family and state".37
Another reformer offered a rehabilitative scheme for delinquents
tied to the regime's ruralisation programme. To cure children of bad
habits learned in wayward adolescence, he believed, alternative family
forms must be developed to take the place of the traditional
reformatory. Not just criminous children, but also victims of abuse
and neglect removed from their own families could benefit from the
"regenerative effects of country life". Fascism must encourage the
growth of farming communities and small family homesteads where
"degenerate children can learn through hard labour the values of
honesty and work".39
According to one specialist, the juvenile offender now came to be
considered under fascism an "impaired and immature individual rather
than a born and uneducable criminal". As part of a plan of social
prevention and defense, she maintained, corrective measures could do
considerably more to "re-educate minors" than punitive ones had done
in the past. Rather than impose imprisonment in adult penitentiaries,
where children learned to become dangerous and Incorrigible criminals,
the regime should create more reformatories for the care of young
derelicts to encourage their "social adaptation". The problem was of
grave national concern, she believed, given the postwar surfeit of
abandoned infants who were "destined to fill the ranks of reckless and
slothful youths dedicated to wasteful lives as vagabonds, prostitutes,
beggars, and thieves".39
This argument advocating correction rather than punishment
reflected the growing conviction that penal and social policy must be
radically changed in order to deter the spread of juvenile
delinquency. The belief that minors should be treated less harshly
than adults under criminal law was based on recognition of social
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conditioning as a major cause of crime. Most delinquents were
otherwise "normal" children who because of mental immaturity had been
corrupted by their surroundings, and particularly by those in which
immorality, drunkenness, theft, and violence were rife. Detrimental
environments caused malformation of character and faculties, and
severely limited the capacity of these children to judge right from
wrong. 4°
Descriptions of harmful influences unfailingly focused on how
badly the lower orders raised their children. Poor moral standards
rather than social and economic deprivation came to be Identified as a
major inducement f or children to go astray. As one commentator
observed, juvenile delinquency was a "social scourge endemic to
inferior elements in the labouring class and certain sectors of the
lower middle class but unknown in good families". 4' Others regarded
the problem as a "racial question" and attached greater importance to
a general decline in morality as the underlying reason. Postwar
promiscuity, and above all the rise In extra-marital cohabitation,
caused a deterioration of the "race's healthy sexual instinctu. The
decline in traditional family and religious values found expression in
the wanton rebellion of modern youth. This type of argument advocated
the censure and control of a wide range of pernicious influences on
children. Literature, pornography, the cinema and theatre, and the
press, all associated with modernity, led to the "sexual excitation"
of youth and brought out tendencies to anti-social behaviour. 4 And
others perceived the problem as an urban dilemma, the result of
industrialisation and social change. Undisciplined by working parents,
the young grew up in the streets, this argument went, and turned to
crime as a consequence. 4
Apart from the discovery of the morally corrupted child, some
medical research seemed to Indicate congenital causes. Mental
deficiency came to account for a significant proportion of juvenile
crime.'4 The renowned psychiatrist Sante De Sanctis tried to define
the attributes of the delinquent personality, with the aim of
developing therapies. Inferior intelligence, rather than social
conditions, left some children with severe emotional and psychological
disturbances, The "abnormal" child showed a marked propensity for
criminal behaviour through lack of adaptive social skills. Unbalanced
from earliest Infancy, they became "mal-adjusted and alienated"
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adolescents and then psychopathic adults. Although he approached the
problem from a clinical rather than a penal perspective, he echoed the
appeal to government to establish many more educational establishments
for internment with a curative purpose. Fascism could not ignore, he
stated, the profound "ethical and moral obligation" to help the
"intellectually unfit" become "productive workers, proud citizens and
worthy soldiers". Nor could the regime deny the immense "social
rewards" awaiting a government which mounted a broad campaign f or the
mental hygiene of youngsters.
Promulgated on 18 October 1930, Italy's new penal code incorparated
these views into the criminal justice system. Like many criminal
anthropologists and psychiatrists, Alf redo Rocco believed juvenile
delinquency had begun to rise long before the war. But, according to
the professor of commercial law, mobilisation had aggravated the
problem by causing the break-up of families. Military service had
imposed a kind of institutionalised abandonment on young recruits.
Orphaned and stray children also figured prominently amongst the
social casualties of war. In parliament, the nationalist stated on a
number of occasions that the nature of Juvenile crime had changed in
the postwar period. Youngsters, he stressed, now committed serious
of fences endangering persons, property, and even the state. Appointed
Minister of Justice in 1925, Rocco determined to defend society from
the growing threat of the "alarming criminality of Italian youth".4
Political considerations undoubtedly lay behind many of Rocco's
revisions of the 1889 Zanardelli code. The Minister openly admitted
that fascist criminal law had to be sufficiently harsh to act as a
deterrent on crime and dissent. The re-introduction of the death
penalty after its abolition in 1889 and sentences far more severe than
those set by the previous code functioned, he stated, as a form of
"overt intimidation" whose purpose was to frighten Italians into
obedience. The acknowledged need to "preserve the state" caused Rocco
to shift the balance of the penal system away from the idea of law
enforcement to protect citizens from criminal injury or injustice.47
An innovative feature of the 1930 code was the incorporation of
some principles from positivist theory. The section covering "social
dangerousness" drew selectively from postwar currents in Italian
criminal anthropology and psychology. 	 The crux of the idea of
dangerousness was the enlarged power given a judge to form an opinion
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about the personal qualities of a defendant and to order the
segregation of that person from society because of that ,Judgement. The
concept of dangerousness posed certain problems for sentencing
procedure. A murderer who comznited a crime of passion would probably
not be found dangerous by virtue of the extenuating circumstance. But
a beggar or madman were considered very dangerous because their
general behaviour threatened the ideal of a sanitised social order
espoused by fascism.
Against the recommendations of his appointed review commission,
Rocco introduced a whole repressive regime for the incarceration or
confinement of socially undesirable persons. The Minister justified
the new mixed system of punitive and psychiatric punishments by saying
that "purely penal measures have proven insufficient to combat the
grave and worrying upsurge of habitual delinquency, juvenile
delinquency, and mental infirmity".49
The code empowered a judge to declare a person socially dangerous
even when he or she was acquitted of a charge, was presumed criminally
irresponsible, or was discharged from prison. Individuals most likely
to be deemed injurious fell within two broad categories: those who
were criminally irresponsible because they showed symptoms of mental
defect or subnormal intelligence; and those who were imputable because
they showed signs of moral depravity. Although causing considerable
confusion, the code did give a judge the authority to declare a person
dangerous even without any breach of law. Anyone with a conduct,
attitude, or lifestyle considered offensive could be placed in
indefinite detention. The fascist justice system did not permit right
of appeal in those cases involving dangerousness. No evidence other
than a full character assessment need be brought as proof of the
threat to society posed by a defendant's liberty. Sufficient grounds
for detention were met if a judge felt the accused was a likely
candidate to commit a crime.50
Rocco preserved in principle provision for criminal irreponsibility
due to mitigating circumstances, minority age, impaired reason, or
mental and physical handicap. But he increased the maximum time limits
on punishments set by his parliamentary committee after review of the
1929 draft. In the case of acquittal owing to mental breakdown,
alcohol or drug use, deafness, or dumbness, for example, the code
prescribed confinement of the accused person in a penal lunatic asylum
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f or a period of not less than five years. And children under criminal
minority age could be placed in institutions f or "re-educational
internment" by virtue of misbehaviour.
The code created a grading system of punishment according to three
delinquent types: the professional, habitual, and tendencious
criminal. Implicit in the code was the belief that the criminal act
was an expression of the malfunctioning of the individual personality.
The code imposed especially harsh sentences for recidivists, who were
defined as "persons addicted to crime". A judge could pronounce a
defendant a "habitual delinquent" or a "habitual misdemeanant" by
reason of two previous convictions. A further offence could result in
a judgement of "professional offender". And anyone, even if not a
recidivist, who showed "a special predisposition towards crime"
because of a "peculiarly wicked personality" could be found to be a
"deliquent by tendency".
The effects of a finding of habituality, professionality, and
tendency to delinquency entailed the application of "security
measures" for preventive custody. These measures allowed the fascist
justice system to send people down for lengthy sentences which did not
reflect the actual gravity or brutality of the crime committed.
Reclusion for a "delinquent" alcoholic could amount to a life sentence
in an asylum, while a murderer could be freed on parole after serving
his regular time.
Some of Rocco's contemporaries criticised the code for this reason.
The principle of predisposition to crime embodied in the articles on
delinquency collapsed the entire foundation of Italian criminal law
which was based on a presumption of intent. How could a criminal be
responsible for his actions, critics charged, when he was delinquent
by temperament and constitution.&4 The Minister of Justice answered
these attacks by disassociating his classification from positivist
theory. Delinquents were imputable, he maintained, because they were
"normal". Confounding one vague premise of the new criminology, the
conflation of criminality with insanity, Rocco nonetheless created
more ambiguity. His definition of delinquency admitted free will but
clung to a notion of crime as a reflection of a fundamental moral
failing in character. His delinquent suffered from something far worse
than some organic imbalance for he was "evil" by nature and choice.
In the case of minors, Rocco enlarged the scope and severity of
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punishments. The code maintained minority age at fourteen years and
majority age at eighteen years, after which mitigated sentences would
not be admissable. New guidelines eroded those few provisions in the
1889 penal code and the 1913 code of procedure for the establishment
of a probation service to divert child offenders from institutional
custody. Though Rocco made a show of his clemency towards children,
the goal of correction informed the decision to enhance the
Il educationai N
 aspect of retribution at the expense of so-called Hpurelu
punishment. While both penal and educational penalties applied to
responsible minors, Rocco shifted the emphasis in a rehabilitative
direction. But if convicted of a crime, a child could still serve an
ordinary sentence in a prison, workhouse, or agricultural colony. Upon
release, however, a court could now order protective detention in a
reform school under the security measures.
A new regulation governing penal institutions came Into effect on
18 June 1931. This law, together with a further enactment on 20 July
1934, re-defined the nature of punishment of child offenders. These
acts specified that court buildings should have annexed facilities for
the detention and treatment of all types of juvenile delinquent. The
N reeducation centre" should contain a psychiatric clinic, a school, a
reformatory, and a minors' prison. 67 Most importantly, this
legislation made provision for special establishments where
particularly refractory children could be kept for psychological
testing. The juvenile justice system under fascism sought to remove
child offenders from society and place them in isolation wards where
personality defects such as anti-social instincts, violence, and
malevolence could be eradicated. Apart from purely punitive measures
provided by prison, the reformatory, and hard labour, these enactments
set a clear precedent for the application of eugenic measures such as
medico-pedagogical "re-education".
The National Organisation f or the Protection of Motherhood and
Infancy remained somewhat aloof from these trends. Officials expressed
the view that the public sector should provide assistance only f or
"healthy and sane children who will make a positive contribution to
their race, the economy, and the nation" while private charities
should care f or "derelicts, incurables, and unproductive elements".
Budget limitations forced ONMI to set these priorities.	 Nonetheless,
in May 1929 the organisation did negotiate with the Ministry of
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Justice the terms of an agreement for the establishment of special
provincial commissions to combat juvenile delinquency. Though the
programme had a limited effect throughout the fascist period, some
provincial federations did establish a system of home visits to
compile "hereditary and environmental data" about defendants. Evidence
concerning the character and background of minors, bearing on a
verdict of habituality especially, was now admissable in court
proceedings.
These developments gave a boost to the advance of so-called
forensic medicine, which at this period was a peculiar blend of
phrenological, anthropological, and pychological ideas. Practitioners
compiled case biographies, based on "soinato-psychic investigations".
For the collection of data about home life, questions concerning the
morality and health of family members prevailed; personal details
focused on bad habits such as smoking, gambling, film-going, and
reading of adventure stories to establish whether the child had fallen
under the sway of corrupting influences. And physical examinations
assessed sexual development and "biotype" to determine congenital
causes. Finally, experts completed a personality profile of the
individual which gave a list of all defects. Facts about low mental
age, high suggestibility, and emotional instability affected the final
judgement about the delinquent's level of social dangerousness.°
ONMI did participate in this "therapeutic" movement. With the
involvement of local police and private charities, some ONMI
federations in mainly northern provinces created child detention and
observation centres. By 1935, local money and private venues had been
found for 24 such specialised institutions though forensic medicine
was now officially practiced in reformatories throughout the nation as
well. These establishments housed "delinquent, degenerate, and
disturbed" children awaiting trial or sentencing. Together with a
magistrate and a representative from ONMI, medical staff included a
specialist in criminal anthropology and one expert in psychiatry. The
purpose of these centres was to diagnose the causes of delinquency by
examining each individual for symptoms of abnormality. Intelligence
tests were given to children who appeared mentally deficient; skull
measurements were taken of physically handicapped offenders;
psychiatric Investigations were made of children deprived of "material
and moral" family support who then turned to crime.'
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Between 1931 and 1934, 1,404 male and 60 female children mostly
between the ages of twelve and eighteen were examined in those
institutions under ONMI supervision alone. Biological and psychiatric
testing found that the vast majority of delinquents suffered from some
form of hereditary predisposition due to immoral, alcoholic, and
psychopathological family traits. Out of one sample of 189 minors with
especially pronounced personality disorders, a proportion were judged
"sick and dangerous" but worthy of social re-education in a
reformatory; these comprised 41 children who were found to have low
intelligence and 19 to have severe emotional problems. In Rome, during
a six-month period beginning in November 1934, authorities admitted
119 young convicts (of whom 36 were suspected "habitual delinquents")
to a neuropsychiatric clinic and indefinitely detained (under the
security measures) 19 of those minors deemed irreparably mal-adjusted.
None of the children had committed serious of fences. Many were without
family contact; and most had been unemployed and homeless at the time
of arrest. The ones found to be "normal" were given over to penal
institutions to serve their full sentences.2
That child poverty could contribute significantly to juvenile crime
was clear from police reports. The regime was fearful of urban unrest
and disorder. After 1926, government gave the police broad powers to
stop minors in the streets on suspicion of criminal intent or
vagrancy, a term covering anything from homelessness to hooliganism.
The "public security" measures permitted the police to question and
detain youths without bringing official charges. Especially in places
like Milanwhich had a notorious reputation as one of the nation's
most "delinquent" cities, dragnet operations increased in frequency
and scope. By the next decade, the police claimed that about 27,000
children were stopped in the streets of major metropolitan centres
annually; and of those subsequently arrested, the overwhelming
majority were charged with crimes of vagrancy, begging, and
prostitution.	 Indeed, general levels of convictions for vagabondage,
begging, and alcoholism, categorised as of fences against public
decency, far outpaced those for any other crimes throughout the
thirties.
ONMI alone reported that the organisat ion had helped to recover
18,068 homeless children nationwide between 1926 and 1931. Foster
parents were very difficult to find, especially in southern and
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northern regions, so institutional confinement was often the only
option available. A proportion of these children were found to be
"corrupted:" over 1,270 were placed in private mental institutions;
care orders were given to over 4,750 f or recovery in public
psychiatric hospitals; and 1,750 were put into custody within houses
of correction.	 This level of child abandonment clearly reflected
profound disruptions to family life wrought by severe economic
hardship.
Although child labour rose during the depression due to the
preference of employers to keep wages down, children younger than
fifteen who would normally contribute to the household were now
finding it harder to find stable work. In some provinces especially
hard hit by mass unemployment, the party actually evaded restrictions
to combat the illegal employment of children. As part of an informal
policy to help Impoverished families, PNF officials ordered prefects
to issue temporary work permits dismissing children from school and
allowing them to do banned jobs, such as night-time shifts in
factories. 67
Abandonment of minors was undoubtedly a huge problem in fascist
Italy. Annually about 8,000 adolescents who had been reclaimed as
illegitimate infants found themselves destitute and alone. 6e Despite
the severity of sentences for parental abandonment, and the increasing
publicity given such cases in the press, the regime failed to put a
stop to the spread of this "moral contagion". Evidence suggests that
financial pressures on poor families and single-parent households put
children in a very precarious position.69
Minors existed in the shadows of the system of protective statutory
provision provided by ONMI and the law. Assistance towards "needy,
abused, abnormal, or delinquent" adolescents fell back mainly onto
private institutions outside ONMI's direct jurisdiction despite the
norms set by the 1926 regulation. Residential charities such as
orphanages, shelters, and colleges had the capacity to house only
about one out of every six children referred by ONMI.'° Over-crowding
and chaos prevailed everywhere. For lack of space and an efficient
system of checks, under-age children were put into adult mental
asylums, minors were placed in adult prisons, abandoned children were
sent to reformatories, and psychiatric patients were given over to
workhouses. 7' For that reason, the real number of children who fell
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victim to the vagaries of this bleak and neglectful system remains
invisible in official statistics.
That the fascist government could claim one achievement was no
accident however. By the end of the thirties, the total population of
children in psychiatric and penal institutions had risen considerably
over the course of the previous two decades. Out of a total prison
population of 327,036, 14,144 mostly male children were interned in
1938, and over 4,000 more boys were detained in reform schools. When
fascism came to power In 1922, Italy's penal and correctional
establishments had held 3,643 minors, over 5,000 fewer than had been
incarcerated at the turn of the century.	 And up markedly from the
preceding period, the number of "deficient and degenerate" children
confined in institutions for both the "educable" and the "Incurable"
averaged about 2,000 a year during the fascist period, and numbered
well over 50,000 by 1938, according to the most conservative
estimates.
From Public Beneficence to Social Services: The Roman Experiment,
1927-1932
ONMI began to implement welfare policy towards illegitimates in
August 1927. The national leadership decided to lauch a pilot scheme
In Rome as a model for the other 91 provincial federations. A member
of ONMI's Roman central directorate, Daisy di Robilant, a Piedmontese
Countess, offered to organise this effort. Her plans focused on the
expansion of existing forms of aid into a comprehensive system of what
she and other ONMI officials defined as "social services".74
Attempting to break the hold foundling homes had and go beyond
wetnursing as the main form of provision, she proposed to encourage
more women to reclaim. What distinguished her plans was the emphasis
she placed on "positive" incentives to take the place of the tough
regimes imposed under liberalism. Better than enforced feeding in her
opinion, a system of rewards and benefits would attract women to
reclamation. In addition to giving direct economic aid, ONMI should,
she believed, integrate medical and social services, and thereby
provide unwed mothers with continuous care beginning in early
pregnancy and ending only when the child reached late infancy.
A founder of the national Mothers' Aid Society, an independent
charity which provided temporary shelter for homeless single mothers,
and an international campaigner for chlldrens' rights, the Countess
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expressed very strong views about the direction policy should go. 75 A
committed supporter of welfare programmes, she believed the state had
a moral obligation to care generously for unmarried mothers and their
children. Especially since Italian women did not have any right to
seek paternity support, she maintained, the state had to provide
meaningful alternatives to forms of private maintenance which were
permitted in democratic countries. She reminded Mussolini that
abortion and contraception were illegal in fascist Italy. For this
reason, she declared, government could not Ignore the plight of the
"pariahs born outside marriage", a "social surplus of infants" which
Its own laws had helped to create.76
Although willing to express frank opinions, Daisy dl Robilant
remained cautious when it came to open criticism of the party line.
She did present herself as a "fascist by true faith". But her approach
was rather more pragmatic than Ideological in inspiration. She never
submitted to the blind fealty characterising relations between other
ONMI officials and the Duce. She did acknowledge though the political
objectives behind welfare. Like her colleagues, she depicted aid to
unwed mothers as a means to an end rather than a good In itself. The
Countess defined her aims as the promotion of what she called
"responsible unwed motherhood". Benefits were not free hand-outs by a
paternal and benevolent state; in return for support, she stated,
public providers expected unwed mothers to "breast-feed and rear
healthy children for the race". Moreover welfare recipients should
never come to perceive entitlement to benefits as a "right" accorded
by the "fascist welfare revolution". Social assistance, by her own
definition, was a "privilege" bestowed the worthy few who fulfilled
fascism's demographic aspirations.77
The Countess attempted to convince her colleagues that social
assistance had to be broad in scope. She looked to the long-term
savings to be had In sustaining stable single-parent families. She did
agree that some kind of restrictive qualifications had to be
maintained in the interests of economy. Subsidies to women living with
waged workers, to women who had a history of illegitimate
chIldbearing, and to women who refused outright to comply with the
breast-feeding rule were at best a waste, she believed, and at worst
an Incentive to extra-marital promiscuity. But she advocated these
limits so that she could better provide more substantive rewards for
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the most needy. Each case had to be assessed for worthiness, she
stressed, and benefit schemes had to be flexible enough to accomodate
individual needs. This approach differed radically from official
policy.
Daisy di Robilant refused to follow what she saw as a short-
sighted and doomed policy of cutting corners to keep expenditure low.
And because she believed some women truly needed help, she advocated
individual assessment as the most reasonable way to restrict access to
welfare. This highly personal social vision clashed from the start
with the rigidity of policy design. She repeatedly told her ONMI
colleagues that not all unwed mothers were alike though the law seemed
to treat them as such. She wanted to give preferential treatment not
to those who burdened society with one bastard baby after another, she
explained, but to under-age runaways, victims of rape, homeless girls,
and those women who expressed a keen desire to raise their children.
The state had to be willing to provide a real income support to offset
the social and economic costs of single parenthood In a society where
unwed motherhood was still so stigmatised.7
Her highest ambition was the abolition of all legal distinctions
between legitimate and illegitimate children, a goal shared by others
both within and outside the ONMI hierarchy. Organised by Regina
Teruzzi, the president of the national Massate Rurali federation, this
campaign put pressure on the Ministry of Justice to eradicate the
nomenclature "ft gifo d'ignoto, ignota, d'Ignotl" (child of unknown
parentage) and "figilo dl N.N." (child of no one) from all civil
registration documents. The movement focused attention on the
discriminatory aspects of customary procedure. Activists pressed for
birth certificates to show the names of fictitious parents, a proposal
to further the gradual integration of illegitimates Into society. And
in the case of reclamation by one parent, they argued, the reclaiming
parent should be able to record the name of the other parent in the
act. The Ministry of Justice saw these proposals as too premature and
radical. This campaign for what adherents called a more "humane"
approach failed to achieve more than minor amendments In 1926 and 1932
to the body of laws covering civil status.9°
Even otherwise staunch defenders of fascism within the ONMI
leadership found fault with this aspect of policy. Both Baron Alberto
Blanc, ONMI's first president, and Sileno Fabbri, the Milanese lawyer
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who succeeded him in January 1932, expressed the opinion that these
and other reforms would make the work of welfare far simpler. The
Italian parliament had equivocated for far too long on the matters of
adoption, affiliation, foster parenthood, and paternity, they pointed
out. By bringing these issues out into the open, they argued, the
regime could do much to change people's attitudes towards
illegitimacy. They urged the government to combat tradition and
prejudice for the benefit of demographic policy. From a practical
point of view, they maintained, it made sense to remove some of the
emotional pressures on women to abandon their babies. And legal
recognition of "surrogate families", they stressed, would provide
acceptable alternatives to abandonment.
To these recommendations, Daisy di Robilant added criticism of the
logic of fascist policy. She focused her attention on the distinction
between assistance towards legitimates and illegitimates written into
ONMI's 1925 regulation. The provision of statutory aid for unwed
mothers as a distinct group, she stated, aroused public resentment
over an alleged favouritism shown "sinners" over "respectable" married
women. 2 And the segregation of illegitimate children and their
mothers into a separate sector of services crippled welfare
organisation. The dual structure, she reasoned, effectively doubled
the costs of provision. The Countess advocated the integration of
welfare into a system serving the needs of people without regard to
civil status.
There was some consensus amongst the ONMI leadership about the
nagging blindspots in law and policy. Along with high-ranking 0MM!
leaders, Daisy di Robilant held that the regime worked at cross-
purposes with the organisation by averting the larger implications of
illegitimacy policy. But with regard to the particulars of welfare
implementation, Daisy stood alone. Although she attempted to conform
to most aspects of official 0MM! policy, Daisy di Robilant voiced her
awareness of its limitations. She identified the main objective of
maternal reclamation as a significant weakness in the 1927
legislation.
She saw observance of this principle as incompatible with her
commitment to providing the best quality care possible for unwed
mothers. According to her own research, stable extra-marital
couplement leading to illegitimate childbearing rose considerably in
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the postwar period. But she differed from most other ONMI officials in
her interpretation of the causes. A high proportion of her claimants
had durable mock marriages with men, she told ONMI colleagues. Many of
these women complained to her about financial constraints as their
chief obstacle to forinalising unions. In response to these
testimonies, Daisy saw poverty as a contributing factor to
illegitimacy and a significant impediment to marriage.
Heedless to the ONMI leadership in Rome, Daisy di Robilant devised
a new benefit scheme to remedy this problem. Without the full
endorsement of her superiors, the Countess began to offer unwed
mothers a marriage premium in late 1928. Between 600 and 800 lIre,
depending on the urgency of each case, the benefit was large enough to
assist a newly-wed couple to set up household. The scarcity of
affordable housing, and the extra burden of childcare, she believed,
frightened many men from marriage. The premium covered the full cost
of a deposit and one month's rent in modest accommodation.
Alternatively, the couple could use the money to buy a "marriage bed"
and other furnishings, and still have some funds left over for extra
expenses on baby clothing and bedding. On top of this substantial cash
payment, Daisy gave out a "rearing premium" to especially needy women.
Because women lost entitlement to nursing subsidies once they married,
this grant helped to ease the anxiety some felt about child support.
Daisy defined this provision as an occasional hardship allowance, an
essential security for families for unforeseen emergencies like
unemployment or sickness. Neither the marriage nor the rearing
premiums was a fixed award; Daisy reserved the right to adjust the
amount of the sums to the changing needs and circumstances of her
clientele.
Opposed by ONMI officialdom who thought public money was better
spent on subsidies alone, Daisy improvised many of her more innovative
initiatives. Demand for marriage premiums increased even during the
economic crisis, convincing her that policy was achieving desirable
results. 7 The Countess opened up the nation's first public marriage
bureau in 1929 providIng free legal and social services to unwed
mothers and their partners. Her small staff of volunteers did all the
preparatory work of collecting documents from parish and civil record
offices. Often at her own expense, Daisy offered to cover the fees for
the processing and registration of marriage and legitimation acts. She
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took especial care to court the approval of parish priests. While at
first she encountered resistance because of what she interpreted as
their moral outrage over "subsidising unwed motherhood", she soon won
many local churchmen to her side. She needed their support to help
persuade Catholic women to undergo a civil ceremony on top of a
religious wedding, a practice only slowly gaining ground in former
Papal territorles.8°
Fascist planning or central directives had nothing to do with these
spontaneous initiatives. Despite the protestations of ONMI
officialdom, Daisy made flexibility and responsiveness two features of
her administration. In her defense, the Countess showed that the
organisat ion could make a substantial savings on the long-term costs
of care. She gave out 600 to 800 lire marriage premiums instead of
nursing subsidies, which then averaged just under 100 lire a month in
Rome for first-year babies. While the foundling home paid 75 percent
and ONMI 25 percent of the subsidy, the per capita cost amounted to
1,500 lire on average for one year of maintenance. She matched the
economic achievement of almost halving public spending with
considerable success In social terms. Between 1929 and 1932, almost 25
percent of the mothers in her case load married and legitimated their
babies, a figure well over three times the national average.e9
The ONMI provincial leadership remained totally unimpressed despite
these remarkable results. This clash of views reflected a larger
problem, the rigid and short-sighted nature of fascist welfare policy.
The Countess responded to criticisms about her Independent initiatives
by complaining of the "stifling bizantinisin and oppressive bureau-
cratisation" of ONMI administration. Afforded some measure of autonomy
if not official approbation, Daisy was nonetheless subjected to
disciplinary bullying precisely because she chose to shape policy to
fit the needs of her clientele. In a moment of ironic candour, the
Countess reflected: "would it not be rather strange that if by
threatening my marriage service with closure, the regime is actually
encouraging illegitimacy?"90
Daisy's organisatlonal acumen had more to do with the success of
her programmes than state sponsorship did. She kept administrative
expenditure low largely through personal contacts, hard work, and a
business sense. From her offices in the headquarters of ONMI's
provincial federation, Daisy di Robilant ran a tight organisation
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based on a small volunteer staff. Her illegitimacy centre, a separate
department within ONMI, absorbed her former charity's institutional
network. This included two women's residential shelters, a mothers'
kitchen, and two obstetric and paediatric clinics, all on premises
donated by private philanthropists. Money covering the cost of
construction of both the mothers' homes came from a low-cost loan
provided by the national Cassa Matern!tà, a contribution which Daisy
secured through a friendship with a senator. 9' The Countess arranged
f or inexpensive bulk food and provision for the refectories by
negotiating special concessionary rates with workers' co-operatives
and municipal government.'2 When available, vegetables produced
locally on farms run by the Massale Rural! were sold to her on a
discount. In times of scarcity, the Countess herself paid food bills
at full retail rates.' Overheads on the clinics were kept minimal
because they functioned mainly as dispensaries for minor medicines,
food packets and powdered milk. Many of these products came cheaply
from left-over stock owned by the provincial administration of public
hospitals. Daisy managed the deal by putting pressure on these
authorities. '
The maintenance cost of the mothers' homes was low. On an annual
average, the Countess provided housing for 150 pregnant women and 120
nursing mothers and their children for maximum three-month stays. All
the residents worked in the institutions' own workshops and split the
profits made on sale of their sewed goods with management. Added to
this were occasional funds from fines collected for disciplinary
Infractions by residents, as well as any personal contributions for
room and board which the women or their families could make. And
together with a volunteer staff of nuns, both enterprises were
virtually self-financing. The small yearly award the homes received
from ONMI did not equal the beneficent endowment raised through public
donation. In 1931, the governing board found balancing the budget
especially difficult given rising inflation. Despite a petition to
Mussolini, which included signatures and salutations from the
residents themselves, a request for a special discretionary grant from
the government's social fund was rejected.'5
Located on the same site as one of the mothers' homes in the centre
of Rome, the refectory served also as a profit-making workers' cafe.
Women residents gathered daily In the dining hall for an early lunch
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before noon when the premises opened for paying customers. Some of the
cost for the provision of free meals came from ONMI's provincial
budget which set a monthly rate based on per capita consumption.
Because this quota remained fixed while food costs constantly rose
during the depression, Daisy had to authorise regular price hikes for
workers' meals. She charged "more for less" when meat or bread
periodically became scarce, she reported. When she found foodstuffs in
especially short supply, she complained to ONMI officials about their
lack of concern. Her refectory was not entitled to purchase the food
distributed to the kitchens run directly by ONMI. The organisation did
not help to meet the costs of rent, personnel, heating or electricity.
For general repairs, and for cutting wood for stoves and ovens, she
relied on the workers who patronised her establishment.
Daisy di Robilant boasted of the devotion she inspired in her
volunteers. The women she gathered around her were all as equally
wealthy and as well-connected as she was. The unpaid work they did
went far beyond the standards set by law. As evidence of this in her
annual reports to the ONMI leadership, Daisy outlined the nature of
the types of social services her centre routinely offered. Apart from
arranging marriages, her staff found jobs for the husbands of clients,
located housing through private and public associations, and paid the
passage for Italian Immigrants abroad to be re-united with their
pregnant lovers at home. Many of their clients were adolescents, and
some of these came from troubled families. Most minors resided In
outlying rural areas and migrated to Rome after they had been kicked
out or had run away from home because of unwanted pregnancy. Daisy's
volunteers attempted to reconcile families when they could secure
their clients a safe environment after birth.97
Public welfare programmes, she repeatedly reminded her ONMI
colleagues, had to be truly "social" If the state were to succeed "in
gaining the adhesion of the masses". She claimed that whereas few
women in Rome had yet heard of ONMI, much less come to see the state
as a provider, she could reach local communities by making welfare aim
at improving the quality of lives of people. Part of the reason for
this, she explained, was that she recognised the importance of
continuity of care, follow-up social work, and close contact with
recipients for the success of the benefit scheme.
Not all of her initiatives were popular. Daisy reluctantly admitted
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that home visits which she began in 1929 were deeply resented by her
clientele. The reason for this was the fact that the system was not
designed for health or safety checks for the benefit of recipients.
The purpose was to find welfare frauds. Those mothers who had
reclaimed their children were required to pick up nursing subsidies
once a month on a specified pay day.' Daisy and her staff scrutinised
them closely for details of dress and appearance which might show
changing fortunes. They believed some women feigned poverty while
others lied. Daisy identif led domestic servants as a "maternally
unreliable" group who privately farmed out infants with the help of
employers. And a particularly prolific but "demographically
undesirable" group comprised the "inveterate recidivists", often women
over forty who "speculate in bastard babies". With two or more farmed-
out Infants, they lived comfortably "in moral decrepitude" with income
support on top of earnings from working lovers. 100
Daisy di Robilant identif led a marked tendency amongst certain
women to become welfare dependent as a consequence of the 1927
legislation. In her 35 years of experience, she remarked, she had
never seen such a high proportion of cases involving repeated non-
marital pregnancies in such rapid succession.' 0' National data
concerning fertility patterns by age and civil status do not exist.
But Daisy's finding seems to be confirmed in official statistics
covering causes of death for women in the older age bracket.
Throughout the fascist period, general levels of maternal mortality
remained stationary. Unmarried women as a whole were far more likely
than married women to die because of birth-related accident,
infection, or other complications. This differential actually
increased after 1930. But the highest proportional rise in maternal
mortality by age-group and civil status affected unmarried middle-aged
women. 102 It seems reasonable to deduce from both aggregate data and
Daisy's qualitative evidence that the regime's pronatalist policy may
have had some selective impact. Perhaps single and widowed women
between the ages of 40 and 55 were indeed prolonging and increasing
the frequency of childbearing. They certainly suffered an otherwise
unaccountable rise in the risk of death due to childbirth.
Home visits were designed to discover whether a woman was living
with a man and whether she was rearing her child. Daisy di Robilant
proudly related that her visitors raided homes in the small hours of
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the morning, an especially effective but much hated strategy of
surprise. The work of the home visitors was not all unpleasant though.
They did provide a vital link in the theretofore loose bond between
the foundling home and farmed-out infants. Unlike foundling home
Inspectors who were notoriously bad at their job, the visitors kept in
close contact with abandoned babies sent out to wetnurse. Daisy di
Robilant also did much to Improve rates of survival amongst farmed-out
infants by urging homes to employ only registered nurses. And because
of this, the visitors were able to assist those women who re-appeared
to reclaim their children from foster care, sometimes after years had
lapsed.
Relations between Daisy's centre and ONMI became increasingly
strained as the depression deepened. By early 1932, the effects of
economic crisis imposed new financial constraints on welfare
expenditure and threatened to undermine Daisy's experiment. In her
correspondence to Mussolini, Daisy di Robilant unsuccessfully asked
for official recognition of her marriage premiums. 	 ONMI provincial
officialdom intervened by setting a new lower ceiling on the amount of
the award and restricting acceptable quotas. Marriage premiums became
less substantial although Daisy had trouble keeping the numbers given
out down. This situation compromised the main function of the premiums
with the result that fewer couples married and legitimated
children. 105
The value of monthly subsidies to both nursing mothers and
wetnurses also fell markedly in late 1931. Daisy begrudgingly Imposed
new austerity measures. She tried to compensate for reduced subsidies
by giving out larger benefits in kind, such as powdered milk and food
parcels. Mothers, she claimed, sold these goods to neighbours, a
symptom of hardship which she failed to prevent. And as part of the
economising trend, mothers now had to collect vouchers in place of the
cash payments they formerly received; and these were now given out on
a weekly basis. In a bid to control spending on subsidies and increase
monitoring of welfare abuses, ONMI required women to encash these
promissory notes at the organisation's communal committees.'° 6 This
transfer of authority marked the beginning of the end for Daisy's
project.
This procedure caused consternation amongst women who felt they
were not getting enough from the state. ONMI communal committees
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reported back to provincial headquarters that disturbances were
breaking out with some frequency and that the organisation was rapidly
loosing credibility.' 07
 The passage of control confused matters as
ONMI communal authorities required more documentation from claimants
than the centre had done. Proof of settlement and poverty, as well as
authorisation from the provincial federation, now came to be standard
features of subsidy provision. A significant backlog of payments
clogged the machinery of welfare and women now regularly faced long
arrears. The Countess pointed out to her colleagues that many mothers
were homeless and penniless so delays in payment only jeapardised the
life of infants. She stated in one of her reports: "I have been under
the mistaken Impression all these years that the regime wants us to
far vivere (to help children survive) and not Just to far nascere
(increase the birthrate)". Daisy warned that her loss of authority
meant she could no longer keep a close watch over the movement of
women and children. Regular clients, she reported, simply disappeared
rather than deal with the new system. 10 The Holy Spirit foundling
home in Rome confirmed the suspicion that abandonment was rising. The
director reported that record numbers of women were asking for aid and
as a consequence the home had to seek out wetnurses farther afield
than ever before. The enlarged wetnurse radius, he stated, eroded the
home's fragile network of home inspections to check on the well-being
of babies.'°9 The character of welfare had become increasingly
Impersonal and bureaucratic as the system formalised into chaos.
The work of the illegitimacy centre unravelled between 1932 and
1934. Daisy did make an energetic effort to salvage her initiatives
despite financial constraints. Overcrowding In the mothers' homes
failed to accommodate the strain of growing social demand. A new
mothers' residence which opened in Monterotundo In 1932 absorbed some
of the spillover from the centre. The exclusive establishment refused
entry to prostitutes, foreigners, and later "non-latinTM women, and
functioned mainly as a refuge f or middle-class, fee-paying guests. But
through informal agreement between the governing body and the
Countess, the institution created a separate ward for some of Daisy's
more urgent referrals."° And another maternal albergo which had
opened in April 1930 in Ostla Marina also offered some of Daisy's
clients temporary shelter,1''
Declaring the 1927 ruling on mandatory early recovery a "farce",
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the Countess confronted obstruction from institutions directly under
ONMI control. Public hospitals refused entry to her clients claiming
inavailability of beds and ONMI's clinics did not allow unwed mothers
to attend f or fear of offending respectable married women. When an
epidemic of cholera broke out in the city of Rome, panic ensued
amongst public health authorities. Her clients were seen as "suspected
carriers of contagion" so even ONMI consultorl closed their doors. Low
maternal mortality amongst her clients had been one of her proudest
achievements. In 1931, none of the women she had helped that year had
died in childbirth, a accomplishment she accredited to the food and
shelter the centre provided for them during their pregnancies. The
following year, the Countess reported that many of her clients were
falling ill during pregnancy. Childbed deathrates rose and more women
declined to breast-feed for lack of adequate milk. To compensate for
the obvious failings in the system of protracted care, Daisy dl
Robilant began to make private arrangements with families to provide
emergency accommodation for homeless women awaiting birth. Likening
these frantic searches to begging, the Countess recounted in her
reports how humiliating the matter was for both herself and her
clients. And she offered these women three free meals a day at her
refectory in a desperate attempt to maintain some semblance of
prenatal provision.112
She also openly encouraged women to defer reclamation until after
pocketing a substantial portion of their nursing subsidies. This
defiance of ONMI directives did not bode well for the future of her
centre. While advised to keep marriage premiums low, the Countess did
occasionally offer a larger subsidy than the now standard 300 lIre
benefit. Although she pointed out that few couples would marry for a
one-off, paltry award when they stood to gain more on the long-term
from nursing subsidies, the ONMI leadership failed to listen. Rankling
officialdom even further, she attempted to uphold a certain elasticity
of payment by still fluctuating subsidies and premiums according to
need. Evidence of the escalating momentum of welfare decline,
nonetheless, nursing subsidies shrank to less than 25 lIre by 1934.
And the stipend was no longer doubled when a woman had twins. The best
ONMI could now do was to provide new mothers with a single benefit for
one baby and to offer to send the other out to wetnurse at the
standard lower rate, which was then set at 18 lIre.la
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In early 1934, the Countess disorganised the mainstay of her unique
system of social assistance. She fired her home visitors in March so
this form of domiciliary service ceased to exist.'' 4 The state
provision which she had attempted to consolidate became further
attenuated as the foundling home re-asserted itself as the
institutional focus of welfare. Fewer and fewer women married or
reclaimed infants. Many did not bother with ONMI at all but went
directly to the foundling home Instead to abandon their babies. The
crisis of confidence in ONMI which the Countess had begun to sense as
early as 1931 spiralled into a loss of all purpose. And the
spectacular failure to sustain social programmes and reach even
minimal policy targets came to be blamed away as evidence of the
Countess' misrule of public money. When ONMI's provincial headquarters
moved to grander buildings at the end of 1932, the leadership left
Daisy's offices behind, This conspicuous affront did not dampen
Daisy's nerve for the Countess continued to champion her cause. 115 Her
centre survived for a while though truncated from ONMI administration.
In the summer of 1936, MussolIni personally intervened to order the
closure of her Mothers' Aid Society on the grounds that Daisy was
providing an unsatisfactory service which was Incompatible with the
higher aims of the government. In her defense, the Countess claimed
that if her institution was deficient, It was for lack of resources
and not for want of effort. And no matter how inadequate her care
could be, she stated, foundling homes far outdid her in incompetence.
While their directors fiddled with the figures on infant mortality to
gain favour with the regime, she charged, her greatest weakness had
always been to admit openly to the faults in the system. 115 The brief
but most promising era of welfare reform under fascism had come to a
less than dignified end.
Disaantling Services Nationwide in the Afteraath of Reform, 1933-1938
When first put into effect in 1927, the legislation on illegi-
tiinates had received widespread support. Out of a total of 91
provinces, 73 had voluntarily undertaken to initiate a mixed benefit
scheme with provision for both reclamation and nursing subsidies.''7
But by 1930, ONMI owed two years in back payments to provincial
governments so many of them refused to comply with policy any longer.
ONMI central leadership saw policy implementation quickly deteriorate
as provinces suspended programmes because of the huge debts
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accumulated in their budgets. Protesting to the Council of State,
provincial deputations won an appeal for immediate reimbursement from
ONMI in January 1930. When the organisation failed to fork out the
revenue, the union of provincial deputations again turned to state
authority and won another appeal in February 1931. Only 19 provincial
governments remained In support of the Illegitimacy programme
following these decisions but they severely restricted services by
allocating monies for the bare essentials. Although they withdrew
funding for planning new projects, they still found maintaining the
system of nursing subsidies alone rather difficult. The others made
use of provision In the 1930 and 1931 rulIngs to abrogate altogether
their statutory responsibility to carry this expenditure in their
budgets. 11B
ONMI could not sustain the burden of the campaign. The money spent
on this one programme alone amounted to almost 70 percent of all
spending and paralysed the organisatlon's accounts. ONMPs president,
Baron Blanc secured an emergency government grant in 1931 by
beseeching Mussolini for help. Drawn from the social fund created by
collection of the celibacy tax, this injection of quick cash failed to
put ONMI's finances aright.' 19 The organisation's enormous deficit
swallowed the over 65 mIllion lire advance but ONMI's debts still grew
while costs feverishly mounted. Some confusion arose about where all
of ONMI's funding was going. In 1930, the organisation had raised over
150 million lire in private donations alone and yet leaders complained
of acute money shortages. In only one of the many parliamentary
debates on ONMI's financial future, a deputy raised the issue of the
organisation's efficiency. On the 9 AprIl 1931, dIscussion focused on
whether ONMI should reduce administrative expenditure in the interests
of social welfare spending. But the leaders of ONMI did not see
cutting the bureaucracy down to size as a realistic solution to the
crisis. 120
The decision taken by ONMI's leadership was to restrict indef i-
nitely all expenditure on welfare programmes. On 15 June 1932,
Mussolini received ONMI delegates assembled in the Campidoglio for the
organisation's first national convention. ONMI's new president, Sileno
Fabbri made a speech which signalled the end of the old era of
optimism and marked the beginning of a new era of resignation.
Abandoning the former rhetoric, Fabbri spoke little of welfare
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revolution. He mentioned the organisation's Insurmountable economic
troubles which necessitated, he stated, that ONMI take a more Mgradual
end patient" approach to all the work ahead. The public's increasing
awareness of ONMI, he believed, accounted more f or the gravity of the
financial crisis than single programmes. Because of rising demand, the
organisation found itself spending more to provide only desultory and
casual assistance. To ameliorate ONMI's financial situation, Fabbrl
proposed major cutbacks and suspensions affecting all social
programmes. Although the organisat ion had barely got off the ground in
many areas, he admitted, the economic crisis meant provincial leaders
would have to spend less money more efficiently.' 2 ' To renegotiate the
terms of illegitimacy policy stood out as a major priority for the
national leadership who approved a resolution to review the 1927
legislation. From the recommendations passed at this convention
emerged the law of 13 April 1933.
By de-centralising services once more, the revision law of April
1933 dissolved the system of social assistance created by the 1927
act. The enactment effectively re-introduced the structure of local
authority control over social welfare first devised in the liberal
period. The administration of aid towards reclaimed children now
passed from ONMI control onto the begrudging backs of provincial
government. ONMI still cared directly for unwed mothers however, while
the communes and provinces together provided for abandoned and
reclaimed infants. One problem with this new organisat ton was that,
when implemented in May, no one quite knew what to do. Newborn
illegitimates came under provincial administration though those born
before the enactment stayed with ONMI. The provision fragmented
welfare amongst competing authorities and separated services for
mothers from those for children. If the 1927 law encouraged
administrative struggles over payment, this law too invited opposition
and chaos. 122
The chief aim behind the amendment, to lessen the financial stake
ONMI had In illegitimacy relief, did not come to be. Designed to
reduce ONMI's spending, the legislation did just the opposite.
Although provincial administrations now determined for themselves how
money was allocated, ONMI was still required to contribute a third of
the overall costs of the programmes. The transfer of authority to
provincial governments may have relaxed pressures on ONMI to perform,
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but the new regime provided the organisation with little control over
expenditure. Even after 1933, ONMI not only remained insolvent but
also saw its deficit grow ever larger because of this single outlay.
While the total number of women and children assisted dropped from
over 550,000 In 1932 to 69,905 In 1933, the amount ONMI spent actually
rose considerably. And while spending continued to increase
progressively between 1934 and 1938, the number of aid recipients re-
stabilised at around 100,000 a year on average. 12
A significant drawback to the 1933 legislation, funding procedure
overlooked regional disparities in resources. In rich provinces like
Milan, local government could match ONMI's contribution with an
equally hefty share in provision. In 1928, provincial government and
ONMI together had begun to replace the foundling home system with a
new structure of assistance unifying all services for illegitimates
into one department. The new 'institute for the protection of
assistance towards Illegitimate infants' functioned much as Daisy's
centre did though the administration and staff were larger. The prime
aim of the institute differed however from that of the Roman centre.
In Milan, the strength of welfare organisation lay in the great
diversity of forms of assistance. The institute ran sewing classes f or
unwed mothers, held summer camps for abandoned adolescents, and even
housed a cinema for single-parent families. But the substance and
impact of these initiatives did not compare favourably with the hard
cash Daisy di Robilant gave her clients. Marriage and reclamation
premiums never amounted to more than a minor expense in Milan, and the
size of nursing subsidies on offer did not equal those given by Daisy
even in her bad years. ONMI's financial crash In 1932 caused provision
In Milan to drift further away from direct economic benefits. A Mila-
nese lawyer, ONMI's president, Sileno Fabbri, made sure the provincial
federation he had previously run now followed his directives. The
subsidies Milan offered after 1933 were far lower than those given in
poorer southern areas like Ban, Catanta, and Trapani.124
In especially disadvantaged areas, the 1933 legislation, much like
the 1927 law, did little to help deprived public authorities meet
local needs. ONMI's federation in Mantua province did not start making
any contribution to the illegitimacy programme until 1930. Because of
high unemployment during the depression, much of the organisat ion's
resources were devoted to alms-giving to relieve hardship. The budget
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consisted primarily of expenditure for food, wood, and clothing for
the poor. As the economic crisis worsened, ONMI leadership in Mantua
had trouble dealing with growing numbers of abandoned infants and
children, a symptom, they believed, of the disruptive effects of
severe deprivation. A small reclamation premium, on top of a monthly
subsidy of 25 lire for a few of their claimants comprised the best
they could do as the province lacked any foundling home. Although
putting the burden on them to fulfill the promises of illegitimacy
policy, the 1933 act did not mean much for Mantuan authorities since
public welfare hardly existed at ail.'2
An official government Inquest completed in 1940 showed just how
little the state provided. The National Organisation for the
Protection of Motherhood and Infancy was found to be a heavy and
inefficient bureaucracy which had realised few of the aims of
illegitimacy policy. Prenatal care for unwed mothers was a myth
outside big cities and mandatory recovery averaged only about 10 days
rather than the 3 months specified by law. For this reason, the study
concluded, maternal mortality levels for unmarried mothers still far
outpaced those for married women. Together with these shortcomings,
investigations revealed that forms of income support designed to close
the subsistence gap between single-parent and dual-parent families had
failed to achieve a decent standard. In only 5 out of 91 provinces in
1938 did unwed mothers who reclaimed receive subsidies deemed
"sufficient to guarantee, at least In theory, the very minimum
requirements for infant survival". Only 23 provinces made provision
for reclamation premiums and these varied from between 10 and 50 lire.
Far less common in practice, marriage premiums seldom went as high as
the 800 lire Daisy gave out ten years before. Most averaged between
300 and 500 lire. And across the nation, Infant mortality amongst
those infants born outside marriage still differed so dramatically
from those born within the Institution. Despite social programmes to
redress this imbalance, deathrates for illegitimate infants were
double that for legitimate infants In some provinces.' 26 In a country
where pronatalism governed all domestic policy initiatives, the
failure to sustain infant life seems all the more striking.
'Surrogate' Families and Abandonsient
Both public and private law in Italy changed only slowly with
regard to 'illegitimates'. Beginning in 1865 with the kingdom's first
229
unified civil code, lawmakers adhered tenaciously to a moral belief in
the 'natural' and hence 'legitimate' family'. The Juridical foundation
of Italian family order, patrla potestas defined the duties of
fatherhood. The three pillars of a father's exercise of patrla
potestas were to provide support, guidance, and formal education for
his children. In his project for reform of the civil code presented to
parliament In April 1923, the then Minister of Justice, Aldo Ovlgllo
proposed some major amendments to this concept of paternal
responsibility. The law, he maintained, had to keep pace with social
change. The realities were such, Oviglio believed, that many Italians
lived outside the legal confines of the 'legitimate' family. A new
civil code would have to make provision for alternative family
arrangements. He urged the legislature to extend patria potestas to
fathers of illegitimate children by making them legally responsible
for child maintenance and welfare.'27
A bill presented to the lower house In June 1924, and undersigned
by 13 deputIes, aimed to make paternity searches legally admissable.
The signatories proposed that in cases involving partners cohabitating
at the time of conception, and consequently in cases where paternity
was not imputable, the laws governing maternity be extended to include
provision for paternal reclamation and child support. 12S But the
desire to protect the rights of succession for 'legitimate' heirs
inspired continued resistance to opening up further debate about the
legal and social responsibilities of 'illegitimate' fatherhood.
Parliament under fascism never legislated on behalf of paternity
though they had both ample opportunity and reason to do so.
The Italian parliament also habitually resisted putting new laws on
adoption on the books. Written into the old Napoleonic Code and
preserved in the code of 1865, adoption had been an aristocratic
invention to insure the inheritance of family patrimony. In the
nineteenth century, the new bourgeoisie acquired the titles, names,
and land rights of deceased noblemen through adoption. In July 1919,
parliament passed a bill outlining special provision f or the adoption
of war orphans and only those abandoned babies born between 1915 and
1919. The unusual specifications regarding wartime Illegitimates
seemed to reflect fears that a large percentage of Italian women In
occupied territories had been raped and impregnated "with Teutonic
blood".' 2' This legislation was careful not to equate 'surrogate'
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families with 'real' families. The patria potestas of an adoptive
father had to be established in separate court proceedings and could
be revoked far more easily than it could be for 'natural' fathers.
Minimum age requirements for an adoptive parent fell from sixty to
forty years, but the procedure was complicated and costly. And most
significantly, a prospective couple had to be childless to be
considered as adoptive parents.'3°
This tentative provision failed to have much of an impact so
adoption rates for the orphaned and the abandoned remained very low
throughout the following decade.' 31 In 1924 the Attorney-General,
Silvio Longhi, inaugurated the judicIal year of Italy's Supreme Court
of Appeal with a speech on the institution of piccola adozione. He
proposed that major changes be made in family law to accommodate the
urgent need to provide abandoned children with families. More than
just foster parenthood, his institution of piccola adozione granted
adoptive families the right of patria potestas and gave adopted
children the right to a family name. Whether the child should be fully
entitled to inheritance on a par with 'natural' heirs was a matter for
the courts to decide, he stated. The purpose of the reform, he
stressed, was to remedy abandonment by giving legal recognition to
types of family formation which fell outside existing laws. He
contemplated far-reaching changes in attitudes towards wetnursing
families such that they would no longer be seen as "mercenary" in
motivation. By promoting the idea that non-biological parents could
provide the same love and support as natural parents, he concluded,
the state could do much to encourage positive social change.132
When the regime finally gave serious consideration to the legal
position of 'illegitimates' in Italian society, the reforms which
emerged were timid and tardy. With the publication of the first book
of Italy's new civil code on 1 July 1939, the right of 'affiliation'
was granted. The rulings allowed anyone regardless of sex or civil
status who was mentally sound and European in race to affiliate an
abandoned child. The affiliating person or parents could adopt as
their own as many abandoned children as desired. One restrictive
condition comprised the decision to permit affiliation only in cases
of childlessness. Another limitation concerned the civil status of
this new type of family which remained far inferior to that of
'normal' families. Parental authority was strictly defined so adopted
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children did not have the rights of succession or even of support
which patria potestas bestowed legitimate children. 133
 The desire to
distinguish this 'surrogate' family from a 'natural' family of blood
relations united through marriage went unchanged.
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EPILOGUE
In 1937, ONMI's leadership published results which showed. that the
organisation had not achieved its alms. Not only had the birth and
marriage rates continued to fall, but infant mortality had begun to
rise again. In 1937, the national average of 10.87 deaths for every
100 Infants under the age of one was higher than it had been in 1930.
Between 1924 and 1937, Infant mortality had increased by 5 percent in
the Abruzzi and Mouse, by 6 percent in Latium, by 14 percent in
Calabria, by 16 percent in Sardinia, and by 18 percent in Sicily. The
decreases In levels of infant mortality realised In Tuscany, Emilia,
and Umbria were much lower than had been expected back in 1927.'
The national institution also admitted that social programmes had
failed to put a halt to illegitimacy. The proportion of illegitimates
to every 100 livebirths had risen from 4.9 in 1924 to 5.3 in 1932 and
then slowly returned to the 1924 level by 1937. But the numbers of
babies who were being reclaimed had declined from 78.4 percent of
Illegitimate newborns in 1924 to 77.2 percent in 1937. And authorities
estimated that the abortion rate had In the very least trebled between
1927 to 1937. About fifteen percent of pregnancies, they calculated,
ended In abortion.
In response to these disappointing results, the fascist government
made a formal declaration to its people that the "fecund decade" had
come to an unsuccessful end. In 1937, a number of articles appeared in
the national press which announced that the regime was preparing to
revise population policy In its entirety. On 17 February 1937, a press
release from the Grand Council was published In Ii Popolo d'ItaJIa.
This stated that the birthrate had continued to decline in cities and
in the countryside notwithstanding concerted attempts to promote
fertility. The annual number of births decreased too by a wider margin
each year. Ministers revealed that they intended to implement a new
"plan of action" as the course of fascism's pollttcd demografica
assistenzfale entered its "second phase". The "social revolution"
would continue, but the means would have to change since "positive
eugenic encouragements" had not altered the procreative habits of
Italian people.a
On 3 March 1937, the Grand Council met to discuss the future of
population policy. Guiseppe Bottai gave a speech which addressed the
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question of the underlying causes of the failure of the demographic
campaign. Economic privations explained why Italians refused to have
more children, Bottal argued. He encouraged those assembled to admit
that "babies cost money". The "low quality of life in Italy, the slow
progress towards social development, and considerable poverty and
unemployment" exerted a "constant anti-demographic pressure" on the
people which welfare had been unable to dispel. He continued:
"The demographic programme has failed completely. And it has failed
because of fascism's idealism. The regime has neglected to take into
consideration the fact that when misery and destitution knock at your
door, you have rio patience for big words and grand appeals to collec-
tive solidarity. You become egotistical. The Idea of the defense of
the race has not sunk into the heads of most Italians. The need to
continue to produce in order to preserve the race for future gener-
ations Is meaningless to those who face a far more personal and daily
struggle to ensure the survival of themselves and their families".
The regime, he stated, should continue to provide social assistance,
but aid should be confined to only the most prolific members of
society. Italians, Bottai believed, were guilty of "conscious and
premeditated sterility". When a "tree does not bear fruit", he stated,
"you must cut it down". The regime, he urged, should "root up the
infecund weeds and let the fertile plants ones grow".4
Bottai proposed a number of remedies for Mussolini to consider,
which together comprised a mixed programme of positive and negative
measures. He wanted the regime to "abolish all residual indulgence"
towards single citizens over 30 years of age, childless couples, and
couples with fewer than four children. His plan called for new
legislation to prohibit the employment of these categories in all
private and public enterprises. Prolific people should be given enough
material rewards to make them into a new economic elite, he stated.
Already extended to all workers, family allowances, he believed,
should be raised from 4 lIre for every child to an amount which truly
reflected the real cost of childcare and would provide a substantial
income support to big families. The state should also consider
implementing an annual income tax against "sterile and infecund
unions". Couples should be forced to pay the state what they saved in
household expenses by not having any or many children. This penalty
could amount to as much as two thirds the property and Income of a
couple who produced only one child. And even those who had two and
three children would be forced to pay a sizable proportion of their
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yearly earnings to the state. In addition to these measures, he
recommended, a law prohibiting childless people from drawing up wills
and unmarried people from inheriting wealth was another avenue the
regime should explore. He stated: "we should take away the automobiles
too and any other assets which those citizens who practice voluntary
sterility possess".
Alberto De Stefani began his address to the Grand Council by
stating that "reproduction Is a political duty which many Italians
have failed to perform". Like Bottal, he believed the state should
stop being so tolerant towards those who refused to be fecund.
Welfare, he stated, had caused Italians to become selfish and
dependent rather than responsible citizens. He pointed out that
despite progressively harsher penalties against celibacy, which had
trebled the amount of the annual tax between 1927 to 1936, many single
men still preferred to pay the price of bachelorhood rather than
embark on marriage and fatherhood. If celibacy really was a "crime
against the state and against the race", as official ideology upheld,
then the regime should increase the severity of the punishments
against infecundity. He considered the idea of expanding the powers of
the state over the private lives of citizens. A feasible course of
action for a new demographic campaign, De Stefani suggested, would
Involve enacting legislation to criininalise celibacy and to force
people to marry before their thirtieth birthday. Another possibility
was to give the courts the authority to annul marriages which remained
childless after five years.6
When news of these deliberations leaked out to the press, national
party headquarters were inundated with calls from citizens who feared
imminent state expropriations. Telephone tappings also revealed that
some Italians were trying desperately to offload assets by signing
over property to particularly prolific relatives. Foreign newspapers
picked up on the fact that these proposed measures coincided with the
Grand Council's resolution at the same meeting to launch a fifteen-
year rearmament programme based on Hitler's plans for a permanent war
economy. The militant and punitive drift in pronatalist policy, German
journalists reported, reflected worry about how fascism was going to
pay the costs of armaments and autarky without levying hefty taxes.7
Lawmakers received plans for the implementation of a fascist
version of Roman sanctions against celibacy with considerable
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misgivings. At least one prominent senator, Aifredo Felici, voiced
concern that the regime was moving far too quickly in its efforts to
salvage the demographic campaign. Before putting new provisions on the
books, those drawing up fascism's revised civil code, he stated, would
have to consider the legal questions raised by radical proposals such
as the abrogation of infertile marriages. Legislators would also need
time to discuss the juridical framework of harsh new penalties before
contemplating passing laws on inheritance taxes and rights.8
The regime did seem to be groping for some new vision for the
future. The March deliberations displayed a cabinet which had lost all
sense of political purpose. When confronted with the defeat of
fascism's greatest battle, ministers frantically clung to their
delusions that an extension of the system of privileges and reprisals
already enacted would increase the birthrate, To hide the serious
crisis of credibility which the government faced, one hasty bit of
legislation followed another in quick succession. On 3 June 1937, the
regime promulgated a law which created the Unlone Fascista fra le
Famiglie Numerose as part of the plan to restrict social welfare
benefits to the most deserving. The association was designed to be a
huge interest group within Italian society which would take over many
of the party's responsibilities for mass demonstrations and celebra-
tions around demographic themes. With the establishment of provincial
federations, the organisation would serve to put moral and economic
pressure on Italians to reproduce by showing them just how much
fascism privileged prolific people. And on the 17 June, a new
enactment broadened the range of family allowances.9
Perhaps the most far-reaching move by the regime Involved the
creation of an Uff.fclo Centrale Demografico under the Interior
Ministry on 7 June 1937. According to its founding statutes, the
competence of the department was to review laws on citizenship and
rights and to promote the development of "demographic and racist"
legislat ion. Top on the agenda stood plans for an extension of laws to
prevent the u bastardisation of the Italian race", such as the
enactment on 19 AprIl 1937 against "conjugal relations" between
Africans and Italians in the colonies.' 0 Those who defended these
measures from criticism stated that the regime was fulfilling its
mission and following its doctrine. Ferdinando Loffredo argued:
"If you implement a positive policy to promote the health and
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fertility of the race, it's only logical that you should also try to
preserve the race by other means. Fascism has not deviated from its
original plan f or racial defense but has merely developed the racist
programme in the direction towards which it was destined to
proceed".''
Mussolini also attempted to silence attacks against the new militancy.
On 30 July 1937, the Duce answered those critics who charged that the
regime was trying to implant German racism on Italian soil. At an
address to party secretaries In Forli, he stated: "To say that fascism
has imitated anyone or anything is absolutely absurd". In September,
he spoke at a rally in Trieste where he argued:
"The racial problem (of crossbreeding] has not suddenly emerged as
some seem to believe. It's been on the horizon ever since the
foundation of empire; because history has taught that empires are made
with arms but maintained when those who have conquered have a strong
racial consciousness not only of their difference but also of their
overwhelming superiority over the vanquished". 12
If 1937 marked the beginning of a new phase in fascist population
policy, then 1938 brought a definitive end to the preeminent place
welfare held in the regime's programme f or racial defense.
On 26 July 1938, AchIlle Starace received a delegation of univer-
sity professors which included Nicola Pende, Franco Savorgnan, and
other prominent eugerilcists within the Gruppo Universitarlo Fascista.
The academics came armed with a Race Manifesto which they wanted the
government to accept as the doctrinal basis for all future racist
legislation. They proclaimed that there existed "a pure Italian race"
whose "purity of blood" was the biological foundation for the nobility
of Mediterranean civilisation. Italian racism, they continued,
differed from German racism which was based on the mistaken belief
that all Europeans were of a similar constitutional type. Careful to
point out other distinguishing characteristics of Italian racism, they
hastened to add that they sought to conserve the "uniqueness" of
Italian attributes rather than affirm the "superiority" of their race.
Mediterraneans, they argued, were physically and psychologically
different from all other European races. The professors also put on
the political agenda acceptance of their theories of the Jewish
contagion. While other migrant races who had settled in Italy over the
centuries had become fused Into the Italian stirp, they maintained,
Jews were the only race which had refused to assimilate. "Jews do not
belong to the Italian race", they believed. Achille Starace agreed
with their views and stated that "the spread of world semitism" made
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Jews an enemy of fascism. The ultimate logic of fascism, he affirmed,
was the preservation of the "biological purity, the morality, and the
genius of the Italian race".13
In 1938, the regime accelerated moves which made the dictatorship
Into what government spokesmen now called a "stato razzista". On 7
September 1938, the regime revoked the citizenship rights of recent
immigrants whose parents belonged to the "Jewish race". This enactment
marked a turning-point In Italian law as a definition of biological
race now became a legal category. That same month, the Ufficlo
Centrale Demografico was transformed into the Superior Council of Race
and Demography, a full branch of civil administration on a par with
the Health or Education Ministries. On the 5 of the month, the regime
also passed legislation which tendered ONMI's official resignation as
the demographic campaign's showpiece institution. 4
Approved by a new law on 22 May 1939, the royal decree law of
September 1938 tIghtened the grip the Interior Ministry had over ONMI
by abolishing much of its former autonomy as a parastate organisation.
Mussolini himself became the titular head of the institution. New
rulings also made representation by delegates from the Race and
Demography Council and the Fascist Association of Numerous Families
mandatory within the leadership of all three tiers of administration.
Much of ONMI's huge programme was dismantled and many of its duties
dispersed to various government departments. Supervision over the
development of assistance towards delinquent and deficient children
passed entirely to the Ministries of Education and Justice, and
provision for healthy children over six years of age disappeared as a
planning target. The main work left to the new ONMI pertained to the
care of needy infants, but even here the objectives were pared down to
more realistic proportions,' 5 Talk of welfare revolution lingered, but
the aims and language of population policy had changed.
Fascism never completed the 'civilising mission' outlined in the
Ascension Day Speech. In those last three years before Italy's entry
into the Second World War on the side of the Axis powers, the regime
embarked frantically on a downward spiral. The momentum of reform had
been irretrievably lost and all the old promises had worn thin. The
desperate search for someone to blame for the regime's own failures
continued apace as the Jew replaced the celibate as the nation's chief
Internal enemy. The formal Declaration of Race on 6 October 1938, the
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creation of a Race Tribunal on 13 July 1939, and legislation that year
to prevent the birth of "hybrids" and to halt the spread of Jewish
menace all revealed what the regime had been all along. Mussolini
presided over an unsteady and changeable dictatorship which abandoned
old causes and launched new battles for want of any clear plans for
the future of the nation. '
The National Organisation for the Protection of Motherhood and
Infancy barely survived the war but did outlive the regime. By 1945
allied bombings had destroyed 3,266 of the 9,959 InstItutions under
ONMI control in 1940. In March 1946, new ONMI leaders began to
reconstruct federations and recommence the work which fascism had
begun in the Interwar years. Recognising finally that the organi-
satiort's structure and programme were far too unwieldy, the Italian
parliament voted to abolish ONMI in December 1966. 17
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